Storm-2139 / FizzDogg Azure OpenAI LLMjacking (Microsoft DCU)
A Microsoft civil action alleges the group stole Azure OpenAI credentials and bypassed safety controls to generate harmful images at victims' expense.
What happened
Microsoft civil action against Storm-2139 (FizzDogg) network alleged theft of Azure OpenAI credentials and custom tooling to bypass safety controls and generate harmful images via DALL-E/GenAI services at victims' expense.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Theft route is not detailed in the seed
Microsoft’s civil case alleges stolen Azure OpenAI credentials.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Stolen keys access victim resources
The credentials provide unauthorized access to generative services.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Custom tooling bypasses safety controls
The alleged operation generates harmful content through DALL-E and related services.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Victim accounts bear the usage
The civil action describes unauthorized model use at account owners’ expense.
Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported impact: The civil action describes unauthorized model use at account owners’ expense.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The civil-action account concerns stolen Azure OpenAI credentials and usage charged to victim resources.
Conditions to check- Confirm that you operate Azure OpenAI resources and store keys or tokens that could be exposed.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Review Azure OpenAI key ownership, rotate exposed credentials and investigate unexpected usage.
Protect Azure OpenAI keys; monitor anomalous image/model invocation
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
02Stolen keys access victim resourcesUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
The credentials provide unauthorized access to generative services.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
03Custom tooling bypasses safety controlsUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
The alleged operation generates harmful content through DALL-E and related services.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
04Victim accounts bear the usageUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft
The civil action describes unauthorized model use at account owners’ expense.
What to look for
A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Cloud control-plane and identity audit
- AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
- Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory
Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- cloud.credential.use
- cloud.role.change
- model.invoke
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
- Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI credential theft
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Azure OpenAI
- DALL-E
Targets and reported impact
- Reported scale / exposure
- unknown (litigation)
Reported attribution
Storm-2139 / FizzDogg
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Storm-2139
- Aliases
- FizzDogg
- Motivation
- cybercrime
- Attributed by
- Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit
- Attribution confidence
- high
Linked threat actors
Source defensive notes
Protect Azure OpenAI keys; monitor anomalous image/model invocation
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
The civil case alleges use of stolen Azure OpenAI credentials. Source
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit · Microsoft
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Storm-2139 / FizzDogg Azure OpenAI LLMjacking (Microsoft DCU)
- Entry ID
- storm-2139-fizzdogg-microsoft-llmjacking-2024-12
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- vendor-asserted