Detection queries Not classified

Sapphire Sleet (DPRK) backdoors 140+ Mastra AI framework npm packages

Jun 17, 2026: Microsoft attributes to DPRK Sapphire Sleet (aka BlueNoroff, APT38, Stardust Chollima): compromised Mastra AI framework maintainer account and published 140+ backdoored npm packages between…

What happened

Jun 17, 2026: Microsoft attributes to DPRK Sapphire Sleet (aka BlueNoroff, APT38, Stardust Chollima): compromised Mastra AI framework maintainer account and published 140+ backdoored npm packages between May 29-Jun 15, 2026. Mastra is TypeScript AI agent framework (github.com/mastra-ai/mastra). Malicious postinstall scripts deployed obfuscated Node.js payload targeting: OpenAI keys, Anthropic keys, Azure OpenAI endpoints, AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, npm tokens, SSH keys, Docker configs, Kubernetes service accounts. Payload POSTed to DPRK C2 hxxps://mastra-telemetry[.]com (posing as legitimate telemetry endpoint). npm removed packages Jun 16-17; Microsoft estimates 8,000-12,000 downloads across compromised versions. Sapphire Sleet previously linked to crypto exchange attacks, IT worker schemes, and supply chain operations. Detection: monitor npm installs of Mastra@* between May 29-Jun 15 2026; check for mastra-telemetry[.]com egress; review postinstall scripts for obfuscation/eval; scan for credential file access from npm scripts.

DPRK Sapphire Sleet backdoored 140+ Mastra AI framework npm packages via malicious postinstall scripts to steal credentials from AI developers

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Mastra - AI Framework for TypeScript

How it happened

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Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Compromise Mastra maintainer

    Sapphire Sleet (DPRK) compromised Mastra maintainer's npm account via targeted phishing or credential theft; gained publish access to @mastra scope

    Hunt: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

    Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Publish 140+ backdoored packages

    Published 140+ malicious @mastra packages between May 29-Jun 15 with obfuscated postinstall scripts; maintained functional AI framework features to avoid immediate detection

    Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

    Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Harvest AI and cloud credentials

    Postinstall script executes obfuscated Node.js: scans env vars (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, AZURE_OPENAI_*), filesystem (~/.config, ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.docker, ~/.kube), npm config; base64-encodes findings

    Hunt: A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.

    Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Exfiltrate to DPRK C2

    POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://mastra-telemetry[.]com (DPRK infrastructure masquerading as telemetry); credentials support DPRK intelligence collection and revenue generation (AI service resale, crypto exchange targeting); 8,000-12,000 affected installs

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: npm install of backdoored @mastra/* packages (140+ packages, versions published May 29-Jun 15 2026) via compromised maintainer account. Reported impact: POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://mastra-telemetry[.]com (DPRK infrastructure masquerading as telemetry); credentials support DPRK intelligence collection and revenue generation (AI service resale, crypto exchange targeting); 8,000-12,000 affected installs; reported targets include 8,000-12,000 downloads across compromised versions; AI/ML developers using Mastra framework; TypeScript/JavaScript AI application developers; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Verify npm package integrity; use package lock files with checksums; review postinstall scripts before install; monitor for unexpected network egress from npm scripts; rotate credentials after suspected exposure; use npm audit; implement SCA tools; prefer packages from verified maintainers; check npm package publish dates and maintainer history

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Compromise Mastra maintainerCredential / session use outside baselineCustom schema · Draft

Sapphire Sleet (DPRK) compromised Mastra maintainer's npm account via targeted phishing or credential theft; gained publish access to @mastra scope

What to look for

Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Identity / service authentication logs
  • Device, source-IP and session context
  • Resource access and token issuance audit

Coverage limit. Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline
id: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5
status: experimental
description: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a
  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - identity.login
      - identity.token.use
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
  2. Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
02Publish 140+ backdoored packagesDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft

Published 140+ malicious @mastra packages between May 29-Jun 15 with obfuscated postinstall scripts; maintained functional AI framework features to avoid immediate detection

What to look for

A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Package-manager and CI job logs
  • Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
  • Runner process trees, secret access and egress

Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - package.install
      - ci.workflow.change
      - package.lifecycle.exec
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
  2. Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
03Harvest AI and cloud credentialsPackage installation spawns a shell or downloaderNative logs · Draft

Postinstall script executes obfuscated Node.js: scans env vars (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, AZURE_OPENAI_*), filesystem (~/.config, ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, ~/.docker, ~/.kube), npm config; base64-encodes findings

What to look for

A package-manager install or lifecycle script launches a shell, downloader, or script interpreter that retrieves or executes an unexpected second stage.

Use package-manager ancestry to identify the postinstall execution, then pivot to the credential-store hunt for confirmed reads.

Visibility: Endpoint process telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Process creation with ancestry and complete command lines
  • Package-manager, CI, and installation logs
  • Download, file creation, signature, and network telemetry

Coverage limit. Build and install scripts commonly invoke shells and download dependencies. Require package provenance and destination context; this hunt does not by itself prove supply-chain compromise.

Process candidates with package-manager ancestry that launch shells or downloaders. Tune known build tooling and correlate with network/file telemetry.

MCP reference matches: Curl Download Activity from npm Package Install (Elastic detection-rules), Suspicious PowerShell from npm Package Install (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Shell or Downloader Spawned by Package Installation
id: c83f22aa-d07c-4f3c-a67f-6d5512818133
status: experimental
description: Detects package-manager processes spawning common shells, interpreters, or downloaders.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_curl_download_from_npm_install.toml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate package build and installation scripts
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentCommandLine|contains:
      - npm-cli.js
      - npx-cli.js
      - yarn
      - pnpm
      - pip install
      - python -m pip
      - gem install
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - /sh
      - /bash
      - /zsh
      - /curl
      - /wget
      - /python
      - /node
  condition: all of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("npm-cli.js", "npx-cli.js", "yarn", "pnpm",
    "pip install", "python -m pip", "gem install")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python", "node")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.parent_process IN ("*npm-cli.js*", "*npx-cli.js*", "*yarn*", "*pnpm*",
    "*pip install*", "*python -m pip*", "*gem install*")
  Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "python", "node")
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the package, version, publisher, lifecycle hook, resolved source, and parent process.
  2. Recover downloaded content and correlate credential access, persistence, or outbound traffic.
04Exfiltrate to DPRK C2Sensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

POSTs harvested credentials to hxxps://mastra-telemetry[.]com (DPRK infrastructure masquerading as telemetry); credentials support DPRK intelligence collection and revenue generation (AI service resale, crypto exchange targeting); 8,000-12,000 affected installs

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft
Additional role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
npm install of backdoored @mastra/* packages (140+ packages, versions published May 29-Jun 15 2026) via compromised maintainer account

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • npm supply chain attack
  • Node.js postinstall scripts
  • mastra-telemetry[.]com C2 (DPRK infrastructure)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
8,000-12,000 downloads across compromised versions; AI/ML developers using Mastra framework; TypeScript/JavaScript AI application developers
Reported scale / exposure
140+ npm packages backdoored over 18-day window (May 29-Jun 15); 8,000-12,000 estimated downloads; packages removed Jun 16-17, 2026
Target geography
Multiple regions

Reported attribution

Sapphire Sleet (DPRK, aka BlueNoroff, APT38, Stardust Chollima); Microsoft high-confidence attribution; part of DPRK revenue generation and intelligence collection operations

Structured attribution

Actor
Sapphire Sleet (DPRK)
Country
DPRK
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Microsoft
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • Supply chain monitoringGUIDANCE

    Monitor package installations, verify publisher authenticity, scan for malicious code patterns

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-06-17
Last updated
2026-11-04

Updates

  • 2026-06-17 — Microsoft

    Initial discovery and analysis

Source defensive notes

Verify npm package integrity; use package lock files with checksums; review postinstall scripts before install; monitor for unexpected network egress from npm scripts; rotate credentials after suspected exposure; use npm audit; implement SCA tools; prefer packages from verified maintainers; check npm package publish dates and maintainer history

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0000Search Open Technical Databases

DPRK APT supply chain compromise of AI framework to steal AI service credentials for intelligence collection and revenue generation Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • mastra-telemetry.com

ips

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        2 sources

        Research by Microsoft Threat Intelligence · Microsoft

        1. Microsoft: North Korea's Sapphire Sleet targets AI developers with Mastra supply chain attack www.microsoft.com
        2. Mastra - AI Framework for TypeScript github.com

        Microsoft Threat Intelligence attribution to Sapphire Sleet (DPRK APT); Mastra GitHub github.com/mastra-ai/mastra. Sapphire Sleet focus on revenue generation (crypto theft) and AI/technology intelligence collection. Detection: alert on npm packages with postinstall scripts accessing credential files, check for mastra-telemetry[.]com domain, monitor base64/eval in npm scripts, review Mastra package versions installed in environment against compromise window (May 29-Jun 15).

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Sapphire Sleet (DPRK) backdoors 140+ Mastra AI framework npm packages
        Entry ID
        sapphire-sleet-mastra-npm-2026-06
        Catalog review
        November 4, 2026
        Category
        attacks-on-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed