Detection queries Reported campaignDeveloper workflows

PhantomRaven npm campaign using slopsquatted package names

Malicious npm packages with AI-hallucination-style names hid dependencies from scanners and stole npm, Git and CI tokens.

What happened

A flood of malicious npm packages used remote dynamic HTTP dependencies invisible to many scanners and included AI-hallucination-friendly names such as unused-imports. The packages delivered credential stealers targeting npm, Git, and CI tokens.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Sonatype: PhantomRaven npm Malware CampaignAdditional source: BleepingComputer: PhantomRaven Attack Floods npm

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Hallucinated names create an exposure path

    AI package recommendations can direct developers to attacker-owned names; not every install is established as AI-driven.

    Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

    Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Developer installs a malicious package

    The campaign includes names friendly to AI hallucination-based recommendations.

    Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

    Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Remote dependencies load code

    Dynamic HTTP dependencies conceal additional behavior from some scanners.

    Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

    Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Developer credentials are stolen

    The delivered stealer targets npm, Git and CI tokens.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: npm install of malicious/slopsquat packages. Reported impact: The delivered stealer targets npm, Git and CI tokens.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

npm / PyPI dependencies

The reported campaign uses malicious npm packages and AI-hallucination-style package names.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm installation of an affected package; receiving an AI code suggestion alone does not establish compromise.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Verify dependency provenance and inspect hidden dependencies and token access before approving packages.

Block remote HTTP deps; lockfiles; SCA; never trust AI-suggested package names blindly

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Hallucinated names create an exposure pathDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft

AI package recommendations can direct developers to attacker-owned names; not every install is established as AI-driven.

What to look for

A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

Join the recommendation, resolved package identity and actual install. Do not infer that every installation followed an AI recommendation.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Package-manager and CI job logs
  • Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
  • Runner process trees, secret access and egress

Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - package.install
      - ci.workflow.change
      - package.lifecycle.exec
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
  2. Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
02Developer installs a malicious packageDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft

The campaign includes names friendly to AI hallucination-based recommendations.

What to look for

A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Package-manager and CI job logs
  • Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
  • Runner process trees, secret access and egress

Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - package.install
      - ci.workflow.change
      - package.lifecycle.exec
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
  2. Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
03Remote dependencies load codeDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft

Dynamic HTTP dependencies conceal additional behavior from some scanners.

What to look for

A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Package-manager and CI job logs
  • Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
  • Runner process trees, secret access and egress

Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - package.install
      - ci.workflow.change
      - package.lifecycle.exec
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
  2. Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
04Developer credentials are stolenSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

The delivered stealer targets npm, Git and CI tokens.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
npm install of malicious/slopsquat packages

Tooling as reported

Other tooling

  • Remote dynamic dependencies
  • info-stealers

Targets and reported impact

Reported scale / exposure
126 packages cited in related reporting

Reported attribution

PhantomRaven; operator unknown

Structured attribution

Actor
JPD
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
CrowdStrike
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in PhantomRaven npm campaign with slopsquatting names. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Activity timeline

First seen
2025-10-01
Last updated
2026-11-05

Updates

  • 2025-10-01 — Koi Security, Sonatype, BleepingComputer

    PhantomRaven campaign disclosed; 126 malicious npm packages with slopsquatting names and remote dependencies

  • 2026-09-15 — CrowdStrike

    Stealer code confirmed LLM-generated; operator identified as JPD

Source defensive notes

Block remote HTTP deps; lockfiles; SCA; never trust AI-suggested package names blindly

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0060Publish Hallucinated Entities

The campaign includes names compatible with hallucinated package recommendations; AI-driven installation is not established for every package. Source

Sources & research credit

3 sources

Research by Koi Security / Sonatype / BleepingComputer · Koi Security

  1. Koi Security: PhantomRaven npm Malware Hidden in Invisible Dependencies www.koi.ai
  2. Sonatype: PhantomRaven npm Malware Campaign www.sonatype.com
  3. BleepingComputer: PhantomRaven Attack Floods npm www.bleepingcomputer.com

CrowdStrike identified LLM-generated stealer patterns: characteristic variable naming, comments explaining basic operations, structured code organization typical of AI-generated malware

Record & downloads
Source record name
PhantomRaven npm campaign with slopsquatting names
Entry ID
phantomraven-npm-slopsquatting-2025-10
Catalog review
November 5, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed