Detection queries Reported campaignCloud & SaaS

Exposed AWS keys mass-tested for Bedrock LLMjacking

Datadog observed automated, internet-scale testing of exposed AWS keys specifically for Amazon Bedrock model access, a reconnaissance step toward LLMjacking.

What happened

Datadog documents automated testing of exposed AWS keys specifically for Amazon Bedrock access (ListFoundationModels / Invoke / Converse patterns), showing LLMjacking reconnaissance at internet scale beyond generic AWS abuse.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Exposed AWS keys are collected

    Attackers obtain credentials exposed outside the legitimate account boundary.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Automated key tests run

    Requests check model listing, invocation and conversation permissions.

    Hunt: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.

    The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Bedrock access is identified

    Testing distinguishes keys that can use model inference services.

    Hunt: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.

    The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Per-key abuse is not quantified

    The supplied entry establishes reconnaissance at scale, rather than a bill or victim count for every key.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported impact: the cited report does not establish a confirmed victim outcome.

Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.

AWS BedrockAI API / cloud credentials

The campaign tests exposed AWS keys for Bedrock access.

Conditions to check
  • Confirm that the credentials belong to AWS and have Bedrock permissions; a product subscription alone is not the condition.

Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Start here

Inventory Bedrock-enabled keys, rotate exposed credentials and correlate discovery calls with actual model usage.

Secret scanning; CloudTrail detections for Bedrock enum+invoke from unexpected keys

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

02Automated key tests runBedrock discovery / key testingNative logs · Draft

Requests check model listing, invocation and conversation permissions.

What to look for

A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • AWS CloudTrail management events
  • Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled
  • Key inventory and inference usage

Coverage limit. The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.

AWS discovery candidates: Sigma CloudTrail, Sentinel AWSCloudTrail, and Splunk aws:cloudtrail. Invocation logging is a separate prerequisite.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Bedrock discovery / key testing
id: 89e0e836-0c7b-44b4-a9d4-3524f68318b2
status: experimental
description: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed
  by unexpected model access or usage.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: bedrock.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - ListFoundationModels
      - GetFoundationModel
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Discovery only; correlate with principal inventory and enabled invocation logs.
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventSource == "bedrock.amazonaws.com"
| where EventName in ("ListFoundationModels", "GetFoundationModel")
| summarize Requests=count() by UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, EventName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| order by Requests desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" eventSource="bedrock.amazonaws.com"
eventName IN ("ListFoundationModels", "GetFoundationModel")
| bin _time span=1h
| stats count by _time userIdentity.arn sourceIPAddress userAgent eventName
| sort - count
Investigation steps
  1. Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.
  2. Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference.
03Bedrock access is identifiedBedrock discovery / key testingNative logs · Draft

Testing distinguishes keys that can use model inference services.

What to look for

A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed by unexpected model access or usage.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • AWS CloudTrail management events
  • Bedrock invocation logging / relevant data events when explicitly enabled
  • Key inventory and inference usage

Coverage limit. The starter queries cover discovery only. Do not assume default CloudTrail management logs contain InvokeModel / Converse requests or prompt content.

AWS discovery candidates: Sigma CloudTrail, Sentinel AWSCloudTrail, and Splunk aws:cloudtrail. Invocation logging is a separate prerequisite.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Bedrock discovery / key testing
id: 89e0e836-0c7b-44b4-a9d4-3524f68318b2
status: experimental
description: A key enumerates Bedrock models from an unfamiliar origin, followed
  by unexpected model access or usage.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  product: aws
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventSource: bedrock.amazonaws.com
    eventName:
      - ListFoundationModels
      - GetFoundationModel
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Discovery only; correlate with principal inventory and enabled invocation logs.
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventSource == "bedrock.amazonaws.com"
| where EventName in ("ListFoundationModels", "GetFoundationModel")
| summarize Requests=count() by UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, EventName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| order by Requests desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail" eventSource="bedrock.amazonaws.com"
eventName IN ("ListFoundationModels", "GetFoundationModel")
| bin _time span=1h
| stats count by _time userIdentity.arn sourceIPAddress userAgent eventName
| sort - count
Investigation steps
  1. Group ListFoundationModels / GetFoundationModel calls by key, source IP and user agent; compare against normal application identities.
  2. Correlate with invocation logs and cost. Discovery alone does not establish a stolen key or successful inference.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI credential theft

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • Stolen AKIA keys

Detection rules

  • Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE

    Monitor for the techniques described in Exposed AWS keys mass-tested for Bedrock LLMjacking. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.

Source defensive notes

Secret scanning; CloudTrail detections for Bedrock enum+invoke from unexpected keys

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

Exposed AWS credentials are tested for model-service access. Source

Sources & research credit

1 source

Research by Datadog Security Labs · Datadog

  1. securitylabs.datadoghq.com
Record & downloads
Source record name
Exposed AWS keys mass-tested for Bedrock LLMjacking
Entry ID
datadog-bedrock-key-testing-2025
Catalog review
October 20, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed