Detection queries Research demonstrationAgents & MCP

Morris II generative AI email worm (research PoC)

In controlled tests, self-replicating prompts spread between GenAI email assistants, demonstrating potential propagation and data-theft risks.

What happened

Adversarial self-replicating prompts make GenAI email assistants propagate malicious instructions to other agents (zero-click in lab), with potential spam/exfil side effects. Tested against GPT-4, Gemini Pro, LLaVA in controlled setups.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: wired.com

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsResearch / qualified account
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Controlled research PoC against GenAI-powered email assistants; not observed in the wild.

  1. 01 · Research payload enters an email assistant

    The controlled experiment places adversarial content in assistant-readable email.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Self-replicating instructions are processed

    The model follows a prompt designed to reproduce itself.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Assistant propagates the payload

    Generated email carries the adversarial instructions to another assistant.

    Hunt: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.

    Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Lab demonstrates propagation

    Potential spam and data-exfiltration effects are research outcomes, not confirmed real-world victims.

    Hunt: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.

    Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported impact: Potential spam and data-exfiltration effects are research outcomes, not confirmed real-world victims.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

AI email assistants

The controlled PoC propagates instructions between GenAI email assistants.

Conditions to check
  • The assistant must ingest attacker-controlled email content and have the demonstrated forwarding / retrieval capabilities.
  • This is a controlled research proof of concept, not an observed in-the-wild worm campaign.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Treat retrieved email content as untrusted and constrain autonomous forwarding and data access.

Treat retrieved email/content as untrusted; isolation between agent mailboxes

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Research payload enters an email assistantUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

The controlled experiment places adversarial content in assistant-readable email.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
02Self-replicating instructions are processedUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

The model follows a prompt designed to reproduce itself.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
03Assistant propagates the payloadCoordinated messaging / propagationCustom schema · Draft

Generated email carries the adversarial instructions to another assistant.

What to look for

Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.

Visibility: Platform / application records

Required logs

  • Platform account and posting audit
  • Agent session and message-provenance records
  • Rate, recipient and content-similarity features

Coverage limit. Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Coordinated messaging / propagation
id: c4001568-b68b-4887-a86f-6f05807640f6
status: experimental
description: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting,
  forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - social.post
      - message.forward
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("social.post", "message.forward")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("social.post", "message.forward")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.
  2. Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse.
04Lab demonstrates propagationCoordinated messaging / propagationCustom schema · Draft

Potential spam and data-exfiltration effects are research outcomes, not confirmed real-world victims.

What to look for

Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting, forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.

Use controlled-lab message and session records to investigate propagation; the research does not establish real-world victims.

Visibility: Platform / application records

Required logs

  • Platform account and posting audit
  • Agent session and message-provenance records
  • Rate, recipient and content-similarity features

Coverage limit. Requires platform-side visibility. Similar content and synchronized activity can have legitimate explanations.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Coordinated messaging / propagation
id: c4001568-b68b-4887-a86f-6f05807640f6
status: experimental
description: Related accounts or assistants repeat correlated posting,
  forwarding or tool actions beyond the expected user workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - social.post
      - message.forward
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("social.post", "message.forward")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("social.post", "message.forward")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Group actions by linked account, session, recipient and time rather than judging writing style.
  2. Compare propagation with legitimate campaigns and preserve whether the source describes a lab demonstration or observed abuse.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Morris II generative AI email worm (research PoC). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Treat retrieved email/content as untrusted; isolation between agent mailboxes

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0051.001Indirect

Email content injects instructions into assistants in a controlled experiment. Source

AML.T0061LLM Prompt Self-Replication

The prompt is designed to replicate into assistant output. Source

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by Cohen, Bitton, Nassi et al. · Academic / Cornell Tech et al.

  1. arxiv.org
  2. wired.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
Morris II generative AI email worm (research PoC)
Entry ID
morris-ii-ai-worm-poc-2024-03
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
unverified