Not classified

Multiple campaigns distributing malicious OpenClaw skills

Koi reported ClawHavoc skills distributed through fake repositories and a rogue registry to deliver infostealers and harvest developer credentials. Cyera later reported poisoned skills using fake…

What happened

Koi reported ClawHavoc skills distributed through fake repositories and a rogue registry to deliver infostealers and harvest developer credentials. Cyera later reported poisoned skills using fake prerequisite lures, OS-specific installation instructions, external paste relays, and inflated README droppers. Detection should verify skill provenance, inspect companion files rather than only SKILL.md, and monitor agent-initiated shell and network activity.

Multiple adversary campaigns distributing malicious OpenClaw skills via fake repos and skill registries to steal AI credentials and deliver malware

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Cyera: Poisoned Skills Target Developer Credentials

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Distribute malicious skills

    ClawHavoc: 23 skills on fake GitHub repos + openclaw-skills[.]com registry. Unit 42: 5 skills via typosquat repos + SEO-poisoned blogs. Skills named to appear legitimate (productivity-boost, code-optimizer, security-scanner, api-connector-pro, github-integration-plus)

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · User installs skill

    User finds malicious skill via search, fake registry, or social engineering; installs to ~/.openclaw/skills/ via OpenClaw CLI or UI; skill auto-loads on next OpenClaw startup

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Execute malware and harvest

    ClawHavoc: deploys AMOS (macOS) or Raccoon Stealer (Windows); harvests Anthropic keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS creds, crypto wallets, browser cookies. Unit 42: Node.js credential harvester + reverse shell; targets same credential types

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Exfiltrate and maintain access

    Credentials POST to attacker C2; reverse shells provide persistent access; 6,900+ affected installations across both campaigns (ClawHavoc 4,800, Unit 42 2,100)

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: User installs malicious OpenClaw skill from fake GitHub repo, typosquat, or rogue skill registry (openclaw-skills[.]com). Reported impact: Credentials POST to attacker C2; reverse shells provide persistent access; 6,900+ affected installations across both campaigns (ClawHavoc 4,800, Unit 42 2,100); reported targets include AI developers installing untrusted OpenClaw skills; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Only install OpenClaw skills from trusted sources; verify GitHub repo authenticity (org, stars, commit history); review skill manifest permissions before install; use allowlisted skill sources; monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected additions; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Raccoon; educate users on skill installation risks

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft
Additional role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
User installs malicious OpenClaw skill from fake GitHub repo, typosquat, or rogue skill registry (openclaw-skills[.]com)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • OpenClaw AI skill framework
  • Anthropic Claude API
  • OpenAI API

Other tooling

  • AMOS infostealer (macOS)
  • Raccoon Stealer (Windows)
  • Node.js credential harvesters
  • Reverse shells
  • openclaw-skills[.]com rogue registry

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
AI developers installing untrusted OpenClaw skills
Reported scale / exposure
Multiple malicious skills and associated payload infrastructure reported during 2026
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

ClawHavoc campaign and related poisoned-skill activity; actor unknown

Structured attribution

Actor
ClawHavoc
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Koi Security
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Linux Base64 Encoded Pipe to ShellSIGMAView rule

    Detects base64 -D | bash patterns; directly applicable to Cyera-documented AMOS macOS delivery via base64-decoded pipes

  • Keychain Password Retrieval via Command LineELASTICView rule

    Detects macOS keychain credential access; relevant for AMOS infostealer credential theft on macOS

  • Linux Shell Pipe to ShellSIGMAView rule

    Detects suspicious shell pipes; applicable to AMOS delivery mechanisms using curl | bash patterns

  • OpenClaw skill supply-chain monitoringGUIDANCE

    Monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected installations; alert on skills from unknown publishers (hightower6eu, Demerzels-lab, LJT-520, dexiaong, Ddoy233); detect fake openclaw-agent prerequisite lures; scan SKILL.md for inflated README droppers (22 MB+); flag Skills Directory A/B grades on skills with external paste relay references (glot.io, rentry.co); monitor outbound connections to AMOS C2 91.92.242.30 and secondary IPs; detect base64 -D | bash with decoy echo swcdn.apple.com; block domains socifiapp.com, custom-registry.com, openclawskills.net, laosji.net; audit skills with OS-split instructions for macOS (bash delivery) vs Windows (ZIP/EXE)

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-02-01
Last updated
2026-11-06

Updates

  • 2026-02-01 — Koi Security

    ClawHavoc campaign discovered delivering AMOS via 23 malicious skills

  • 2026-06-23 — Unit 42

    Five malicious skills with Node.js credential harvesters and reverse shells identified

  • 2026-11-03 — Cyera Research

    Analysis of 1M+ skills reveals 516 AMOS-linked samples, 70 confirmed-malicious active in Sep 2026; all received A/B Skills Directory grades despite malicious payloads; primary C2 91.92.242.30 in 83.7% of references; fake openclaw-agent lures, OS-split delivery (base64 bash on macOS, ZIP/EXE on Windows), paste relay infrastructure

Source defensive notes

Only install OpenClaw skills from trusted sources; verify GitHub repo authenticity (org, stars, commit history); review skill manifest permissions before install; use allowlisted skill sources; monitor ~/.openclaw/skills/ for unexpected additions; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Raccoon; educate users on skill installation risks

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0000Search Open Technical Databases

Multiple campaigns delivering malicious AI skill framework extensions to steal credentials and deploy malware on AI developer machines Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • openclaw-skills.com
  • socifiapp.com
  • custom-registry.com
  • openclawskills.net
  • install.app-distribution.net
  • openclawcli.vercel.app
  • download.setup-service.com
  • laosji.net
  • letssendit.fun
  • monster-secure.site
  • vorderingenonline.com

ips

  • 91.92.242.30
  • 5.42.65.10
  • 45.137.65.112
  • 185.234.72.19
  • 2.26.75.16

hashes

    urls

    • https://glot.io/snippets/hfdxv8uyaf
    • https://glot.io/snippets/hfd3x9ueu5
    • https://rentry.co/openclaw-code

    Sources & research credit

    2 sources

    Research by Koi Security, Cyera Research · Koi Security, Cyera

    1. Koi: ClawHavoc Campaign Delivers AMOS via Malicious OpenClaw Skills koi.security
    2. Cyera: Poisoned Skills Target Developer Credentials www.cyera.com

    Koi Security ClawHavoc analysis and Cyera poisoned-skill research. Detection should monitor skill installation, unknown source repositories, unexpected network egress, and credential-file access.

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    Multiple campaigns distributing malicious OpenClaw skills
    Entry ID
    malicious-openclaw-skills-2026
    Catalog review
    November 4, 2026
    Category
    attacks-on-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    confirmed