Detection queries Research demonstration

Unit 42: LLMs obfuscate malicious JavaScript

Research showed LLMs can effectively rewrite existing malicious JavaScript to evade detection, though writing full malware from scratch was less practical at the time.

What happened

Showed LLMs can effectively rewrite and obfuscate existing malicious JavaScript to evade detection, while finding fully AI-written malware from scratch less practical at the time.

LLM used to rewrite/obfuscate existing malware JS for evasion

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsResearch / qualified account
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Research demonstration of LLM obfuscation efficacy; not a single named campaign.

  1. 01 · Researchers provide malicious JavaScript

    The experiment starts with existing code rather than an observed delivery campaign.

    Hunt: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

    This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · LLMs rewrite and obfuscate the code

    Model output changes the script while retaining malicious behavior.

    Hunt: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

    This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Researchers test detection outcomes

    The study compares detection before and after rewriting.

    Hunt: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

    This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Demo measures evasion

    The finding concerns obfuscation efficacy, not a separate confirmed victim intrusion.

    Hunt: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

    This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported impact: The finding concerns obfuscation efficacy, not a separate confirmed victim intrusion; using the named AI products does not by itself establish exposure.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Behavioral JS detections over static signatures

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Researchers provide malicious JavaScriptIndependent malware-analysis validationCustom schema · Draft

The experiment starts with existing code rather than an observed delivery campaign.

What to look for

Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

Preserve sample hashes and independent behavior labels before the model transformation; this is a research workflow.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Sample hashes and static / dynamic analysis results
  • Model verdicts with prompt provenance
  • Independent analyst and deterministic scanner verdicts

Coverage limit. This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Independent malware-analysis validation
id: aa44bd2e-f46c-4884-a6db-e6b370a12c50
status: experimental
description: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or
  obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious
  behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - analysis.verdict
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("analysis.verdict")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("analysis.verdict")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare model conclusions with independent behavioral evidence and a controlled evaluation set.
  2. Treat sample comments as data; measure disagreement and false negatives without following embedded instructions.
02LLMs rewrite and obfuscate the codeIndependent malware-analysis validationCustom schema · Draft

Model output changes the script while retaining malicious behavior.

What to look for

Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Sample hashes and static / dynamic analysis results
  • Model verdicts with prompt provenance
  • Independent analyst and deterministic scanner verdicts

Coverage limit. This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Independent malware-analysis validation
id: aa44bd2e-f46c-4884-a6db-e6b370a12c50
status: experimental
description: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or
  obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious
  behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - analysis.verdict
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("analysis.verdict")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("analysis.verdict")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare model conclusions with independent behavioral evidence and a controlled evaluation set.
  2. Treat sample comments as data; measure disagreement and false negatives without following embedded instructions.
03Researchers test detection outcomesIndependent malware-analysis validationCustom schema · Draft

The study compares detection before and after rewriting.

What to look for

Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Sample hashes and static / dynamic analysis results
  • Model verdicts with prompt provenance
  • Independent analyst and deterministic scanner verdicts

Coverage limit. This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Independent malware-analysis validation
id: aa44bd2e-f46c-4884-a6db-e6b370a12c50
status: experimental
description: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or
  obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious
  behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - analysis.verdict
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("analysis.verdict")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("analysis.verdict")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare model conclusions with independent behavioral evidence and a controlled evaluation set.
  2. Treat sample comments as data; measure disagreement and false negatives without following embedded instructions.
04Demo measures evasionIndependent malware-analysis validationCustom schema · Draft

The finding concerns obfuscation efficacy, not a separate confirmed victim intrusion.

What to look for

Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious behavior.

Compare model/scanner verdicts with known behavior on the evaluated set; this does not establish a separate victim intrusion.

Visibility: Review / research workflow

Required logs

  • Sample hashes and static / dynamic analysis results
  • Model verdicts with prompt provenance
  • Independent analyst and deterministic scanner verdicts

Coverage limit. This evaluates analysis robustness, not victim endpoint compromise. Side behaviors mentioned elsewhere in a report do not establish edges in this flow.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Independent malware-analysis validation
id: aa44bd2e-f46c-4884-a6db-e6b370a12c50
status: experimental
description: Instructions inside a sample influence an LLM analysis result, or
  obfuscation changes a model's classification without changing malicious
  behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - analysis.verdict
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("analysis.verdict")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("analysis.verdict")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare model conclusions with independent behavioral evidence and a controlled evaluation set.
  2. Treat sample comments as data; measure disagreement and false negatives without following embedded instructions.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
LLM-generated malware

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Commercial LLMs

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Unit 42: LLMs obfuscating malicious JavaScript. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Behavioral JS detections over static signatures

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

The supplied source explicitly describes generative-model tooling assisting the reported activity; this mapping does not establish additional autonomy or victim impact. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Unit 42 · Palo Alto Networks Unit 42

  1. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
Unit 42: LLMs obfuscating malicious JavaScript
Entry ID
unit42-llm-js-obfuscation-2024
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
adversary-use-of-ai
AI involvement confidence
unverified