Not classifiedPentAGI

KeyHunter Operation - LLM API key theft and academic fraud

Nov 4, 2026: SOCRadar STRU discovered KeyHunter operation by leepsmarts (Chinese-speaking, UTC+8), active since Jan 2026. Two parallel tracks: (1) LLM API key theft: 2,233 API keys harvested (Anthropic,…

What happened

Nov 4, 2026: SOCRadar STRU discovered KeyHunter operation by leepsmarts (Chinese-speaking, UTC+8), active since Jan 2026. Two parallel tracks: (1) LLM API key theft: 2,233 API keys harvested (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek), 12 marked valid (0.54% yield), targeting 247 exposed LLM gateways on PaaS platforms (Vercel, Netlify, Railway, Render, Replit, Streamlit, Fly.io, Cloudflare Pages). Tools scan .env files, GitHub repos, and cloud metadata. (2) Academic fraud: 195 Harvard alumni records from Nov 2025 ShinyHunters torrent, application payment links for Stanford/UChicago/Wake Forest/Case Western/Central Michigan, accounts at NYU/UC Berkeley/Oregon State/UIUC/Colorado State. (3) Financial fraud: Harmony ONE crypto drainer, stolen Stripe merchant keys for card validation, CVVs from Chinese underground market. Infrastructure: 6 servers + Malaysia OpenClaw host, tied by PentAGI CA certificate. AI agents manage operations: Hermes Agent node runs AI_radar cron (every 240min) monitoring X/Twitter, HuggingFace, GitHub, arXiv for new LLM releases/quotas via grok-4.6 + Tavily proxy. Four-phase pipeline: Phase 0 (AI monitoring), Phase 1 (FOFA/Shodan reconnaissance), Phase 2 (env_hunter scans 50+ paths, fadidevv/keyhunter + bigzooooz/KeyHunter GitHub scrapers), Phase 3 (validation), Phase 4 (unified dashboard). OPSEC failure: directory listing on 209.112.91.74 exposed 110 files/37 directories including Telegram bot tokens, operational logs, stolen credentials. CVE-2026-41940 (CVSS 9.8, CISA KEV) exploit staged against UTN Argentina, Arizona Christian University, University of Utah. Real victim seed phrases captured by Harmony ONE drainer.

leepsmarts harvests LLM API keys from misconfigured cloud infrastructure while using AI agents (Hermes, OpenClaw) to manage operations and conduct parallel academic fraud campaign

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Phase 0: AI-driven intelligence monitoring

    Hermes Agent runs AI_radar cron (240min intervals) using grok-4.6 to monitor X/Twitter, HuggingFace, GitHub, arXiv for new LLM releases, API quotas via Tavily proxy

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Phase 1: Reconnaissance

    mscanner-fofa.service + mscanner-shodan.service query FOFA/Shodan for exposed LLM endpoints on Vercel, Netlify, Railway, Render, Replit, Streamlit, Fly.io, Cloudflare Pages; 360 Quake, HFS scanning, Wayback Machine queries

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Phase 2: Credential extraction

    env_hunter v4.0 scans 50+ paths (.env, config.json, secrets.toml); fadidevv/keyhunter + bigzooooz/KeyHunter scrape GitHub; 2,233 API keys harvested

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Phase 3: Validation

    anthropic_check.py, openai_check.py, cloud_check.py, openrouter_check.py validate keys; 12 marked valid (0.54% yield)

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Phase 4: Monetization and fraud

    Stolen keys used for unauthorized inference; parallel academic fraud (20 universities), crypto drainer (Harmony ONE), credit card fraud via Stripe validation

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Exposed .env files on PaaS platforms, GitHub leaked credentials, cloud metadata endpoints (IMDS). Reported impact: Stolen keys used for unauthorized inference; parallel academic fraud (20 universities), crypto drainer (Harmony ONE), credit card fraud via Stripe validation; reported targets include Developers and organizations with exposed LLM API keys on PaaS platforms; 20 universities (19 US): Harvard alumni data, Stanford/UChicago/Wake Forest/Case Western/Central Michigan applications, NYU/UC Berkeley/Oregon State/UIUC/Colorado State/CSU accounts; cryptocurrency wallet users (Harmony ONE drainer); credit card fraud victims; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Secure .env files and cloud configurations; never expose API keys in GitHub repos or PaaS platforms; monitor cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254); rotate API keys regularly; implement API key usage monitoring; restrict .env access; use secret management solutions (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager); monitor FOFA/Shodan reconnaissance; detect HFS server scanning; alert on Wayback Machine queries for .env files; implement PaaS security best practices

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft
Offensive frameworks
PentAGI
Additional role
AI as operator
Initial access
Exposed .env files on PaaS platforms, GitHub leaked credentials, cloud metadata endpoints (IMDS)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Hermes Agent (github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent)
  • OpenClaw agent
  • grok-4.6 model (AI_radar monitoring)
  • PentAGI (github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi)
  • aipocket (github.com/leepsmarts/aipocket)

Other tooling

  • fadidevv/keyhunter (github.com/fadidevv/keyhunter, Rust, crates.io: github-keyhunter v0.1.0)
  • bigzooooz/KeyHunter (github.com/bigzooooz/KeyHunter)
  • env_hunter (v4.0, scans 50+ paths)
  • FOFA reconnaissance
  • Shodan API
  • 360 Quake searches
  • HFS server hunting
  • Wayback Machine (wayback_verify.py)
  • Tavily search proxy (tavily.astrdark.cyou)
  • Exa and Firecrawl APIs
  • anthropic_check.py
  • openai_check.py
  • cloud_check.py
  • openrouter_check.py
  • stripe_card_checker.py
  • Harmony ONE crypto drainer (modified fork)
  • CVE-2026-41940 exploit (4-stage, pre-staged SSH key)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Developers and organizations with exposed LLM API keys on PaaS platforms; 20 universities (19 US): Harvard alumni data, Stanford/UChicago/Wake Forest/Case Western/Central Michigan applications, NYU/UC Berkeley/Oregon State/UIUC/Colorado State/CSU accounts; cryptocurrency wallet users (Harmony ONE drainer); credit card fraud victims
Reported scale / exposure
2,233 API keys harvested, 12 valid (0.54% yield); 247 exposed LLM gateways catalogued, 223 usable; 195 Harvard alumni records; 20 universities targeted (19 US); active since Jan 15, 2026, last activity Oct 13, 2026; 110 files exposed (37 directories, 9GB); AI_radar: 20 runs Aug-Sep, $6.13/run, $37/day est.; URL survival rate 1.9%; 41 keys in 24h; env_hunter v4.0: +257% path expansion (14→50)
Target geography
United States · China · South Korea · Malaysia · Argentina

Reported attribution

leepsmarts (@leepsmartsx), Chinese-speaking, UTC+8, GitHub PRO account

Structured attribution

Actor
leepsmarts
Aliases
@leepsmartsx
Country
China
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
SOCRadar STRU
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • AWS IMDS Malicious UsageSIGMAView rule

    Detects malicious usage of AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) for credential theft; applies to KeyHunter's cloud metadata harvesting

  • Exposed .env file monitoringGUIDANCE

    Monitor for unauthorized access to .env files, config.json, secrets.toml on PaaS platforms; alert on .env.development, .env.prod, .env.staging, .env.backup access patterns

  • Cloud metadata endpoint abuse (IMDS)GUIDANCE

    Alert on access to 169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200 (Alibaba), metadata.google.internal; detect IMDS credential theft attempts

  • Kubernetes Pod Exec Cloud Instance Metadata AccessELASTICView rule

    Detects IMDS access from K8s pods; applicable to KeyHunter's cloud metadata harvesting tactics

  • AWS Bedrock AgentCore Runtime Prompt Targeting CredentialsELASTICView rule

    Detects prompts targeting credentials or metadata; relevant for AI-driven credential theft

  • GitHub credential harvestingGUIDANCE

    Monitor for keyhunter/KeyHunter tool signatures scanning GitHub repos for API keys; detect mass repository enumeration

  • API key validation trafficGUIDANCE

    Detect automated API key validation attempts against Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek endpoints; monitor for high-volume failed authentication from single sources

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-01-15
Last updated
2026-11-05

Updates

  • 2026-01-15 — SOCRadar STRU

    KeyHunter operation began; infrastructure timeline starts

  • 2026-07-10 — SOCRadar STRU

    Active key harvesting documented in operational summary; 2,233 keys total

  • 2026-08-16 — SOCRadar STRU

    195 Harvard alumni records processed from ShinyHunters torrent

  • 2026-09-09 — SOCRadar STRU

    Open directory discovered at 209.112.91.74, exposing operation

  • 2026-10-13 — SOCRadar STRU

    Last observed LEEP group activity

  • 2026-11-04 — SOCRadar STRU

    KeyHunter operation publicly disclosed by SOCRadar

Source defensive notes

Secure .env files and cloud configurations; never expose API keys in GitHub repos or PaaS platforms; monitor cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254); rotate API keys regularly; implement API key usage monitoring; restrict .env access; use secret management solutions (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager); monitor FOFA/Shodan reconnaissance; detect HFS server scanning; alert on Wayback Machine queries for .env files; implement PaaS security best practices

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

KeyHunter operation harvests LLM API credentials from exposed cloud infrastructure, GitHub repos, and PaaS platforms Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • senhai.store
  • pentagi.senhai.store
  • snap.senhai.store
  • astrdark.cyou
  • tavily.astrdark.cyou
  • xxtt.me
  • agent.xxtt.me
  • sajuai.xyz
  • web.712019.xyz
  • mail2.bfvdoor.com
  • new74.osxwrong.us.com
  • vvbin.me

ips

  • 209.112.91.74
  • 173.231.39.244
  • 123.60.2.245
  • 14.47.118.194
  • 66.42.94.67
  • 47.123.2.193

hashes

    urls

    • https://github.com/fadidevv/keyhunter
    • https://github.com/bigzooooz/KeyHunter
    • https://github.com/leepsmarts/aipocket
    • https://github.com/vxcontrol/pentagi
    • https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent

    Sources & research credit

    1 source

    Research by SOCRadar STRU · SOCRadar

    1. SOCRadar STRU: KeyHunter Operation - Harvard Alumni Data, Stanford Applications and LLM Key Theft socradar.io

    SOCRadar STRU analysis. Attribution via open directory at 209.112.91.74, Telegram bot tokens exposing @leepsmartsx, GitHub PRO account leepsmarts with forked repositories. Infrastructure: 209.112.91.74 (primary C2, US), 173.231.39.244 (Hermes Agent, US), 123.60.2.245 (PentAGI, Huawei Cloud CN), 14.47.118.194 (Open WebUI + Wazuh, Korea Telecom KR), 66.42.94.67 (Vultr relay), Malaysia Oracle Cloud (OpenClaw). Domains: senhai.store, astrdark.cyou, xxtt.me, sajuai.xyz, 712019.xyz, bfvdoor.com. Telegram bots: LEEP group messages through Oct 13, 2026. CVV source: 卷王二手CVV Chinese underground market (>60% live rate claim).

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    KeyHunter Operation - LLM API key theft and academic fraud
    Entry ID
    keyhunter-llm-key-theft-2026-11
    Catalog review
    November 5, 2026
    Category
    attacks-on-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    confirmed