Visual Studio / SSMS Copilot trailing-dot RCE (CVE-2026-103572)
Writing '.mcp.json.' slipped past Copilot's edit guard, and Windows strips the trailing dot, so attackers could rewrite the MCP config for code execution. Affects VS 2022/2026 and SSMS; patched.
What happened
Copilot edit guard blocked writes to .mcp.json via string compare. Writing '.mcp.json.' bypasses check; Win32 strips trailing dot so write lands on real MCP config → RCE via MCP server command or ripgrepPath pointing at arbitrary binary. Chainable via indirect prompt injection from a file or MCP server. Shared Microsoft.VisualStudio.Copilot.Core.dll affects VS 2022/2026 and SSMS. Patched with GetFullPath.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Untrusted instructions reach Copilot
A file or MCP server supplies indirect instructions.
Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.
Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Agent edits a protected configuration name
Writing .mcp.json. bypasses a string-based edit check.
Hunt: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Windows normalizes the trailing dot
The write reaches the real MCP configuration or executable-path setting.
Hunt: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Attacker-chosen command runs
The changed MCP startup command or binary path enables code execution.
Hunt: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
MagicSword policy opportunity · The attacker-chosen Windows MCP server / ripgrepPath executable when denied by policy. This does not repair the configuration-name canonicalization bug.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Indirect prompt injection (file content / MCP) into Copilot chat, or misaligned agent. Reported impact: The changed MCP startup command or binary path enables code execution; reported targets include Visual Studio and SSMS users.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
This report concerns Copilot in Visual Studio / SSMS on Windows, rather than every Copilot integration.
Conditions to check- Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
- Confirm use of the affected Visual Studio / SSMS integration; the trailing-dot path depends on Windows filename normalization.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Check the Visual Studio / SSMS advisory and review agent edits to MCP and executable-path settings.
Patch VS/SSMS; alert on Copilot writes to .mcp.json / settings.VisualStudio.json; watch devenv/Ssms spawning unexpected binaries
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Untrusted instructions reach CopilotUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft
A file or MCP server supplies indirect instructions.
What to look for
An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.
Record the originating file or MCP response and the consuming session, then correlate with configuration changes and execution.
Visibility: Application / agent audit records
Required logs
- Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
- Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
- Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions
Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.
Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.input.ingest
- agent.session.resume
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
- Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
02Agent edits a protected configuration nameAgent trust / configuration changesCustom schema · Draft
Writing .mcp.json. bypasses a string-based edit check.
What to look for
A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration
- Repository audit / pull-request history
- Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
Coverage limit. A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Agent trust / configuration changes
id: 2dfc8034-d66b-42a7-a699-a76b2ef872ac
status: experimental
description: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands,
automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before
new execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.config.write
- agent.approval.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.config.write", "agent.approval.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.config.write", "agent.approval.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
03Windows normalizes the trailing dotAgent trust / configuration changesCustom schema · Draft
The write reaches the real MCP configuration or executable-path setting.
What to look for
A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands, automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before new execution.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File changes and before/after content for MCP / IDE configuration
- Repository audit / pull-request history
- Agent startup and tool-invocation logs
Coverage limit. A file-write event alone cannot establish what changed. Legitimate setup also changes these files; obtain a diff and authorization context.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Agent trust / configuration changes
id: 2dfc8034-d66b-42a7-a699-a76b2ef872ac
status: experimental
description: A repository, dependency or agent changes MCP commands,
automatic-task settings, tool approval or model-routing configuration before
new execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.config.write
- agent.approval.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.config.write", "agent.approval.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.config.write", "agent.approval.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Diff command, args, environment, origin, autoApprove and task settings against the previously approved version.
- Correlate the author and change with the next agent launch; inspect path canonicalization and trailing-dot variants where relevant.
04Attacker-chosen command runsUnapproved Windows program executionNative logs · Draft
The changed MCP startup command or binary path enables code execution.
What to look for
A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation
- Download provenance and file hashes
- File certificate information and application-control audit / block events
Coverage limit. Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution
id: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1
status: experimental
description: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable
location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|contains:
- \Downloads\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \AppData\Roaming\
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "\\Downloads\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
- Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- Agent / MCP as target
- Initial access
- Indirect prompt injection (file content / MCP) into Copilot chat, or misaligned agent
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- GitHub Copilot in Visual Studio / SSMS
- MAI-Code-1-Flash (PoC model)
Other tooling
- MCP config
- ripgrepPath setting
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Visual Studio and SSMS users
- Reported scale / exposure
- Patched 2026-10-13 Patch Tuesday
Reported attribution
Vulnerability research; CVE-2026-103572 CVSS 8.8 Important
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Vulnerability research
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in Visual Studio / SSMS Copilot trailing-dot RCE (CVE-2026-103572). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Patch VS/SSMS; alert on Copilot writes to .mcp.json / settings.VisualStudio.json; watch devenv/Ssms spawning unexpected binaries
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Files or MCP responses can inject the editing instructions. Source
The resulting edit modifies MCP startup or executable configuration. Source
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Johann Rehberger (wunderwuzzi23) · Embrace The Red
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Visual Studio / SSMS Copilot trailing-dot RCE (CVE-2026-103572)
- Entry ID
- vs-copilot-trailing-dot-rce-2026-10
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed