Radware hidden prompt injection targeting GitHub maintainer bots
Radware researchers Zvika Babo and Gabi Nakibly (Nov 5, 2026) document hidden prompt injection techniques targeting GitHub maintainer bots processing issues and pull requests. Attackers hide instructions in…
What happened
Radware researchers Zvika Babo and Gabi Nakibly (Nov 5, 2026) document hidden prompt injection techniques targeting GitHub maintainer bots processing issues and pull requests. Attackers hide instructions in HTML comments, invisible Unicode characters, and CSS display tricks. Examples documented: (1) google-gemini/gemini-cli#28575 - deduplication agent told to use run_shell_command to write base64-encoded GITHUB_TOKEN into GITHUB_ENV; (2) openai/codex#16733 - labeler told to curl webhook.site and dump environment variables; (3) microsoft/agent-framework#7177 - fake triage gate with allow_triage=true, gate_result=pass markers; (4) blondesean/Kings_Herald#21 - hidden backdoor instruction in feature request. Attackers study bot tool names and output field formats to forge steering markers. Hidden instructions can bypass human review while manipulating bot behavior. Radware provides examples repository at github.com/rdwr-gabin/github-ipi-in-the-wild. No specific threat actor attribution; confirmed technique active in wild.
GitHub triage, review, and CI bots manipulated via hidden HTML comments, invisible Unicode, and CSS tricks in issues/PRs to execute unauthorized actions
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Study bot tools and output formats
Attacker analyzes target repository bot behavior, tool names, and expected output field formats
Source for step 1 - 02 · Craft hidden prompt injection
Embed instructions in HTML comments, invisible Unicode, or CSS-hidden elements
Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.
Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Submit malicious issue or PR
Attacker creates GitHub issue or PR containing hidden instructions
Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Bot processes issue/PR
Triage, review, or CI bot reads issue/PR including hidden injection
Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
Source for step 4 - 05 · Bot executes injected instructions
Bot writes GITHUB_TOKEN to env, curls webhook, or accepts fake triage gate
Source for step 5
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Malicious GitHub issues or pull requests with hidden prompt injection. Reported impact: Bot writes GITHUB_TOKEN to env, curls webhook, or accepts fake triage gate; reported targets include GitHub repositories using AI-powered triage, review, and CI bots; examples include Google Gemini, OpenAI, Microsoft repositories; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Strip HTML comments before bot processing; sanitize invisible Unicode from issues/PRs; validate bot tool output fields against expected schema; implement bot action approval gates; monitor for suspicious run_shell_command, curl webhook, environment variable access; restrict bot permissions to minimum required; log all bot actions for audit; educate maintainers on prompt injection risks; implement bot behavioral analysis
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
02Craft hidden prompt injectionUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft
Embed instructions in HTML comments, invisible Unicode, or CSS-hidden elements
What to look for
An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.
Visibility: Application / agent audit records
Required logs
- Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
- Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
- Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions
Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.
Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.input.ingest
- agent.session.resume
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
- Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
03Submit malicious issue or PRPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft
Attacker creates GitHub issue or PR containing hidden instructions
What to look for
A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
- Repository and token permission inventory
- Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- repository.public.write
- repository.visibility.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
04Bot processes issue/PRUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft
Triage, review, or CI bot reads issue/PR including hidden injection
What to look for
Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
- Tool-definition and approval changes
- Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.tool.call
- agent.tool.definition.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Initial access
- Malicious GitHub issues or pull requests with hidden prompt injection
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- GitHub triage bots
- GitHub review bots
- GitHub CI/CD automation bots
- Repository automation agents
Other tooling
- HTML comments
- Invisible Unicode characters
- CSS display manipulation
- webhook.site exfiltration
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- GitHub repositories using AI-powered triage, review, and CI bots; examples include Google Gemini, OpenAI, Microsoft repositories
- Reported scale / exposure
- Multiple confirmed examples across major repositories (Google, OpenAI, Microsoft); active Nov 2026
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Unattributed technique; confirmed active in wild with documented examples
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unattributed technique
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- unknown
- Attributed by
- Radware
- Attribution confidence
- low
Detection rules
- Execution via GitHub Actions RunnerELASTICView rule
Detects malicious code execution via GitHub Actions bot manipulation
- Tampering with RUNNER_TRACKING_ID in GitHub Actions RunnersELASTICView rule
Detects GITHUB_ENV and GITHUB_TOKEN manipulation via bot prompt injection
- GitHub bot security controlsGUIDANCE
Strip HTML comments before bot processing; sanitize invisible Unicode (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF); detect CSS display:none in issues/PRs; monitor run_shell_command usage; alert on curl webhook.site from bots; restrict GITHUB_TOKEN write access
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-10-01
- Last updated
- 2026-11-05
Updates
- 2026-11-05 — Radware
Zvika Babo and Gabi Nakibly publish analysis of hidden prompt injection targeting GitHub maintainer bots; examples repository documents real-world cases from Google, OpenAI, Microsoft repositories
Source defensive notes
Strip HTML comments before bot processing; sanitize invisible Unicode from issues/PRs; validate bot tool output fields against expected schema; implement bot action approval gates; monitor for suspicious run_shell_command, curl webhook, environment variable access; restrict bot permissions to minimum required; log all bot actions for audit; educate maintainers on prompt injection risks; implement bot behavioral analysis
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Hidden HTML comments, invisible Unicode, and CSS tricks inject instructions into GitHub bot processing Source
Bots manipulated to execute run_shell_command, curl webhooks, write GITHUB_TOKEN to environment Source
Attackers study bot tool names/output fields to forge valid steering markers (allow_triage, gate_result) Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
webhook.site
ips
hashes
urls
https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/issues/28575https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16733https://github.com/microsoft/agent-framework/issues/7177https://github.com/blondesean/Kings_Herald/issues/21https://github.com/rdwr-gabin/github-ipi-in-the-wild
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Zvika Babo, Gabi Nakibly · Radware
- Radware: Prompt Injecting Coding Agents www.radware.com
- Radware: GitHub IPI in the Wild - Examples Repository github.com
Radware blog (Nov 5, 2026) primary source; examples repository github.com/rdwr-gabin/github-ipi-in-the-wild provides proof-of-concept demonstrations; links to hackerbot-claw-github-actions-2026-03 and forever-agents-md-hijack catalog entries for related GitHub AI agent attacks
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Radware hidden prompt injection targeting GitHub maintainer bots
- Entry ID
- radware-github-prompt-injection-bots-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 10, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed