Detection queries Reported campaignAndroid

Android malware posing as ChatGPT apps

Fake ChatGPT Android apps delivered Meterpreter and SMS-fraud malware as ChatGPT-themed phishing and trojan sites grew.

What happened

Android APKs impersonating ChatGPT delivered Meterpreter and SMS-fraud malware. Broader ChatGPT-themed phishing and trojan sites rose with GenAI popularity.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · User encounters a fake ChatGPT app

    Phishing or trojan sites offer Android APKs.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · ChatGPT branding provides the lure

    The application impersonates the AI product.

    Hunt: A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.

    Standard Windows EDR tables do not provide Android app events. Device-management and mobile telemetry are required.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · User sideloads the APK

    The package delivers Meterpreter or SMS-fraud malware.

    Hunt: A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.

    Standard Windows EDR tables do not provide Android app events. Device-management and mobile telemetry are required.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Remote access or SMS fraud

    The reported payload determines the resulting device abuse.

    Hunt: A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.

    Standard Windows EDR tables do not provide Android app events. Device-management and mobile telemetry are required.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Sideloaded fake ChatGPT Android apps / phishing sites. Reported impact: The reported payload determines the resulting device abuse; reported targets include Android users seeking ChatGPT apps.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

ChatGPTAndroid

The report concerns Android APKs impersonating ChatGPT.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm sideloading of an affected fake APK; legitimate ChatGPT use alone is not the condition.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Review sideloaded APKs and their source, package identity and granted permissions.

Official app stores only; mobile threat defense

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01User encounters a fake ChatGPT appLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Phishing or trojan sites offer Android APKs.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02ChatGPT branding provides the lureUnapproved Android package / sensitive accessCustom schema · Draft

The application impersonates the AI product.

What to look for

A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.

Compare package identity, signer and permissions with approved software; ChatGPT branding alone does not establish a malicious APK.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Android enterprise / mobile threat-defense package inventory
  • Install source, signer and permission changes
  • SMS, accessibility and network telemetry where available

Coverage limit. Standard Windows EDR tables do not provide Android app events. Device-management and mobile telemetry are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Android package / sensitive access
id: 4bedc57c-a921-4078-ae94-213465e0b46b
status: experimental
description: A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and
  performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - android.package.install
      - android.permission.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("android.package.install", "android.permission.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("android.package.install", "android.permission.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package ID and signing certificate with the approved source.
  2. Correlate new permissions and outbound or SMS behavior; apply mobile platform controls rather than Windows policies.
03User sideloads the APKUnapproved Android package / sensitive accessCustom schema · Draft

The package delivers Meterpreter or SMS-fraud malware.

What to look for

A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Android enterprise / mobile threat-defense package inventory
  • Install source, signer and permission changes
  • SMS, accessibility and network telemetry where available

Coverage limit. Standard Windows EDR tables do not provide Android app events. Device-management and mobile telemetry are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Android package / sensitive access
id: 4bedc57c-a921-4078-ae94-213465e0b46b
status: experimental
description: A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and
  performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - android.package.install
      - android.permission.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("android.package.install", "android.permission.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("android.package.install", "android.permission.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package ID and signing certificate with the approved source.
  2. Correlate new permissions and outbound or SMS behavior; apply mobile platform controls rather than Windows policies.
04Remote access or SMS fraudUnapproved Android package / sensitive accessCustom schema · Draft

The reported payload determines the resulting device abuse.

What to look for

A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Android enterprise / mobile threat-defense package inventory
  • Install source, signer and permission changes
  • SMS, accessibility and network telemetry where available

Coverage limit. Standard Windows EDR tables do not provide Android app events. Device-management and mobile telemetry are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Android package / sensitive access
id: 4bedc57c-a921-4078-ae94-213465e0b46b
status: experimental
description: A sideloaded AI-branded APK obtains sensitive capabilities and
  performs unexpected SMS, credential or remote-access actions.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - android.package.install
      - android.permission.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("android.package.install", "android.permission.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("android.package.install", "android.permission.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package ID and signing certificate with the approved source.
  2. Correlate new permissions and outbound or SMS behavior; apply mobile platform controls rather than Windows policies.
Technical detailsTooling, impact

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
Sideloaded fake ChatGPT Android apps / phishing sites

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Android users seeking ChatGPT apps

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Android malware posing as ChatGPT apps. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Official app stores only; mobile threat defense

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by Unit 42 · Palo Alto Networks Unit 42

  1. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
  2. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
Android malware posing as ChatGPT apps
Entry ID
unit42-android-chatgpt-malware-2023
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed