CLOSEDQUORUM implant - 4 LLMs vote on next action
CLOSEDQUORUM is a Go-based Windows implant that queries DeepSeek, Qwen (via OpenRouter), Mistral, and Gemini in sequence for post-compromise decisions. Each model receives system info (hostname, Windows…
What happened
CLOSEDQUORUM is a Go-based Windows implant that queries DeepSeek, Qwen (via OpenRouter), Mistral, and Gemini in sequence for post-compromise decisions. Each model receives system info (hostname, Windows version, admin status) and a constrained JSON prompt with 4 actions: steal (credentials/browsers/wallets), inject (process hollowing), persist (registry/startup), or move (no handler in the public build). Models vote; plurality wins; ties favor DeepSeek > Qwen > Mistral > Gemini. Decisions are posted to a Discord webhook with reasoning. No human operator commands are needed after deployment. The public build uses dummy keys and a dummy webhook, so Talos did not observe end-to-end execution. Talos discovered it via CAIRN, its open-source AI-malware hunting toolkit. Developer artifacts link to carding forums dating to 2025.
First publicly documented Windows implant to delegate C2 decisions to LLM panel; 4 models vote on next action via plurality voting
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Public distribution build contains dummy API keys and webhook; Talos has not observed end-to-end run or confirmed in-the-wild deployment; binary artifacts connect developer to carding forum postings dating to 2025
- 01 · Implant deployment
Go-based Windows implant deployed (method unknown in public sample); no confirmed in-the-wild deployment
Source for step 1 - 02 · System enumeration
Collects hostname, Windows version, administrator status for LLM query context
Source for step 2 - 03 · LLM panel voting
Queries 4 LLM providers in sequence: DeepSeek, Qwen (OpenRouter), Mistral, Gemini; sends system info and constrained JSON prompt with 4 actions (steal, inject, persist, move); each model votes; plurality wins; ties favor DeepSeek > Qwen > Mistral > Gemini; no quorum threshold
Source for step 3 - 04 · Decision logging to Discord
Posts winning decision and model's stated reasoning to Discord webhook before execution; stolen data also sent to same webhook
Source for step 4 - 05 · Execute decision
Executes winning action: steal (credentials, browsers, wallets), inject (process hollowing via CreateProcessW CREATE_SUSPENDED), persist (registry/startup), or move (no handler); public build injection reaches primitives but demonstrates no successful execution
Source for step 5
Dashed edges show a repeated decision loop.
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Not established in public sample; deployment method unknown. Reported impact: Executes winning action: steal (credentials, browsers, wallets), inject (process hollowing via CreateProcessW CREATE_SUSPENDED), persist (registry/startup), or move (no handler); public build injection reaches primitives but demonstrates no successful execution; reported targets include No confirmed in-the-wild deployment; public sample analysis only; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
AI API key monitoring; Discord webhook traffic from unexpected processes; plurality voting pattern detection; LLM query patterns with system enumeration; CAIRN tool for AI-malware hunting
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI as operator
- Additional role
- AI infrastructure as C2
- Initial access
- Not established in public sample; deployment method unknown
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- DeepSeek (api.deepseek.com, deepseek-chat)
- Qwen (via OpenRouter, qwen/qwen-2.5-72b-instruct)
- Mistral (api.mistral.ai, mistral-large-latest)
- Google Gemini (gemini-2.0-flash-exp)
Other tooling
- Discord webhook for decision logging and exfiltration
- CAIRN (Talos AI-malware hunting tool, used for discovery)
- Go-based implant
- Windows process injection primitives (CreateProcessW, CREATE_SUSPENDED)
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- No confirmed in-the-wild deployment; public sample analysis only
- Reported scale / exposure
- First publicly documented autonomous AI C2 implant; analysis dated Jun 17, 2026; disclosed Sep 22, 2026; public build non-functional (dummy keys)
Reported attribution
Developer artifacts link to carding forum postings dating to 2025; no confirmed threat actor attribution
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unknown
- Motivation
- unknown
- Attributed by
- Cisco Talos
- Attribution confidence
- low
Detection rules
- Correlated LLM-provider and Discord trafficGUIDANCE
Alert on unexpected Windows processes contacting several LLM providers and Discord webhooks within the same execution window.
- Autonomous implant behavior correlationGUIDANCE
Correlate LLM API traffic with LSASS access, process injection, persistence creation, or repeated execution at randomized intervals.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-06-17
- Last updated
- 2026-09-22
Updates
- 2026-09-22 — Cisco Talos
Talos published its static analysis and stated that it had no confirmation of in-the-wild deployment.
Source defensive notes
AI API key monitoring; Discord webhook traffic from unexpected processes; plurality voting pattern detection; LLM query patterns with system enumeration; CAIRN tool for AI-malware hunting
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
First documented Windows implant using LLM panel voting for autonomous C2 decisions; represents shift where expanding portions of attack chain execute without operator involvement Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
api.deepseek.comopenrouter.aiapi.mistral.aigenerativelanguage.googleapis.com
ips
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Ryan Fetterman · Cisco Talos
Cisco Talos first public documentation; discovered via CAIRN. Talos reports that the public distribution binary is inert because it contains dummy API keys and a dummy webhook. Static analysis confirms plurality voting and deterministic tie-breaking, not a minimum 3-of-4 quorum; if every provider fails, an unhandled consensus value causes the loop to sleep and retry.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- CLOSEDQUORUM implant - 4 LLMs vote on next action
- Entry ID
- talos-closedquorum-implant-2026-09
- Catalog review
- November 6, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed