Detection queries Not classified

LiteLLM 1.107.0 backdoor steals cloud and AI credentials

LiteLLM version 1.107.0 on PyPI and GHCR delivered malware through Python startup hooks (cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py). The payload collects: AWS/Azure/GCP/K8s credentials, GitHub CLI tokens, SSH/GPG…

What happened

LiteLLM version 1.107.0 on PyPI and GHCR delivered malware through Python startup hooks (cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py). The payload collects: AWS/Azure/GCP/K8s credentials, GitHub CLI tokens, SSH/GPG keys, AI tool credentials (Codex, Claude, Gemini, Cursor MCP, Copilot, etc.), browser data, LiteLLM proxy database credentials, and environment variables. Collector encrypts data with AES-256-CBC and exfiltrates to www.litellm.dev/healthcheck. A second loader downloads Python from GitHub-controlled domain for remote execution. Docker provenance showed lookalike repository Berri-AI/litellm (hyphenated) instead of legitimate BerriAI/litellm.

Supply chain attack targeting AI gateway, steals cloud/AI-tool/gateway credentials via Python startup hooks

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Compromised release workflow

    Project release workflow used lookalike repository Berri-AI/litellm (hyphenated) instead of legitimate BerriAI/litellm; malicious commit added Maturin data directory; build provenance recorded source-owner override

    Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

    Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Malicious package distribution

    Published litellm 1.107.0 to PyPI (7 wheels across macOS/Linux/Windows) and Docker images to GHCR with floating tags (latest, main-latest, main-stable)

    Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

    Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Python startup hook installation

    Wheels install cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py to environment's Python library directory; triggered automatically on any Python startup

    Hunt: A package or installer creates sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py, or a .pth startup hook in a Python environment, causing code to run during later interpreter starts.

    Legitimate packages use .pth files and customization hooks. File telemetry must cover the relevant environment, and the rule does not establish that the hook later executed.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Credential collection

    Collects AWS/Azure/GCP/K8s, AI tools (Codex/Claude/Gemini/Cursor/Copilot/Windsurf), SSH/GPG keys, browser data, LiteLLM proxy DB credentials, environment variables; 16 collection modules with individual error handling

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Encrypted exfiltration

    Data encrypted with AES-256-CBC, key wrapped with RSA-4096 public key, packaged in gzip tar; POSTed to www.litellm.dev/healthcheck with X-Token header; up to 4 retry attempts

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Remote code loader

    sitecustomize.py forks detached process; downloads domain.txt from GitHub repo letters9813/pythonclient-test; if domain resolves, downloads and executes Python from /codepy endpoint; 1-hour loop

    Hunt: A package or installer creates sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py, or a .pth startup hook in a Python environment, causing code to run during later interpreter starts.

    Legitimate packages use .pth files and customization hooks. File telemetry must cover the relevant environment, and the rule does not establish that the hook later executed.

    Source for step 6

Dashed edges show a repeated decision loop.

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Supply chain compromise: malicious wheels published to PyPI and Docker images to GHCR; project release workflow used lookalike source repository (Berri-AI/litellm with hyphen). Reported impact: Data encrypted with AES-256-CBC, key wrapped with RSA-4096 public key, packaged in gzip tar; POSTed to www.litellm.dev/healthcheck with X-Token header; up to 4 retry attempts; reported targets include LiteLLM users across ~23M weekly downloads; affects AI development, cloud deployments, CI/CD pipelines; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Block litellm==1.107.0 and affected image digests; Python startup hook monitoring; dependency pinning and artifact verification; registry tag floating risks; separate release credentials from installation environments; audit cloud/AI credentials

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Compromised release workflowPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft

Project release workflow used lookalike repository Berri-AI/litellm (hyphenated) instead of legitimate BerriAI/litellm; malicious commit added Maturin data directory; build provenance recorded source-owner override

What to look for

A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
  • Repository and token permission inventory
  • Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records

Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - repository.public.write
      - repository.visibility.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
  2. Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
02Malicious package distributionDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft

Published litellm 1.107.0 to PyPI (7 wheels across macOS/Linux/Windows) and Docker images to GHCR with floating tags (latest, main-latest, main-stable)

What to look for

A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Package-manager and CI job logs
  • Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
  • Runner process trees, secret access and egress

Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - package.install
      - ci.workflow.change
      - package.lifecycle.exec
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
  2. Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
03Python startup hook installationPython startup-hook persistenceNative logs · Draft

Wheels install cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py to environment's Python library directory; triggered automatically on any Python startup

What to look for

A package or installer creates sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py, or a .pth startup hook in a Python environment, causing code to run during later interpreter starts.

Visibility: Endpoint file telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • File creation and modification events for Python library directories
  • Package-manager and installer process trees
  • Subsequent Python process and network activity

Coverage limit. Legitimate packages use .pth files and customization hooks. File telemetry must cover the relevant environment, and the rule does not establish that the hook later executed.

Python startup-hook file candidates. Tune approved packages and environments, then correlate the file event with interpreter execution.

MCP reference matches: Python Site or User Customize File Creation (Elastic detection-rules), Python Site Hooks Creation During Package Installation (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Python Startup Hook Creation
id: e229b088-94e8-4254-8bfb-fc1e03173def
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of Python customization or path startup hooks.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/persistence_site_and_user_customize_file_creation.toml
  - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/python_site_hooks_creation_during_package_installation.yml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Python package installation and environment management
level: medium
logsource:
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection_named_hook:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - /sitecustomize.py
      - /usercustomize.py
  selection_pth:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - /site-packages/
      - /dist-packages/
    TargetFilename|endswith: .pth
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FileName in~ ("sitecustomize.py", "usercustomize.py")
    or (FileName endswith ".pth" and FolderPath has_any ("/site-packages/", "/dist-packages/", "\\site-packages\\"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FolderPath, FileName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
(TargetFilename="*\\sitecustomize.py" OR TargetFilename="*\\usercustomize.py"
  OR TargetFilename="*\\site-packages\\*.pth")
| table _time host User Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Inspect the hook contents, owner, package provenance, and creating process.
  2. Correlate later Python launches with child processes, credential access, or unexpected egress.
04Credential collectionSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Collects AWS/Azure/GCP/K8s, AI tools (Codex/Claude/Gemini/Cursor/Copilot/Windsurf), SSH/GPG keys, browser data, LiteLLM proxy DB credentials, environment variables; 16 collection modules with individual error handling

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
05Encrypted exfiltrationSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

Data encrypted with AES-256-CBC, key wrapped with RSA-4096 public key, packaged in gzip tar; POSTed to www.litellm.dev/healthcheck with X-Token header; up to 4 retry attempts

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
06Remote code loaderPython startup-hook persistenceNative logs · Draft

sitecustomize.py forks detached process; downloads domain.txt from GitHub repo letters9813/pythonclient-test; if domain resolves, downloads and executes Python from /codepy endpoint; 1-hour loop

What to look for

A package or installer creates sitecustomize.py, usercustomize.py, or a .pth startup hook in a Python environment, causing code to run during later interpreter starts.

Visibility: Endpoint file telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • File creation and modification events for Python library directories
  • Package-manager and installer process trees
  • Subsequent Python process and network activity

Coverage limit. Legitimate packages use .pth files and customization hooks. File telemetry must cover the relevant environment, and the rule does not establish that the hook later executed.

Python startup-hook file candidates. Tune approved packages and environments, then correlate the file event with interpreter execution.

MCP reference matches: Python Site or User Customize File Creation (Elastic detection-rules), Python Site Hooks Creation During Package Installation (Splunk Security Content). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Python Startup Hook Creation
id: e229b088-94e8-4254-8bfb-fc1e03173def
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of Python customization or path startup hooks.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/persistence_site_and_user_customize_file_creation.toml
  - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/detections/endpoint/python_site_hooks_creation_during_package_installation.yml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Python package installation and environment management
level: medium
logsource:
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection_named_hook:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - /sitecustomize.py
      - /usercustomize.py
  selection_pth:
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - /site-packages/
      - /dist-packages/
    TargetFilename|endswith: .pth
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where FileName in~ ("sitecustomize.py", "usercustomize.py")
    or (FileName endswith ".pth" and FolderPath has_any ("/site-packages/", "/dist-packages/", "\\site-packages\\"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FolderPath, FileName,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
(TargetFilename="*\\sitecustomize.py" OR TargetFilename="*\\usercustomize.py"
  OR TargetFilename="*\\site-packages\\*.pth")
| table _time host User Image TargetFilename ProcessGuid
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Inspect the hook contents, owner, package provenance, and creating process.
  2. Correlate later Python launches with child processes, credential access, or unexpected egress.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft
Additional role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
Supply chain compromise: malicious wheels published to PyPI and Docker images to GHCR; project release workflow used lookalike source repository (Berri-AI/litellm with hyphen)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • LiteLLM (legitimate proxy for LLM providers, compromised version)

Other tooling

  • Python startup hooks (cook.pth for import cook, sitecustomize.py)
  • Base64-encoded zlib-compressed credential collector
  • Maturin build with data directory
  • RSA-4096 encryption for exfiltration
  • GitHub domain.txt pointer for remote code loader

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
LiteLLM users across ~23M weekly downloads; affects AI development, cloud deployments, CI/CD pipelines
Reported scale / exposure
LiteLLM receives ~23M weekly downloads; 7 platform-specific wheels published Oct 21, 2026 11:39:51 UTC, flagged by Socket AI scanner at 11:46:30 UTC; multiple GHCR/Docker Hub image tags affected

Reported attribution

unknown; lookalike repository and release workflow compromise suggest targeted supply chain operation

Source defensive notes

Block litellm==1.107.0 and affected image digests; Python startup hook monitoring; dependency pinning and artifact verification; registry tag floating risks; separate release credentials from installation environments; audit cloud/AI credentials

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0010.001AI Software

Supply chain compromise of LiteLLM package specifically targeting AI/ML infrastructure and gateway credentials Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

Credential theft specifically targets AI development tools (Codex, Claude, Gemini, Cursor, Copilot) and LiteLLM proxy database Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • www.litellm.dev

ips

    hashes

    • 7598727f209d717041db37f7dca271d3a7d328a279890e0e1d55375729aeb86d
    • 0aaf7ba346d41ef2f40390436738b001180d5a1c03aa093f121078a9969d9a1a
    • 668169d35b87bf51324080390b1b1c5ab12bd335cfe5f1a99e3689abd5e02ae6
    • 462d0c9f67ca522d9e0e4acd245e90b36ce0d5353604a66bb7c43a1ec4a6fcf7
    • c2e32d0ce2548aa662c18bf5001911a79fe5b30cf8357132275add02fdcde054
    • 1bbce8caa94f01c0aaa0b7ddae51553a8a32e1ce53d96d44fe583272aff7ad00
    • 12d4ccc5c6f8d35cf4f2cf233b7f3e418e863e657d81ff5f5fc9e210005b9484
    • 9dd0a3926f96a37eb86cf1ee2310d9be93139cc4ebef3ef9e2efe9531390be25
    • 34bef04fe88ac9d0aae0475630b1738681d15b94f233ac8aa46eacf5968305fa

    urls

    • http://www.litellm.dev/healthcheck
    • https://raw.githubusercontent.com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain.txt

    Sources & research credit

    1 source

    Research by Socket Research Team · Socket

    1. LiteLLM PyPI Package and Docker Images Compromised to Steal Cloud and AI Credentials socket.dev

    Socket Research Team detected via AI scanner 7 minutes after publication; Upwind provided independent container investigation; Docker provenance recorded malicious source-owner override; loader GitHub pointer returned empty response at 13:01:44 UTC Oct 21

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    LiteLLM 1.107.0 backdoor steals cloud and AI credentials
    Entry ID
    socket-litellm-supply-chain-2026-10
    Catalog review
    November 4, 2026