Detection queries Provider reportProvider-side

OpenAI disruption: ScopeCreep cyber operation

OpenAI disrupted an operation that used ChatGPT to support intrusion and malware work. The AI was added to existing workflows rather than running attacks end to end.

What happened

OpenAI June 2025 threat report case study 'ScopeCreep' details a cyber operation disrupted for malicious use of ChatGPT in support of intrusion/malware workflows (AI built into existing attacker workflows rather than novel end-to-end autonomy).

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · ScopeCreep accounts seek assistance

    Operators use ChatGPT in an existing cyber operation.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Model supports intrusion and malware work

    The supplied entry establishes assistance without a detailed exploit chain.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Tactical sequence is not disclosed

    Specific commands, initial access and victims are not described in the seed record.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · OpenAI disrupts malicious use

    The reporting concerns disruption of the operation’s use of the service.

    Hunt: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

    Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported impact: The reporting concerns disruption of the operation’s use of the service; using the named AI products does not by itself establish exposure.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Provider-side abuse detection; defender focus remains on resulting malware TTPs

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

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Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01ScopeCreep accounts seek assistanceProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

Operators use ChatGPT in an existing cyber operation.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
02Model supports intrusion and malware workProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

The supplied entry establishes assistance without a detailed exploit chain.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
04OpenAI disrupts malicious useProvider-side abuse investigationCustom schema · Draft

The reporting concerns disruption of the operation’s use of the service.

What to look for

A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts, repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator sessions.

Visibility: Provider / operator records

Required logs

  • Provider-owned account / request audit
  • Abuse-review findings and linked-account context
  • Lawfully available exposed operator-session evidence

Coverage limit. Attacker-side planning is generally absent from victim SIEM logs. These templates require provider-owned audit data and do not identify AI use from a victim process alone.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Provider-side abuse investigation
id: c8c1edc0-c79a-4644-a876-2c1a6cb9a438
status: experimental
description: A model-provider investigation correlates related accounts,
  repeated offensive requests and shared infrastructure or exposed operator
  sessions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - model.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("model.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("model.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Correlate accounts, request rates, infrastructure and source-described behavior in provider-owned records.
  2. For victim-side defense, pivot to the reported execution or access stage rather than trying to detect attacker-side prompts.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Targets and reported impact

Reported scale / exposure
Part of OpenAI's broader 40+ network disruptions since Feb 2024 reporting began

Reported attribution

ScopeCreep (OpenAI designation)

Structured attribution

Actor
ScopeCreep (OpenAI designation)

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in OpenAI disruption: ScopeCreep cyber operation. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Provider-side abuse detection; defender focus remains on resulting malware TTPs

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

The supplied source explicitly describes generative-model tooling assisting the reported activity; this mapping does not establish additional autonomy or victim impact. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by OpenAI Threat Intelligence · OpenAI

  1. cdn.openai.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
OpenAI disruption: ScopeCreep cyber operation
Entry ID
openai-scopecreep-cyber-2025-06
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed