Qualified report

CLOSEDQUORUM implant - 4 LLMs vote on next action

CLOSEDQUORUM is a Go-based Windows implant that queries DeepSeek, Qwen (via OpenRouter), Mistral, and Gemini in sequence for post-compromise decisions. Each model receives system info (hostname, Windows…

What happened

CLOSEDQUORUM is a Go-based Windows implant that queries DeepSeek, Qwen (via OpenRouter), Mistral, and Gemini in sequence for post-compromise decisions. Each model receives system info (hostname, Windows version, admin status) and a constrained JSON prompt with 4 actions: steal (credentials/browsers/wallets), inject (process hollowing), persist (registry/startup), or move (no handler in the public build). Models vote; plurality wins; ties favor DeepSeek > Qwen > Mistral > Gemini. Decisions are posted to a Discord webhook with reasoning. No human operator commands are needed after deployment. The public build uses dummy keys and a dummy webhook, so Talos did not observe end-to-end execution. Talos discovered it via CAIRN, its open-source AI-malware hunting toolkit. Developer artifacts link to carding forums dating to 2025.

First publicly documented Windows implant to delegate C2 decisions to LLM panel; 4 models vote on next action via plurality voting

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsResearch / qualified account
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Public distribution build contains dummy API keys and webhook; Talos has not observed end-to-end run or confirmed in-the-wild deployment; binary artifacts connect developer to carding forum postings dating to 2025

  1. 01 · Implant deployment

    Go-based Windows implant deployed (method unknown in public sample); no confirmed in-the-wild deployment

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · System enumeration

    Collects hostname, Windows version, administrator status for LLM query context

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · LLM panel voting

    Queries 4 LLM providers in sequence: DeepSeek, Qwen (OpenRouter), Mistral, Gemini; sends system info and constrained JSON prompt with 4 actions (steal, inject, persist, move); each model votes; plurality wins; ties favor DeepSeek > Qwen > Mistral > Gemini; no quorum threshold

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Decision logging to Discord

    Posts winning decision and model's stated reasoning to Discord webhook before execution; stolen data also sent to same webhook

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Execute decision

    Executes winning action: steal (credentials, browsers, wallets), inject (process hollowing via CreateProcessW CREATE_SUSPENDED), persist (registry/startup), or move (no handler); public build injection reaches primitives but demonstrates no successful execution

    Source for step 5

Dashed edges show a repeated decision loop.

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Not established in public sample; deployment method unknown. Reported impact: Executes winning action: steal (credentials, browsers, wallets), inject (process hollowing via CreateProcessW CREATE_SUSPENDED), persist (registry/startup), or move (no handler); public build injection reaches primitives but demonstrates no successful execution; reported targets include No confirmed in-the-wild deployment; public sample analysis only; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

AI API key monitoring; Discord webhook traffic from unexpected processes; plurality voting pattern detection; LLM query patterns with system enumeration; CAIRN tool for AI-malware hunting

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Additional role
AI infrastructure as C2
Initial access
Not established in public sample; deployment method unknown

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • DeepSeek (api.deepseek.com, deepseek-chat)
  • Qwen (via OpenRouter, qwen/qwen-2.5-72b-instruct)
  • Mistral (api.mistral.ai, mistral-large-latest)
  • Google Gemini (gemini-2.0-flash-exp)

Other tooling

  • Discord webhook for decision logging and exfiltration
  • CAIRN (Talos AI-malware hunting tool, used for discovery)
  • Go-based implant
  • Windows process injection primitives (CreateProcessW, CREATE_SUSPENDED)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
No confirmed in-the-wild deployment; public sample analysis only
Reported scale / exposure
First publicly documented autonomous AI C2 implant; analysis dated Jun 17, 2026; disclosed Sep 22, 2026; public build non-functional (dummy keys)

Reported attribution

Developer artifacts link to carding forum postings dating to 2025; no confirmed threat actor attribution

Structured attribution

Actor
Unknown
Motivation
unknown
Attributed by
Cisco Talos
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Correlated LLM-provider and Discord trafficGUIDANCE

    Alert on unexpected Windows processes contacting several LLM providers and Discord webhooks within the same execution window.

  • Autonomous implant behavior correlationGUIDANCE

    Correlate LLM API traffic with LSASS access, process injection, persistence creation, or repeated execution at randomized intervals.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-06-17
Last updated
2026-09-22

Updates

  • 2026-09-22 — Cisco Talos

    Talos published its static analysis and stated that it had no confirmation of in-the-wild deployment.

Source defensive notes

AI API key monitoring; Discord webhook traffic from unexpected processes; plurality voting pattern detection; LLM query patterns with system enumeration; CAIRN tool for AI-malware hunting

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0040AI Model Inference API Access

First documented Windows implant using LLM panel voting for autonomous C2 decisions; represents shift where expanding portions of attack chain execute without operator involvement Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • api.deepseek.com
  • openrouter.ai
  • api.mistral.ai
  • generativelanguage.googleapis.com

ips

    hashes

      urls

        Sources & research credit

        1 source

        Research by Ryan Fetterman · Cisco Talos

        1. The Closed Quorum: Inside the first reported autonomous AI C2 implant blog.talosintelligence.com

        Cisco Talos first public documentation; discovered via CAIRN. Talos reports that the public distribution binary is inert because it contains dummy API keys and a dummy webhook. Static analysis confirms plurality voting and deterministic tie-breaking, not a minimum 3-of-4 quorum; if every provider fails, an unhandled consensus value causes the loop to sleep and retry.

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        CLOSEDQUORUM implant - 4 LLMs vote on next action
        Entry ID
        talos-closedquorum-implant-2026-09
        Catalog review
        November 6, 2026
        Category
        adversary-use-of-ai
        AI involvement confidence
        confirmed