Detection queries Vulnerability reportAgents & MCP

Copilot Studio SharePoint connector SSRF (CVE-2024-38206)

A malicious agent action could expose a victim's SharePoint token through a connector SSRF flaw, enabling impersonation across affected Microsoft services.

What happened

SSRF in SharePoint connector used by Copilot Studio/Power Automate/Power Apps/Copilot 365. Malicious agent List-folder action with attacker URL could harvest victim SharePoint JWT when they connect/retry, enabling impersonation. Microsoft patched Dec 2024.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: nvd.nist.gov

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Original victim-contact route is unspecified

    The seed describes a malicious agent action and connector retry behavior.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Connector uses an attacker URL

    An agent List-folder action points to an attacker-controlled destination.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · User connects or retries through the agent

    The SharePoint connector follows the manipulated flow.

    Hunt: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

    Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · SharePoint token is exposed

    The reported SSRF chain can reveal a JWT that enables impersonation.

    Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

    Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported impact: The reported SSRF chain can reveal a JWT that enables impersonation.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

Copilot Studio

The source describes a SharePoint connector token-exposure path used by Copilot Studio.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm that the installed version is affected by the historical report; selecting a product does not establish its version or patch status.
  • The path depends on the affected SharePoint connector, a malicious agent action and the victim connecting or retrying.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Check the connector advisory and audit shared agent actions, connector permissions and destinations.

Patch; audit public Copilot Studio agents; least-privilege connectors

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

02Connector uses an attacker URLUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

An agent List-folder action points to an attacker-controlled destination.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
03User connects or retries through the agentCredential / session use outside baselineCustom schema · Draft

The SharePoint connector follows the manipulated flow.

What to look for

Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Identity / service authentication logs
  • Device, source-IP and session context
  • Resource access and token issuance audit

Coverage limit. Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline
id: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5
status: experimental
description: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a
  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - identity.login
      - identity.token.use
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
  2. Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
04SharePoint token is exposedUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft

The reported SSRF chain can reveal a JWT that enables impersonation.

What to look for

A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Cloud control-plane and identity audit
  • AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
  • Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory

Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - cloud.credential.use
      - cloud.role.change
      - model.invoke
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
  2. Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
Technical detailsTooling, impact

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Targets and reported impact

Reported scale / exposure
CVE-2024-38206; multi-product impact

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Copilot Studio / Power Platform SharePoint connector SSRF (CVE-2024-38206). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Patch; audit public Copilot Studio agents; least-privilege connectors

Sources & research credit

2 sources

Research by Zenity Labs · Zenity

  1. labs.zenity.io
  2. nvd.nist.gov
Record & downloads
Source record name
Copilot Studio / Power Platform SharePoint connector SSRF (CVE-2024-38206)
Entry ID
zenity-copilot-studio-sharepoint-ssrf-2024
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed