Detection queries Not classified

FBI FLASH FaceStealer uses stolen webcam video and BlueNoroff deepfakes

FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS (Nov 12, 2026) describes FaceStealer, attributed to Sapphire Sleet / BlueNoroff / APT38 / UNC1069. The operators take over a victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account,…

What happened

FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS (Nov 12, 2026) describes FaceStealer, attributed to Sapphire Sleet / BlueNoroff / APT38 / UNC1069. The operators take over a victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account, read the chat history, and message contacts to catch up or talk investment. A Calendly invite sets the time. Shortly before the call, the link points at a typosquat such as uu01webzoom.us or teams.livemeet.us. The copycat Zoom or Teams page plays the trusted contact's stolen webcam recording, often next to other participants. A chat message says the target cannot be heard and walks them through an update, script, or terminal paste that installs a cookie harvester, keyloggers, a screen capturer, and a backdoor. The target's webcam is recorded from the moment the link opens and feeds the next round. The FBI says the group has begun using what it calls super intelligence to make deepfakes of crypto and web3 figures alongside stolen footage. Earlier in 2026 a maintainer of a widely downloaded JavaScript library ran the fix during a fake Teams call, and the operators then published malicious dependencies that were caught quickly. The FBI has also seen attempts against npm maintainers and, recently, Rust crate maintainers. Arctic Wolf's Nov 12 paper adds lures that end in a ClickFix command: NovaStream Player at vip.novaplayer.online (HTML SHA-256 ca14040cc48fbc3b00ea5f74e891266128f7bb3058be400782c5b08436f7668a), a Chrome PDF Viewer kit at chromeupdate.docdock.online and calendly.docdock.online, and calendly.idcheck.watch. The macOS idcheck command is curl piped to osacompile. The Windows cradle is curl piped to powershell -c with [Console]::In.ReadToEnd()|iex. Hosting includes Hostwinds 104.168.149.21, 104.168.149.182, and 104.168.149.230, and Petrosky 83.136.210.38 for docdock.online. Arctic Wolf's appendix lists 98 high-confidence domains. The domains below are that table plus the FBI examples and the lure hosts named in the paper. Link bluenoroff-uses-deepfaked-executives-fake-zoom-2025-06 and unc1069-gemini-deepfake-crypto-2025.

The FBI FLASH says the operators use what it calls super intelligence to make deepfake video of well-known crypto and web3 figures from public photos and video, and that stolen real footage is still most of the scheme. Arctic Wolf is the generator provenance: 122 assets from seven generators, identified from embedded tags and C2PA data rather than appearance. Grok Imagine and Google Generative AI were nearly two-thirds, with Wondershare AIGC, GPT-4o, GPT Image, and BytePlus ModelArk making up the rest.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months OnAdditional source: Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months On (white paper)Additional source: BlueNoroff uses ClickFix, fileless PowerShell, and AI-generated Zoom meetingsAdditional source: Inside a DPRK BlueNoroff ClickFix kitAdditional source: Coverage of the FaceStealer disruptionAdditional source: FBI warns of North Korean fake Zoom calls

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Hijacked messenger account

    A prior victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account messages contacts and sends a Calendly invite.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Typosquat meeting page

    The link, such as uu01webzoom.us or teams.livemeet.us, plays stolen webcam video and starts recording the new target.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Generator-tagged deepfakes

    Arctic Wolf found 122 assets from seven generators, identified by embedded tags and C2PA rather than appearance. Stolen footage is still most of the scheme.

    Hunt: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

    Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · ClickFix paste

    Windows uses curl piped to powershell ReadToEnd|iex. macOS uses curl piped to osacompile.

    Hunt: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.

    Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Hijacked messenger accounts, then a typosquat Zoom or Teams page and a ClickFix paste. Reported impact: More than $400 million stolen in 18 months, per the FBI. Arctic Wolf: 122 AI-generated assets from seven generators, and 98 high-confidence domains on the Hostwinds cluster; reported targets include Cryptocurrency and web3 individuals and companies, plus open-source maintainers. The FBI says the group stole more than $400 million in 18 months; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Treat a meeting link that arrives in chat just before the call as hostile until the domain is the vendor's. Do not paste a command from a call. On Windows, hunt curl.exe piped into powershell with ReadToEnd and iex. On macOS, hunt curl and osacompile in the same command line. Block the domains and the four IPs below.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3 Additional source 4 Additional source 5 Additional source 6 Additional source 7
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Hijacked messenger accountLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

A prior victim's Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, or Discord account messages contacts and sends a Calendly invite.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02Typosquat meeting pageLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

The link, such as uu01webzoom.us or teams.livemeet.us, plays stolen webcam video and starts recording the new target.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03Generator-tagged deepfakesUntrusted content enters an agent sessionCustom schema · Draft

Arctic Wolf found 122 assets from seven generators, identified by embedded tags and C2PA rather than appearance. Stolen footage is still most of the scheme.

What to look for

An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved task.

Visibility: Application / agent audit records

Required logs

  • Input provenance, source type and request/session identifier
  • Captured tool responses or retrieved content where collection is approved
  • Subsequent tool calls, configuration changes and approval decisions

Coverage limit. Requires application instrumentation and a custom field mapping. Input exposure does not prove that the model followed instructions, executed a tool or bypassed approval. Avoid collecting sensitive prompt bodies unless authorized.

Custom-schema candidate for input exposure only. Map agent.input.ingest and agent.session.resume to your application request and session logs. CorrelationId must link subsequent actions. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor events.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Untrusted content enters an agent session
id: 2d89d7ae-9d44-4dc6-a95b-f9c8de7b8352
status: experimental
description: An agent ingests external content or an untrusted session
  identifier before a tool action or configuration change outside the approved
  task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-04
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.input.ingest
      - agent.session.resume
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.input.ingest", "agent.session.resume")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the ingested input to later actions by session or request ID; preserve the original content as evidence.
  2. Compare the resulting action with the approved task and baseline. Receiving suspicious text alone is not successful injection.
04ClickFix pastemacOS download → shell executionNative logs · Draft

Windows uses curl piped to powershell ReadToEnd|iex. macOS uses curl piped to osacompile.

What to look for

A shell command references remote content or decoding steps, followed by an unexpected download or launched program.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • macOS process events (EDR / Endpoint Security)
  • Browser download and proxy records
  • LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon changes

Coverage limit. Developer install scripts commonly match. Windows application-control coverage is not claimed for this macOS branch.

macos process candidates. Sigma needs normalized process events; KQL needs Defender coverage for that OS; SPL uses a custom openattacks:process sourcetype with Sysmon-style Image / ParentImage / CommandLine fields. Map raw auditd or Endpoint Security data first.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - macOS download → shell execution
id: 66552a7a-b48c-416c-a6a0-d2d3b66a8918
status: experimental
description: A shell command references remote content or decoding steps,
  followed by an unexpected download or launched program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: macos
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - /zsh
      - /bash
      - /sh
      - /curl
    CommandLine|contains:
      - http
      - base64
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "curl")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "base64"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:process"
Image IN ("*/zsh", "*/bash", "*/sh", "*/curl")
CommandLine IN ("*http*", "*base64*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Inspect the copied command as evidence, including decoding and pipe-to-shell stages.
  2. Join shell children, downloaded artifacts and persistence to the originating user session.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Initial access
Hijacked messenger accounts, then a typosquat Zoom or Teams page and a ClickFix paste

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • Grok Imagine
  • Google Generative AI
  • Wondershare AIGC
  • GPT-4o and GPT Image
  • BytePlus ModelArk

Other tooling

  • Stolen webcam recordings
  • ClickFix terminal paste
  • NovaStream Player lure

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Cryptocurrency and web3 individuals and companies, plus open-source maintainers. The FBI says the group stole more than $400 million in 18 months.
Reported scale / exposure
More than $400 million stolen in 18 months, per the FBI. Arctic Wolf: 122 AI-generated assets from seven generators, and 98 high-confidence domains on the Hostwinds cluster.
Target geography
Multiple regions

North Korea is the actor origin from the FBI, not a victim region. Arctic Wolf's target countries are not listed as a closed set, so the entry uses Multiple regions.

Reported attribution

Sapphire Sleet, BlueNoroff, APT38, UNC1069, Dangerous Password, CryptoCore, Stardust Chollima. FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS. Arctic Wolf independently attributes the activity to BlueNoroff.

Structured attribution

Actor
Sapphire Sleet / BlueNoroff / APT38 / UNC1069
Country
North Korea
Motivation
financially-motivated
Attributed by
FBI, Arctic Wolf Labs
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • Potential In-Memory Download And Compile Of PayloadsSIGMAView rule

    macOS process creation. A command line that contains both curl and osacompile. Matches the calendly.idcheck.watch cradle.

  • Suspicious Curl.EXE DownloadSIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. curl.exe downloading a payload. Matches the front half of the Windows ClickFix cradle. It does not see the powershell ReadToEnd|iex half.

  • ReadToEnd stdin cradleGUIDANCE

    security-detections-mcp and a corpus search found no Sigma, Splunk, or Elastic rule for [Console]::In.ReadToEnd()|iex. The Sigma IEX rules require a space that this cradle omits. Also hunt the NovaStream HTML hash and the four IPs.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-05-20
Last updated
2026-11-12

Updates

  • 2026-05-20 — Arctic Wolf Labs

    A self-signed certificate generated at 15:04 UTC is later served by all three Hostwinds addresses. Lure domains resolve over the following days.

  • 2026-11-12 — FBI

    FBI FLASH describes FaceStealer, including deepfakes of crypto figures and the uu01webzoom.us and teams.livemeet.us examples.

  • 2026-11-12 — Arctic Wolf Labs

    Arctic Wolf publishes the six-month update, generator provenance for 122 assets, the ClickFix command lines, and the high-confidence domain table.

Source defensive notes

Treat a meeting link that arrives in chat just before the call as hostile until the domain is the vendor's. Do not paste a command from a call. On Windows, hunt curl.exe piped into powershell with ReadToEnd and iex. On macOS, hunt curl and osacompile in the same command line. Block the domains and the four IPs below.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0088Generate Deepfakes

The FBI says the operators generate deepfake video of crypto and web3 figures from public images, and Arctic Wolf ties 122 assets to generator tags and C2PA data. Source

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

Arctic Wolf attributes the generated media to Grok Imagine, Google Generative AI, Wondershare AIGC, GPT-4o, GPT Image, and BytePlus ModelArk. Source

AML.T0052Phishing

Hijacked accounts and typosquat Zoom and Teams pages deliver the lure. Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • 02live.com.co
  • 02live.us.com
  • 05live.us.com
  • live-teams.com.co
  • me-0live.com
  • me-live.it.com
  • me-live.online
  • me-live.xyz
  • microso1t.com
  • ms-live.cc
  • ms-live.co.com
  • ms-live.online
  • ms-meet.store
  • ms-meeting.co
  • ms-meeting.com.co
  • ms-meeting.live
  • ms-room.online
  • ms-teams.co
  • ms-teams.in
  • protected-view.online
  • teams-live.cam
  • teams-live.com.co
  • teams-live.com.im
  • teams-live.eu.com
  • teams-live.it.com
  • teams-live.vip
  • teams-live.work
  • teams-meet.cc
  • teams-meet.cloud
  • teams-meet.co
  • teams-meet.com.co
  • teams-meet.in
  • teams-meeting.co
  • teams-meeting.in
  • teams-meets.cc
  • teams-meets.com
  • teams-meets.in
  • teams-meets.online
  • teams-meets.us.com
  • teams-room.us
  • teams02live.com
  • teams02live.us
  • teams02live.us.com
  • teams05live.com
  • teams05live.us.com
  • teams06live.com
  • teams07live.com
  • teams0live.com
  • teamscloud.us.com
  • teamslive.cloud
  • teamslive.us.com
  • us02live.co
  • us05cloud.co
  • us05cloud.com
  • us05cloud.live
  • us09live.us
  • web-live.com.co
  • web-live.us
  • call-in.co
  • call-in.online
  • call-live.com
  • call-on.online
  • call-room.online
  • meet-in.co
  • meet-on.online
  • meet-room.online
  • meet-room.xyz
  • meeting-on.online
  • room-live.com
  • room-meet.us
  • room-meet.xyz
  • room-on.online
  • room-on.xyz
  • team-meet.xyz
  • web-meet.us
  • web-teams.us
  • novaplayer.online
  • novaplayer.xyz
  • videolan.online
  • videolan.store
  • videoviewer.online
  • instantsecscan.online
  • instantsecscan.xyz
  • ipblock.watch
  • scanmypc.online
  • scanmypc.xyz
  • securealliance.xyz
  • securemypc.life
  • securemypc.xyz
  • ashnote.blog
  • cloud-docs.online
  • cobolabs.cloud
  • docsend.space
  • notionshare.online
  • agenda.pw
  • idcheck.watch
  • ipcheck.watch
  • sealteam911.online
  • theworldofluck.online
  • uu01webzoom.us
  • teams.livemeet.us
  • docdock.online
  • vip.novaplayer.online
  • updatesdk.novaplayer.online
  • chromeupdate.docdock.online
  • calendly.docdock.online
  • calendly.idcheck.watch
  • updatesdk.ashnote.blog
  • updatesdk.teams-meeting.co
  • updatesdk.ms-teams.co
  • updatesdk.ms-teams.in
  • updatesdk.me-live.online
  • updatesdk.ms-meet.store

ips

  • 104.168.149.21
  • 104.168.149.182
  • 104.168.149.230
  • 83.136.210.38

hashes

  • ca14040cc48fbc3b00ea5f74e891266128f7bb3058be400782c5b08436f7668a

urls

    Sources & research credit

    7 sources

    Research by FBI · FBI

    1. FBI FLASH AC-111226-MS: FaceStealer www.ic3.gov
    2. Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months On arcticwolf.com
    3. Still in the Meeting: BlueNoroff Six Months On (white paper) arcticwolf.com
    4. BlueNoroff uses ClickFix, fileless PowerShell, and AI-generated Zoom meetings arcticwolf.com
    5. Inside a DPRK BlueNoroff ClickFix kit www.jumpsec.com
    6. Coverage of the FaceStealer disruption therecord.media
    7. FBI warns of North Korean fake Zoom calls www.helpnetsecurity.com

    The takeover loop, the two example typosquats, the deepfake statement, and the maintainer supply-chain note are from the FBI PDF. Generator counts, the ClickFix command lines, the Hostwinds and Petrosky addresses, the NovaStream hash, and the high-confidence domain table are from the Arctic Wolf white paper. The Sigma IEX rules require a space in '| iex' or 'iex ', and the published cradle is ReadToEnd()|iex with no space, so those rules are not cited. The osacompile run-only rule requires -x and -e, and the idcheck command uses osacompile -o, so that rule is not cited either. There is no attacker GitHub repository.

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    FBI FLASH FaceStealer uses stolen webcam video and BlueNoroff deepfakes
    Entry ID
    fbi-facestealer-bluenoroff-deepfake-2026-11
    Catalog review
    November 15, 2026
    Category
    adversary-use-of-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    confirmed