Detection queries Reported campaignmacOS

Adception fake Claude for Mac InstallFix malvertising

A Google ad for 'claude mac' leads to a fake Claude download page whose Copy button swaps the real install command for one that pipes an attacker URL into zsh.

What happened

Google ad for claude mac lists bing.com, Bing click-tracking redirects through compromised retailer to fake Claude download. Page shows real Anthropic install command; Copy button swaps clipboard to decode lake-90.com URL and pipe into zsh (InstallFix). Dual cloaking on referrer. Mate Research (Nadav Lorber) documents full attack chain - clipboard swap Copy button triggers base64 curl pipe to zsh, AES-CTR zsh stager, beacon to /api/metrics/run?event=pasted|stager, AMOS infostealer exfiltration to 152.42.143.45, root backdoor via LaunchDaemons com.apple.accountsd.helper and com.apple.metadata.mds.worker. Signed DMG served from claude-desktop.com as Claude.dmg with Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR; jsDelivr note points to anchorpost13.com. Google Ads campaign 24303764142 served via claude-desk-code.com, promotion-chatgpt.com, lake-90.com. PasteSwitch toolkit family, unattributed.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Mate Research: Fake Claude Code Ads are Installing AMOS on Macs

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Search ad redirects

    An ad for Claude on Mac redirects through tracking and a compromised retailer to a fake download page.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Claude branding earns trust

    The page displays a real-looking Anthropic installation command.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Clipboard command is swapped

    The Copy button substitutes a command that decodes a different download URL and pipes content to zsh.

    Hunt: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.

    Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Victim runs attacker content

    Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content.

    Hunt: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.

    Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Malvertising + clipboard swap / paste into Terminal. Reported impact: Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content; reported targets include macOS users searching for Claude.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

Claude / Claude DesktopmacOS

The source describes a fake Claude-for-Mac download that swaps the copied install command.

Conditions to check
  • The user must follow the malicious advertisement / download path and run the substituted command.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Use official download channels and inspect pasted install commands before running them in Terminal.

Check pasted commands; do not pipe remote scripts into shell

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Search ad redirectsLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

An ad for Claude on Mac redirects through tracking and a compromised retailer to a fake download page.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02Claude branding earns trustLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

The page displays a real-looking Anthropic installation command.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Use delivery provenance and the subsequent pasted command; Claude branding alone is not a detection signal.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Clipboard command is swappedmacOS download → shell executionNative logs · Draft

The Copy button substitutes a command that decodes a different download URL and pipes content to zsh.

What to look for

A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)
  • Browser download and proxy records
  • LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes

Coverage limit. Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.

macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution
id: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918
status: experimental
description: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,
  followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: macos
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - /zsh
      - /bash
      - /sh
      - /curl
    CommandLine|contains:
      - http
      - base64
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "curl")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "base64"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/zsh", "*/bash", "*/sh", "*/curl")
CommandLine IN ("*http*", "*base64*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
  2. Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
04Victim runs attacker contentmacOS download → shell executionNative logs · Draft

Pasting the copied command into Terminal runs attacker-supplied content.

What to look for

A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)
  • Browser download and proxy records
  • LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes

Coverage limit. Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.

macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution
id: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918
status: experimental
description: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,
  followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: macos
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - /zsh
      - /bash
      - /sh
      - /curl
    CommandLine|contains:
      - http
      - base64
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "curl")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "base64"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/zsh", "*/bash", "*/sh", "*/curl")
CommandLine IN ("*http*", "*base64*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
  2. Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
Malvertising + clipboard swap / paste into Terminal

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Fake Claude download / InstallFix lure

Other tooling

  • Google Ads campaign 24303764142
  • Bing ck/a redirect
  • zsh/curl pipe with base64 encoding
  • AES-CTR zsh stager
  • AMOS infostealer
  • LaunchDaemons persistence (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker)
  • Signed DMG (Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR)
  • PasteSwitch toolkit

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
macOS users searching for Claude

Reported attribution

Push AcSig ClickFix toolkit family

Structured attribution

Actor
Push AcSig ClickFix toolkit family
Country
Unknown
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
Push Security, Mate Security
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Clipboard Access Via OSAScriptSIGMAView rule

    Detects clipboard manipulation via osascript on macOS

  • Potential Persistence Via PlistBuddySIGMAView rule

    Detects LaunchDaemon creation (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker)

  • Credentials from Password Stores - KeychainSIGMAView rule

    Detects AMOS infostealer credential harvesting from macOS Keychain

  • Malicious Claude install redirect detectionGUIDANCE

    Block domains claude-desktop.com, claude-desk-code.com, promotion-chatgpt.com, lake-90.com, anchorpost13.com; detect base64-encoded zsh pipes; monitor beacon traffic to /api/metrics/run?event=pasted|stager; block AMOS C2 152.42.143.45; flag Google Ads campaign 24303764142

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-10-09
Last updated
2026-11-06

Updates

  • 2026-10-09 — Push Security

    Push Security reports Adception malvertising campaign; Google Ads for 'claude mac' redirect through Bing to fake Claude download; clipboard swap to base64 curl|zsh

  • 2026-11-06 — Mate Security

    Mate Research documents full attack chain: base64 curl pipe to zsh, AES-CTR stager, AMOS infostealer exfiltration to 152.42.143.45, LaunchDaemons persistence (com.apple.accountsd.helper, com.apple.metadata.mds.worker), signed DMG (Developer ID OSMAN ASTUR), Google Ads campaign 24303764142

Source defensive notes

Check pasted commands; do not pipe remote scripts into shell

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0073Impersonation

A fake Claude download impersonates a trusted AI vendor. Source

AML.T0052Phishing

Google Ads malvertising campaign delivers AMOS via fake Claude installer Source

AML.T0074Masquerading

Clipboard swap technique delivers malicious payload via user paste action Source

AML.T0011User Execution

AMOS infostealer establishes persistence via LaunchDaemons Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • claude-desktop.com
  • anchorpost13.com
  • claude-desk-code.com
  • promotion-chatgpt.com
  • lake-90.com

ips

  • 152.42.143.45

hashes

    urls

      Sources & research credit

      2 sources

      Research by Luke Jennings · Push Security

      1. Push Security: Adception Malvertising - Another Search Engine's Search Results pushsecurity.com
      2. Mate Research: Fake Claude Code Ads are Installing AMOS on Macs mate.security

      Push Security initial disclosure (Oct 9); Mate Research comprehensive analysis adds AMOS payload details, LaunchDaemons persistence, signed DMG distribution, Google Ads campaign ID, full IOC set

      Record & downloads
      Source record name
      Adception fake Claude Mac InstallFix
      Entry ID
      adception-claude-mac-2026-10
      Catalog review
      November 10, 2026
      Category
      adversary-use-of-ai
      AI involvement confidence
      confirmed