Not classifiedARTEX

Microsoft Threat Intelligence - ARTEX agents mining GitHub secrets into Entra & Azure Key Vault

Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 5, 2026) reports unattributed cloud-credential harvesting campaign using ARTEX autonomous agent framework. Attackers conduct mass GitHub secret searches querying…

What happened

Microsoft Threat Intelligence (Nov 5, 2026) reports unattributed cloud-credential harvesting campaign using ARTEX autonomous agent framework. Attackers conduct mass GitHub secret searches querying organization names, cloud keywords (Azure, AWS, Entra, Key Vault), and AI provider keys. ARTEX agents authenticate as compromised Azure Entra service principals, then autonomously enumerate and exfiltrate Azure Key Vault secrets, storage account keys, App Service configuration settings, AKS cluster credentials, SharePoint/OneDrive files, Microsoft Graph queries, Azure AI Studio keys, and Azure Foundry credentials within approximately 5 minutes per compromised tenant. Agents feature adaptive retry logic that automatically corrects Azure Resource Manager API version errors on failed calls, demonstrating autonomous error recovery. Campaign operates from IPs 199.19.77.84, Tor exit 199.19.77.18, 65.87.223.26, and 157.22.126.128. Microsoft notes median dwell time of 8 minutes from initial service principal authentication to complete key-vault enumeration, indicating highly automated credential-harvesting workflow targeting cloud and AI infrastructure. VulnCheck (Patrick Garrity, Nov 8, 2026) reports 199.19.77.84 hit VulnCheck canaries Nov 7 exploiting CVE-2025-3248 (Langflow /api/v1/validate/code endpoint). Agent staged Python using @exec decorator, _lf_probe() wrapper function, and |RAISE| exception-based exfiltration channel; dumped env/.env files and langflow.db; checked Docker socket and cloud metadata endpoint 169.254.169.254; grepped for sk-, AIza, AKIA key patterns; read mem0 configuration; decrypted Langflow Fernet-encrypted variables. Linked to Microsoft campaign via shared IP 199.19.77.84; vendor-asserted AI involvement (VulnCheck notes network traffic alone cannot definitively prove agent autonomy).

Threat actors use ARTEX autonomous agent framework to mass-query GitHub for exposed credentials, authenticate as Azure Entra service principals, and autonomously enumerate and exfiltrate Azure Key Vault secrets, storage keys, App Service settings, AKS credentials, SharePoint/OneDrive data, and Azure AI/Foundry keys within minutes

Read the original sourceAdditional source: VulnCheck: Microsoft Secret Hunter

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 02 · Harvest Azure service principal credentials

    Harvest Azure service principal credentials

    Source for step 2
  2. 03 · Authenticate as Entra service principal

    Authenticate as Entra service principal

    Source for step 3
  3. 04 · Enumerate Azure Key Vault secrets

    Enumerate Azure Key Vault secrets

    Source for step 4
  4. 05 · Exfiltrate storage account keys

    Exfiltrate storage account keys

    Source for step 5
  5. 06 · Steal AKS cluster credentials

    Steal AKS cluster credentials

    Source for step 6
  6. 07 · Harvest Azure AI/Foundry keys

    Harvest Azure AI/Foundry keys

    Source for step 7

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Exposed credentials in public GitHub repositories; compromised Azure Entra service principal credentials. Reported impact: Harvest Azure AI/Foundry keys; reported targets include Organizations with exposed Azure service principal credentials on GitHub; targets include AI/ML development teams, cloud infrastructure operators, and enterprises using Azure AI Studio / Foundry; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Scan public repositories for accidentally committed Azure credentials; implement Azure AD Conditional Access policies requiring managed device or IP restrictions for service principals; enable Azure Key Vault firewall and private endpoints; activate Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps for anomalous Graph API usage; rotate service principal secrets regularly; use managed identities instead of service principal passwords where possible; monitor for rapid sequential ARM API calls and Key Vault enumeration patterns; implement Azure Sentinel detections for service principal authentication from Tor exits or VPN/proxy infrastructure

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Offensive frameworks
ARTEX
Additional role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Exposed credentials in public GitHub repositories; compromised Azure Entra service principal credentials

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • ARTEX autonomous agent framework (https://github.com/RuoJi6/ARTEX)Community-maintained fork; the original repository is unavailable.
  • LLM-driven Azure API enumeration with adaptive retry
  • Langflow (https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow) - targeted for credential theft via CVE-2025-3248

Other tooling

  • GitHub API for secret search
  • Azure Resource Manager API
  • Microsoft Graph API
  • Tor network for anonymization

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Organizations with exposed Azure service principal credentials on GitHub; targets include AI/ML development teams, cloud infrastructure operators, and enterprises using Azure AI Studio / Foundry
Reported scale / exposure
Active Nov 2026; median 8-minute dwell time from service principal authentication to complete Key Vault enumeration; ~5 minutes per tenant for full credential exfiltration; campaign IPs observed across multiple tenants
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Unattributed activity cluster; Microsoft Threat Intelligence notes related infrastructure observed by Todyl; cloud and AI credential harvesting for follow-on cybercrime operations

Structured attribution

Actor
Unknown (ARTEX cloud-secrets cluster)
Country
Unknown
Motivation
cybercrime
Attributed by
Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Package Runtime Secret File Access Followed by IMDS RequestELASTICView rule

    Detects IMDS 169.254.169.254 access and Docker socket enumeration patterns

  • Azure Key Vault and credential enumerationGUIDANCE

    Monitor Azure Resource Manager API calls from compromised service principals; detect Key Vault secret enumeration; alert on storage account key access; monitor AKS credential retrieval; detect Azure AI Studio and Foundry key access

  • Langflow CVE-2025-3248 exploitationGUIDANCE

    Monitor /api/v1/validate/code endpoint POST requests; detect @exec decorator usage; alert on _lf_probe() wrapper functions; detect |RAISE| exception-based exfiltration; monitor Fernet decryption attempts

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-11-01
Last updated
2026-11-08

Updates

  • 2026-11-05 — Microsoft Threat Intelligence

    Microsoft reports ARTEX-based campaign harvesting GitHub-exposed Azure credentials and autonomously enumerating Key Vault, storage, AKS, AI/Foundry secrets within ~5 minutes per tenant; campaign IPs 199.19.77.84, 199.19.77.18, 65.87.223.26, 157.22.126.128

  • 2026-11-08 — VulnCheck

    VulnCheck reports 199.19.77.84 exploited CVE-2025-3248 (Langflow /api/v1/validate/code) against canaries Nov 7; agent staged Python with @exec, _lf_probe() wrapper, |RAISE| exfil channel; dumped env/.env, langflow.db; checked Docker socket and 169.254.169.254; grepped sk-, AIza, AKIA patterns; decrypted Fernet variables; linked to Microsoft campaign via shared IP

Source defensive notes

Scan public repositories for accidentally committed Azure credentials; implement Azure AD Conditional Access policies requiring managed device or IP restrictions for service principals; enable Azure Key Vault firewall and private endpoints; activate Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps for anomalous Graph API usage; rotate service principal secrets regularly; use managed identities instead of service principal passwords where possible; monitor for rapid sequential ARM API calls and Key Vault enumeration patterns; implement Azure Sentinel detections for service principal authentication from Tor exits or VPN/proxy infrastructure

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0000Search Open Technical Databases

Adversaries deploy ARTEX autonomous AI agent to automatically discover exposed cloud credentials, authenticate to Azure, and systematically exfiltrate Key Vault secrets and Azure AI service keys Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

Agent autonomously exploits CVE-2025-3248 in Langflow to steal API keys and credentials Source

AML.T0083Credentials from AI Agent Configuration

Agent targets AI platform credentials including Langflow Fernet-encrypted variables and mem0 configuration Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

    • 199.19.77.84
    • 199.19.77.18
    • 65.87.223.26
    • 157.22.126.128

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        2 sources

        Research by Microsoft Threat Intelligence · Microsoft

        1. Threat actors use agentic AI tooling to find and abuse exposed secrets www.microsoft.com
        2. VulnCheck: Microsoft Secret Hunter www.vulncheck.io

        Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog (Nov 5, 2026) primary source; Todyl-observed related infrastructure noted; all IOCs (199.19.77.84, 199.19.77.18, 65.87.223.26, 157.22.126.128) verified from Microsoft post

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Microsoft Threat Intelligence - ARTEX agents mining GitHub secrets into Entra & Azure Key Vault
        Entry ID
        microsoft-artex-github-secrets-keyvault-2026-11
        Catalog review
        November 6, 2026
        Category
        adversary-use-of-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed