Detection queries Research demonstrationCloud & SaaS · Agents & MCP

AgentCorruption: AWS Bedrock AgentCore IMDS credential theft

Research disclosure: chat prompts to exposed AgentCore agents could reach IMDS and steal region-wide role credentials, exposing other agents, memories and secrets. AWS has tightened defaults.

What happened

Chat prompt to public AgentCore agent abused tools that could HTTP/shell to IMDS 169.254.169.254, stealing execution-role credentials. Default role was region-wide across AgentCore: invoke other agents, read conversations/memories, pull images, Secrets Manager / AgentCore Identity, plant persistent memory hijacks. AWS tightened IMDSv2 defaults and narrowed default role.

Read the original source

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Detect this stage
Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Public agent receives a prompt

    An exposed AWS AgentCore agent accepts attacker input.

    Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

    Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Agent tools reach metadata

    Prompt injection abuses HTTP or shell tools to query the instance metadata service.

    Hunt: An agent tool reaches a metadata endpoint and the resulting role identity is used outside its intended task or resource scope.

    Metadata traffic may stay on the host and be absent from ordinary proxy logs. IMDS access can be legitimate; correlate the role and task.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Execution credentials are exposed

    The response discloses the agent execution-role credentials.

    Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

    Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Broader agent access

    The role can reach other agents, memories and connected services; persistent memory hijacks are described.

    Hunt: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

    Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Prompt injection / SSRF via agent tools against exposed AgentCore agent. Reported impact: The role can reach other agents, memories and connected services; persistent memory hijacks are described; reported targets include Organizations deploying AgentCore agents (research disclosure; patched).

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

AWS Bedrock

The research concerns AWS Bedrock AgentCore agents with tools that can reach instance metadata.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm use of AgentCore, exposure to untrusted prompts and HTTP / shell tool access to metadata.
  • Review the execution-role permissions and the defaults / mitigations described in the source.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Review AgentCore metadata access and least-privilege execution roles; check the current vendor guidance.

Least-privilege agent IAM; IMDSv2; agent's role is its blast radius

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Public agent receives a promptUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft

An exposed AWS AgentCore agent accepts attacker input.

What to look for

An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

Collect the exposed agent input and request/session context. A received prompt alone does not establish exploitation.

Visibility: Application / agent audit records

Required logs

  • Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
  • Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
  • Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions

Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
  task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.input.ingest
      - agent.session.resume
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
  2. Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
02Agent tools reach metadataAgent tool access to cloud metadataCustom schema · Draft

Prompt injection abuses HTTP or shell tools to query the instance metadata service.

What to look for

An agent tool reaches a metadata endpoint and the resulting role identity is used outside its intended task or resource scope.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent HTTP / shell tool audit
  • Workload egress / metadata access instrumentation
  • Role-session and downstream cloud audit

Coverage limit. Metadata traffic may stay on the host and be absent from ordinary proxy logs. IMDS access can be legitimate; correlate the role and task.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Agent tool access to cloud metadata
id: c88eca38-d2f7-4e6a-aabf-6a58f5787823
status: experimental
description: An agent tool reaches a metadata endpoint and the resulting role
  identity is used outside its intended task or resource scope.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.metadata.request
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.metadata.request")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.metadata.request")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Look for metadata destination access from the agent's execution context and determine which credentials were available.
  2. Trace that role session into agent memory, secrets and other resources; review the permissions boundary.
03Execution credentials are exposedUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft

The response discloses the agent execution-role credentials.

What to look for

A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Cloud control-plane and identity audit
  • AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
  • Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory

Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - cloud.credential.use
      - cloud.role.change
      - model.invoke
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
  2. Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
04Broader agent accessUnexpected cloud / inference identity useCustom schema · Draft

The role can reach other agents, memories and connected services; persistent memory hijacks are described.

What to look for

A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Cloud control-plane and identity audit
  • AI-service invocation / diagnostic logs when enabled
  • Usage, quotas, cost and key inventory

Coverage limit. Cloud control-plane logs alone may not include model prompts or inference calls. No endpoint policy is claimed to stop cloud-only key misuse.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected cloud / inference identity use
id: afac2e65-c838-485b-a26f-7f175d422f61
status: experimental
description: A service key or role is used from an unfamiliar origin, gains
  broader access or causes inference usage outside its established baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - cloud.credential.use
      - cloud.role.change
      - model.invoke
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("cloud.credential.use", "cloud.role.change", "model.invoke")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Pivot on key ID / principal, source network and user agent, then inspect role changes, token minting and service pivots.
  2. Join inference usage and billing anomalies to the same principal; verify whether the behavior was authorized.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
Prompt injection / SSRF via agent tools against exposed AgentCore agent

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Organizations deploying AgentCore agents (research disclosure; patched)
Reported scale / exposure
Single prompt to one agent → account/region AgentCore blast radius (pre-fix)

Reported attribution

Vulnerability research (Zenity at SecTor)

Structured attribution

Actor
Vulnerability research (Zenity at SecTor)

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in AgentCorruption (AWS Bedrock AgentCore IMDS). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Least-privilege agent IAM; IMDSv2; agent's role is its blast radius

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0051.000Direct

A prompt sent directly to the public agent redirects its tool use. Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

The metadata response exposes execution-role credentials. Source

AML.T0080.000Memory

The source describes persistent memory hijacks. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Tamir Ishay Sharbat, Lana Salameh, Dmitry Lozovoy · Zenity Labs

  1. labs.zenity.io
Record & downloads
Source record name
AgentCorruption (AWS Bedrock AgentCore IMDS)
Entry ID
agentcorruption-bedrock-2026-10
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed