Fake AI tools campaign cluster (ANY.RUN)
1,258 sandbox runs tied to fake Claude, ChatGPT and other AI lures delivered stealers through paste-in commands, ClickFix, shared AI chats, trojanized installers and fake browser ads.
What happened
1,258 public sandbox runs (Apr 15–Oct 5 2026) tied to lures as Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot, Gemini, Ollama, OpenClaw, Manus. Patterns: InstallFix one-liner domain swap; ClickFix Download Claude via mshta; shared claude.ai/chatgpt.com chats; trojanized Claude_x64-setup.exe with mseupdate headless Edge cookie grab; BiTB fake AI ads for marketers.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · AI-themed lures reach users
Search ads, shared AI chats and fake downloads promote familiar AI brands.
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Trusted brands frame the lure
Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot and other product names provide social-engineering context.
Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Commands or installers run
Reported branches use pasted commands, trojanized installers or browser-in-the-browser pages.
Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
MagicSword policy opportunity · Windows mshta / wscript branches only; other reported delivery paths require separate controls.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Malware and cookie theft
The cluster includes malware delivery and a headless-browser cookie-grabbing chain.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Search/malvertising/shared AI chats → paste command or run installer. Reported impact: The cluster includes malware delivery and a headless-browser cookie-grabbing chain; reported targets include Developers, marketers, general users; US second-largest submitter country (16%), first in Download Claude and ChatGPT chains; tech/telecom/education heavy.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The campaign uses impersonated AI brands and shared chats to persuade users to run commands or installers.
Conditions to check- The AI product is a lure; the reported execution path requires the user to follow the malicious content.
- The sandbox sample count is not a count of confirmed victims.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Verify download provenance and inspect copied commands; review suspicious script / installer execution.
Approved AI catalog; take paste-and-run from standard users; prevent mshta/wscript/unsigned scripts
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01AI-themed lures reach usersLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
Search ads, shared AI chats and fake downloads promote familiar AI brands.
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02Trusted brands frame the lureLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft
Claude, ChatGPT, Copilot and other product names provide social-engineering context.
What to look for
An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
Correlate the branded lure with its download destination and subsequent activity; product names alone are not indicators.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Email / secure-web-gateway records
- Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
- User reports and downstream execution / identity events
Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- message.link.click
- web.download
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
- Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Commands or installers runSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft
Reported branches use pasted commands, trojanized installers or browser-in-the-browser pages.
What to look for
A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
- PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
- Download / network and installer events
Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \wscript.exe
- \cscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- -enc
- http
- FromBase64String
- "javascript:"
- "vbscript:"
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
04Malware and cookie theftSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
The cluster includes malware delivery and a headless-browser cookie-grabbing chain.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI tool as lure
- Initial access
- Search/malvertising/shared AI chats → paste command or run installer
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
Other tooling
- mshta
- PowerShell irm|iex
- msiexec
- msedge --remote-debugging-port=9222
- MacSync / Aura Stealer / HijackLoader
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- Developers, marketers, general users; US second-largest submitter country (16%), first in Download Claude and ChatGPT chains; tech/telecom/education heavy
- Reported scale / exposure
- 1,258 analyses; Claude 48%; ≥45% end in paste-and-run
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
The seed describes a global campaign cluster. India and United States percentages refer to sandbox submitters, not confirmed victim locations, and are excluded from country counts.
Reported attribution
Multiple overlapping kits (InstallFix, ClickFix Claude, trojanized installer, AI Ads BiTB)
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Multiple overlapping kits (InstallFix, ClickFix Claude, trojanized installer, AI Ads BiTB)
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in Fake AI tools campaign cluster (ANY.RUN). Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Approved AI catalog; take paste-and-run from standard users; prevent mshta/wscript/unsigned scripts
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by ANY.RUN researchers · ANY.RUN
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Fake AI tools campaign cluster (ANY.RUN)
- Entry ID
- anyrun-fake-ai-tools-2026-10
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed