Malicious MCP servers on npm (ifasn, gadgethumans)
Multiple malicious MCP servers published on npm. @ifasn/md-doc-mcp and @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp probe cloud metadata endpoints, read sensitive files (/etc/shadow, SSH keys, .env, Kubernetes tokens), and…
What happened
Multiple malicious MCP servers published on npm. @ifasn/md-doc-mcp and @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp probe cloud metadata endpoints, read sensitive files (/etc/shadow, SSH keys, .env, Kubernetes tokens), and exfiltrate to 121.199.24.94. @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp versions 2.0.9 and 2.1.1 (GHSA-556m-xfwj-7wff, MAL-2026-18603) use imdsAudit() function to steal Alibaba Cloud IMDS credentials from 100.100.100.200 and exfiltrate them over MCP stdout. gadgethumans-mcp versions 1.0.10-1.0.15 leak WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY environment variable in HTTP header on every tool call. Published with OpenSSF GHSA-rvw8-22w3-342v, GHSA-4h5p-w547-9qmv (Nov 2) and Leitwacht LWA-2026-13557, LWA-2026-13564. Aug 12, 2026: Pillar Security disclosed Deadbugz malicious MCP server (GitHub zellkernel) stealing AI model credentials and API keys. Feb 20, 2026: Socket discovered SANDWORM_MODE campaign spreading malicious MCP servers targeting developer credentials. November 9-12 additions: @rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp 1.0.0 (MAL-2026-19148, Amazon Inspector) ships an inert MCP stub in index.js. Its package.json pulls the only dependency, node-health-utils, as an off-registry tarball over plain HTTP from http://121.199.24.94/dl/health-utils-1.0.0.tgz, so whatever that host serves, including lifecycle scripts, runs at npm install. package.json sha256 f8ad55746cfac30b0a9401634b2728afc93e6dc20a85c511efd0ed312e466e8d. Package tarball sha1 f3ad664b487c4041e7e66e5744656ed44e1a6f6a. GitHub also marked @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server 1.0.3 and 1.0.6 (GHSA-qwfq-cw9x-55x4), mcp-contract-tester all versions (GHSA-34p7-qcxm-gc39, MAL-2026-19082), and @bestcoolman/dev-mcp (GHSA-vgx2-8w7x-xr8v, MAL-2026-19052) as malware, with no published behavior write-up. The entry now covers PyPI as well. my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr 0.1.3 (MAL-2026-19204, GHSA-wg5f-m5mv-gmjg, Amazon Inspector, Nov 12) exposes an MCP tool, analyze_image, described as driving-license OCR. It POSTs the caller's image URLs or base64 bytes over plain HTTP to the hardcoded http://42.193.222.35:8000/ocr_pic and overwrites any MY_API_URL setting so the destination cannot be changed. karma365-mcp 2.1.0 (GHSA-72xc-q3v8-7grp, Nov 13) and @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64 0.1.0 (GHSA-gfpg-48q7-c68h, Nov 12) are GitHub malware advisories with no published behavior. Attack exploits trust in the MCP ecosystem and in npm and PyPI.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Malicious MCP servers published to npm
Three packages published including @ifasn/md-doc-mcp, @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp, and gadgethumans-mcp 1.0.10-1.0.15
Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Source for step 1 - 02 · User installs malicious MCP server
Developer or organization adds malicious package to MCP configuration
Hunt: A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.
Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Server probes for sensitive information
ifasn packages probe cloud metadata endpoints and read /etc/shadow, SSH keys, .env, k8s tokens
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 3 - 04 · File-based credentials exfiltrated
ifasn packages send stolen credentials to 121.199.24.94
Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Source for step 4 - 05 · Wallet keys leaked in headers
gadgethumans-mcp sends WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY in HTTP header on every tool call
Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Source for step 5
Why it matters
Reported entry point: User installs malicious MCP server from npm. Reported impact: ifasn packages send stolen credentials to 121.199.24.94; gadgethumans-mcp sends WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY in HTTP header on every tool call; reported targets include AI agent developers, organizations using MCP servers; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Verify MCP server sources before installation; review MCP server permissions and network access; monitor cloud metadata endpoint access; detect unauthorized file reads of sensitive paths; inspect HTTP headers for credential leakage; use MCP server sandboxing; inventory installed MCP packages
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Malicious MCP servers published to npmDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft
Three packages published including @ifasn/md-doc-mcp, @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp, and gadgethumans-mcp 1.0.10-1.0.15
What to look for
A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Package-manager and CI job logs
- Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
- Runner process trees, secret access and egress
Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- package.install
- ci.workflow.change
- package.lifecycle.exec
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
02User installs malicious MCP serverPackage installation spawns a shell or downloaderNative logs · Draft
Developer or organization adds malicious package to MCP configuration
What to look for
A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.
Visibility: Endpoint process telemetry where collected
Required logs
- Process creation with ancestry and complete command lines
- Package-manager, CI, and installation logs
- Download, file creation, signature, and network telemetry
Coverage limit. Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.
Process candidates with package-manager ancestry that launch shells or downloaders. Tune known build tooling and correlate with network/file telemetry.
MCP reference matches: Curl Download Activity from npm Package Install (Elastic detection-rules), Suspicious PowerShell from npm Package Install (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Shell or Downloader Spawned by Package Installation
id: c83f22aa-d07c-4f3c-a67f-6d5512818133
status: experimental
description: Detects package-manager processes spawning common shells, interpreters, or downloaders.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_curl_download_from_npm_install.toml
falsepositives:
- Legitimate package build and installation scripts
level: medium
logsource:
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentCommandLine|contains:
- npm-cli.js
- npx-cli.js
- yarn
- pnpm
- pip install
- python -m pip
- gem install
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- /sh
- /bash
- /zsh
- /curl
- /wget
- /python
- /node
condition: all of selection_*
KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("npm-cli.js", "npx-cli.js", "yarn", "pnpm",
"pip install", "python -m pip", "gem install")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python", "node")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.parent_process IN ("*npm-cli.js*", "*npx-cli.js*", "*yarn*", "*pnpm*",
"*pip install*", "*python -m pip*", "*gem install*")
Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python", "node")
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTimeInvestigation steps
- Identify the package, version, publisher, lifecycle hook, resolved source, and parent process.
- Recover downloaded content and correlate credential access, persistence, or outbound traffic.
03Server probes for sensitive informationSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
ifasn packages probe cloud metadata endpoints and read /etc/shadow, SSH keys, .env, k8s tokens
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
04File-based credentials exfiltratedSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft
ifasn packages send stolen credentials to 121.199.24.94
What to look for
Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Sensitive resource access / DLP records
- Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
- Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- data.export
- agent.external.send
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
05Wallet keys leaked in headersSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft
gadgethumans-mcp sends WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY in HTTP header on every tool call
What to look for
Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Sensitive resource access / DLP records
- Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
- Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs
Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- data.export
- agent.external.send
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
- Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Initial access
- User installs malicious MCP server from npm
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- MCP servers
- npm packages (@ifasn/md-doc-mcp, @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp, @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp, gadgethumans-mcp, @rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp, @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server, mcp-contract-tester, @bestcoolman/dev-mcp, karma365-mcp, @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64)
- PyPI package my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr 0.1.3
Other tooling
- Cloud metadata probing (AWS, GCP, Azure)
- File system access (/etc/shadow, SSH keys, .env, k8s tokens)
- HTTP exfiltration
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- AI agent developers, organizations using MCP servers
- Reported scale / exposure
- Multiple malicious MCP packages identified (ifasn, gadgethumans, Deadbugz, SANDWORM_MODE); exact installation count unknown
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Multiple regions reflects global npm and MCP user base
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unknown npm and PyPI publishers (ifasn, gadgethumans, rfewqa-fes, lemili9804, bestcoolman, zellkernel, karma365, go-gost)
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- cybercrime
- Attributed by
- OpenSSF, Leitwacht, GitHub Advisory Database, Amazon Inspector, Pillar Security, Socket
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Curl Download Activity from npm Package InstallELASTICView rule
Endpoint, cross-platform. curl spawned from an npm or npx process tree. Fits packages whose install fetches an off-registry tarball. It does not see the PyPI OCR tool's runtime HTTP POST.
- Suspicious PowerShell from npm Package InstallELASTICView rule
Windows. PowerShell started from an npm install script. Use when the remote tarball or a GHSA-flagged MCP package runs a Windows lifecycle script.
- Plain-HTTP tarball and GHSA-only packagesGUIDANCE
Also block http://121.199.24.94/dl/health-utils-1.0.0.tgz and http://42.193.222.35:8000/ocr_pic. The OCR package exfiltrates at tool-call time, not at pip install, and no cited rule matches an MCP tool POSTing image bytes. karma365-mcp, @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64, @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server, mcp-contract-tester, and @bestcoolman/dev-mcp are confirmed malicious by GitHub but have no published behavior.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-02-20
- Last updated
- 2026-11-13
Updates
- 2026-02-20 — Socket
SANDWORM_MODE malicious MCP server campaign disclosed
- 2026-08-12 — Pillar Security
Deadbugz malicious MCP server (GitHub zellkernel) stealing AI credentials
- 2026-11-02 — OpenSSF, Leitwacht
@ifasn/md-doc-mcp, @ifasn/mmdd-doc-mcp, gadgethumans-mcp malicious packages disclosed
- 2026-11-04 — GitHub Advisory Database
@ifasn/ms-doc-mcp versions 2.0.9 and 2.1.1 disclosed stealing Alibaba Cloud IMDS credentials via imdsAudit() (GHSA-556m-xfwj-7wff)
- 2026-11-09 — GitHub Advisory Database
@bestcoolman/dev-mcp marked malware (GHSA-vgx2-8w7x-xr8v, MAL-2026-19052). No behavior write-up published.
- 2026-11-10 — GitHub Advisory Database
@lemili9804/mcp-weather-server 1.0.3 and 1.0.6 (GHSA-qwfq-cw9x-55x4) and mcp-contract-tester all versions (GHSA-34p7-qcxm-gc39, MAL-2026-19082) marked malware. No behavior write-up published.
- 2026-11-12 — Amazon Inspector
@rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp 1.0.0 (MAL-2026-19148) pulls node-health-utils over plain HTTP from 121.199.24.94. index.js is an inert MCP stub. my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr 0.1.3 (MAL-2026-19204) POSTs images to http://42.193.222.35:8000/ocr_pic. @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64 0.1.0 is marked malware with no behavior write-up.
- 2026-11-13 — GitHub Advisory Database
karma365-mcp 2.1.0 marked malware (GHSA-72xc-q3v8-7grp). No behavior write-up published.
Source defensive notes
Verify MCP server sources before installation; review MCP server permissions and network access; monitor cloud metadata endpoint access; detect unauthorized file reads of sensitive paths; inspect HTTP headers for credential leakage; use MCP server sandboxing; inventory installed MCP packages
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Attackers published malicious MCP servers through npm package ecosystem Source
Malicious MCP servers run persistently as agent tooling Source
Packages exfiltrate credentials from environment variables and sensitive files Source
MCP servers probe cloud metadata endpoints for credentials and instance information Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
121.199.24.9442.193.222.35
hashes
f8ad55746cfac30b0a9401634b2728afc93e6dc20a85c511efd0ed312e466e8df3ad664b487c4041e7e66e5744656ed44e1a6f6a
urls
https://github.com/zellkernel
Sources & research credit
14 sourcesResearch by OpenSSF, Leitwacht · OpenSSF, Leitwacht
- OpenSSF Malicious Packages repository github.com
- Deadbugz: Malicious MCP Server on npm www.pillar.io
- Socket: MCP Security and the SANDWORM_MODE campaign socket.dev
- @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp Malicious Package (MAL-2026-18603) github.com
- MAL-2026-19148: malicious code in @rfewqa-fes/mnm-doc-mcp osv.dev
- @lemili9804/mcp-weather-server malware advisory github.com
- mcp-contract-tester malware advisory (MAL-2026-19082) github.com
- @bestcoolman/dev-mcp malware advisory (MAL-2026-19052) github.com
- Roundup of November 2026 malicious npm MCP servers vibevulns.com
- MAL-2026-19204: malicious code in my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr osv.dev
- my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr malware advisory github.com
- my-mcp-server-driving-license-ocr 0.1.3 pypi.org
- karma365-mcp malware advisory github.com
- @go-gost/mcp-darwin-x64 malware advisory github.com
OpenSSF GHSA-rvw8-22w3-342v and GHSA-4h5p-w547-9qmv published Nov 2 2026; Leitwacht advisories LWA-2026-13557 and LWA-2026-13564; GitHub advisory GHSA-556m-xfwj-7wff (MAL-2026-18603) for @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp Relevant detection rules: - Monitor access to cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200 (Alibaba), metadata.google.internal, etc.) - Alert on unauthorized reads of /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, .env files - Detect access to Kubernetes service account tokens (/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/) - Monitor HTTP headers for sensitive environment variable leakage (WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.) - Alert on npm package installations from unverified sources - Note: Cloud metadata access typically detected via network monitoring or instance-level audit logs (CloudTrail, Azure Monitor, GCP Cloud Logging). File access requires host-based file integrity monitoring.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Malicious MCP servers on npm (ifasn, gadgethumans)
- Entry ID
- malicious-mcp-servers-npm-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 15, 2026
- AI-role confidence
- high
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed