Detection queries Not classified

GPUStack CVE-2026-102895 loopback admin bypass used to plant reverse-shell inference backends

GPUStack before v2.2.0 treats a request as the built-in administrator when get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py decides the source is loopback and force_auth_localhost is false, which is the default. A…

What happened

GPUStack before v2.2.0 treats a request as the built-in administrator when get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py decides the source is loopback and force_auth_localhost is false, which is the default. A remote attacker can look like loopback in two ways. Behind a same-host reverse proxy that uses proxy_pass to 127.0.0.1, every request arrives with TCP peer 127.0.0.1. A forged X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 header can also make client_ip_getter report loopback. Either path yields full admin with no credentials. The attacker can enumerate and change users, models, workers, and configuration, mint persistent admin API keys with scope ["*" ] that stay valid from any IP afterward, and read worker credentials and cloud or provider secrets. POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml runs code on worker hosts. The vendor advisory, published by gitlawr, says this was exploited in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment, where attackers created custom inference backends that ran reverse shells. Keys minted before the patch keep working after the upgrade. Affected package is gpustack on pip below 2.2.0. Fixed in 2.2.0. Workaround is force_auth_localhost=true. CISA added CVE-2026-102895 / GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on Nov 9, 2026, with a due date of Nov 12 and a note to apply forensic triage. The vulnerability was reported independently by Nikko Enggaliano, Wei Yunzhou, and Rui Yang and Haoyu Wang of Johns Hopkins University. Javier Sixto of ulex.fr reported the in-the-wild case. No attacker IPs or hashes were published. Project: https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack.

Attackers turn GPUStack's own inference-backend feature into code execution on worker hosts after an unauthenticated admin bypass

Read the original sourceAdditional source: CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE-2026-102895 added 2026-11-09)Additional source: NVD: CVE-2026-102895Additional source: The Hacker News: CISA warns of active exploitation of GPUStack

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Appear as loopback

    A remote request arrives through a same-host reverse proxy or sends X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1, and GPUStack logs it in as the built-in admin.

    Hunt: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

    A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · Mint an admin API key

    The attacker creates an API key with scope star that remains valid from any source IP after the patch.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Register a malicious inference backend

    POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml installs a custom backend on worker hosts.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Reverse shell on the worker

    In the observed v2.1.1 case, the custom backend ran a reverse shell.

    Hunt: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

    Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Unauthenticated admin via loopback trust: same-host reverse proxy or forged X-GPUStack-Real-IP header. Reported impact: In the observed v2.1.1 case, the custom backend ran a reverse shell; reported targets include Organizations serving models with GPUStack; one confirmed v2.1.1 deployment; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Upgrade gpustack to 2.2.0 or later. Set force_auth_localhost=true until upgraded. Strip client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP at the edge. Do not front GPUStack with a same-host reverse proxy that makes every request look like 127.0.0.1. Revoke admin API keys minted before the patch, including keys with scope ["*"]. Hunt worker hosts for reverse shells started by custom inference backends.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3 Additional source 4
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Appear as loopbackWeb exploitation → host activityCustom schema · Draft

A remote request arrives through a same-host reverse proxy or sends X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1, and GPUStack logs it in as the built-in admin.

What to look for

Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected server process, file, or outbound connection.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Reverse-proxy / WAF request logs
  • Server process and file events
  • Outbound DNS / proxy records

Coverage limit. A scan or high request rate alone does not prove compromise or AI use. Host telemetry is needed to confirm execution.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Web exploitation → host activity
id: 04d900b5-0c04-46f2-a13a-91f5574fae98
status: experimental
description: Repeated exploit or upload requests are followed by an unexpected
  server process, file, or outbound connection.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - web.exploit_candidate
      - web.upload
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("web.exploit_candidate", "web.upload")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join requests to the affected host and process tree by time and request ID.
  2. Inspect uploaded files and server-spawned shells; distinguish authorized testing from exploitation.
02Mint an admin API keySensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

The attacker creates an API key with scope star that remains valid from any source IP after the patch.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
03Register a malicious inference backendUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml installs a custom backend on worker hosts.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
04Reverse shell on the workerLinux fileless or anonymous-file executionNative logs · Draft

In the observed v2.1.1 case, the custom backend ran a reverse shell.

What to look for

A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines
  • Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available
  • Network and persistence activity from the resulting process

Coverage limit. Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.

MCP reference matches: Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution
id: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66
status: experimental
description: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|contains:
      - /memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  selection_command:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where FolderPath has_any ("/memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process IN ("*memfd:*", "*/proc/self/fd/*", "*/proc/thread-self/fd/*")
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
  2. Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Initial access
Unauthenticated admin via loopback trust: same-host reverse proxy or forged X-GPUStack-Real-IP header

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • GPUStack inference platform (https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack), versions before 2.2.0, exploited on 2.1.1

Other tooling

  • Custom inference backends created through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml
  • Admin API keys with scope ["*"]

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Organizations serving models with GPUStack; one confirmed v2.1.1 deployment
Reported scale / exposure
CISA KEV dateAdded 2026-11-09, due 2026-11-12. One described in-the-wild deployment on v2.1.1. No victim count published.

Reported attribution

Unnamed. CISA confirmed exploitation by adding the CVE to KEV. The GPUStack advisory documents the in-the-wild reverse-shell case. No country or motivation is stated.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed
Country
Unknown
Motivation
unknown
Attributed by
CISA (KEV) and the GPUStack maintainers
Attribution confidence
high

Detection rules

  • Potential Netcat Reverse Shell ExecutionSIGMAView rule

    Linux workers. Matches netcat reverse shells spawned from a custom inference backend. GPUStack workers are Linux hosts in the documented deployment.

  • Suspicious Reverse Shell Command LineSIGMAView rule

    Linux shell history and audit. Matches bash, python, and perl reverse-shell one-liners on worker hosts.

  • Potential Reverse ShellELASTICView rule

    Linux endpoint. A network utility child followed by a shell, which is the worker-side reverse shell described in the advisory.

  • GPUStack admin-key and header huntingGUIDANCE

    No rule names the X-GPUStack-Real-IP header or POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Alert on that header from non-loopback clients, on new API keys with scope star, and on inference-backend creates. Revoke keys created before the upgrade to 2.2.0.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-11-09
Last updated
2026-11-09

Updates

  • 2026-11-09 — GPUStack / CISA

    GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr describes in-the-wild reverse shells on GPUStack 2.1.1 via the loopback admin bypass. CISA adds CVE-2026-102895 to KEV the same day, due Nov 12.

Source defensive notes

Upgrade gpustack to 2.2.0 or later. Set force_auth_localhost=true until upgraded. Strip client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP at the edge. Do not front GPUStack with a same-host reverse proxy that makes every request look like 127.0.0.1. Revoke admin API keys minted before the patch, including keys with scope ["*"]. Hunt worker hosts for reverse shells started by custom inference backends.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing Application

The loopback-trust bug is a public-facing authentication bypass in the GPUStack API Source

AML.T0012Valid Accounts

Attackers mint persistent admin API keys with scope star that survive the patch Source

AML.T0050Command and Scripting Interpreter

POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml runs attacker commands on worker hosts Source

AML.T0072Reverse Shell

The in-the-wild case used custom inference backends that ran reverse shells Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

Admin access exposes worker credentials and cloud or provider secrets Source

Sources & research credit

4 sources

Research by Nikko Enggaliano; Wei Yunzhou; Rui Yang and Haoyu Wang (Johns Hopkins University); in-the-wild case reported by Javier Sixto (ulex.fr); advisory by gitlawr · GPUStack

  1. GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr: GPUStack authentication bypass via trusted loopback source github.com
  2. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE-2026-102895 added 2026-11-09) www.cisa.gov
  3. NVD: CVE-2026-102895 nvd.nist.gov
  4. The Hacker News: CISA warns of active exploitation of GPUStack thehackernews.com

Behavior, header, endpoint, version, and the in-the-wild reverse-shell statement are from GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr. CISA KEV and NVD pages returned HTTP 403 to this reviewer's fetch but are the canonical catalog and CVE records cited by the advisory coverage. No IPs or hashes were published, so none are listed.

Record & downloads
Source record name
GPUStack CVE-2026-102895 loopback admin bypass used to plant reverse-shell inference backends
Entry ID
gpustack-cve-2026-102895-reverse-shell-2026-11
Catalog review
November 12, 2026
Category
attacks-on-ai
AI involvement confidence
confirmed