Detection queries Not classified

Huntress SCKit installs rogue ScreenConnect clients; RelayTrap source looks LLM-written

Huntress (Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch; published Nov 11, 2026, updated Nov 13) observed Run commands on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels installing rogue ScreenConnect clients. On…

What happened

Huntress (Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch; published Nov 11, 2026, updated Nov 13) observed Run commands on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels installing rogue ScreenConnect clients. On Nov 11, from about 17:47 UTC, at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations were hit in about 90 minutes. ScreenConnect 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 were affected. Huntress ties the activity to the third-party RMM+ extension, versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32: if the access key was never set, the extension accepted a blank key, bypassing ScreenConnect user accounts, roles, and MFA. Commands showed up as RMM+ with no matching login. ConnectWise said it had disabled five extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link) across more than 400 partner environments and had not yet identified an initial access vector when the Nov 11 advisory posted. The Run command, as SYSTEM, downloaded an attacker ScreenConnect installer to C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi, installed it silently, and wrote C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat. The dropper fetches sckit-decoder.ps1 and a kit keyed by the Windows UUID. Components extract to C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. TrapWatch.ps1 runs as SYSTEM, compiles RelayTrap.cs into a host-specific RelayTrap.exe, and creates a scheduled task named TrapWatch that runs every 10 seconds. The legitimate ScreenConnect client is stopped and set to manual start. Huntress Figure 6 says the RelayTrap C# source appears to have been generated by an LLM because of detailed source comments explaining intent. A separate path, seen in the kit and not observed succeeding, steals the technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and tries to push WithUninstall.ps1 through the Shared Toolbox. On Nov 13 at 16:12 UTC Huntress saw another spike, 205 hosts across 41 organizations, with the client hosted at 185.241.211.197 and an installer URL ending in c=ExploitedNOTUSA. Huntress also saw c=Exploited529 and c=Exploited809. One incident used a self-hosted RMM+ plugin, a netsh portproxy from 127.0.0.1:88 to 185.241.211.197:80, and a service named Windows Update Agent running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe from C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\. ConnectWise also pointed on-premises partners at ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later for CVE-2026-84869, a separate client file-transfer flaw. Huntress does not say this wave exploited that flaw. Blackpoint Cyber (Sam Decker, Nevan Beal) says RelayTrap.cs is compiled on the endpoint by TrapWatch.ps1, not shipped as a precompiled binary. When a technician connects, the replacement Guest sends TransferFilesMessage FileAction.Run after a 2.5 second delay, which is the CVE-2026-84869 file-transfer-back path. Blackpoint's test against a current ScreenConnect Host queued the transfer on the Guest, and the Host did not request or run the payload. They report no successful technician compromise. Primary panel indicators include sc.payproofkit.com (155.94.150.39) and 185.99.255.28.

Huntress Figure 6 says the RelayTrap C# source appears to have been generated by an LLM, based on detailed comments that explain what the code is intended to do. BleepingComputer reports the same inference. No prompts were published. The schema has no inferred value, so this is recorded as vendor-asserted.

Read the original sourceAdditional source: New worm-like SCKit malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacksAdditional source: ScreenConnect attack: SCKit

How it happened

Select a stage to explore its defenses
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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Blank RMM+ access key

    RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept an empty access key when none was configured, so Run Command arrives without a ScreenConnect login.

    Hunt: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

    Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · SYSTEM installs sc.msi and SCKit

    The command writes C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi and sckit-run.bat, then downloads a UUID-keyed kit into C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap.

    Hunt: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

    Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · LLM-commented RelayTrap

    TrapWatch.ps1 compiles RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says looks LLM-written, and schedules TrapWatch every 10 seconds.

    Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

    Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Cookie theft path not seen succeeding

    The kit can read a technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and upload a Shared Toolbox item. Huntress had not seen that jump succeed.

    Source for step 4

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Blank access key on RMM+ 1.0.31 or 1.0.32, then ScreenConnect Run Command as SYSTEM. ConnectWise had not identified a single initial-access vector in the Nov 11 advisory. Reported impact: The kit can read a technician .aspxauth cookie with sqlite3.exe and upload a Shared Toolbox item. Huntress had not seen that jump succeed; reported targets include Organizations using Huntress and ScreenConnect. 48 organizations on Nov 11 and 41 on Nov 13. Sectors were not named; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Disable RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 where the access key was left blank, including on-premises ScreenConnect. Do not triage a suspect host over ScreenConnect. Remove the rogue client service, the TrapWatch task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, and sckit files under %TEMP%. Hunt msiexec installs of ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi or UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi with c=Exploited. Block 185.99.255.28 and 185.241.211.197.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Blank RMM+ access keyCredential / session use outside baselineCustom schema · Draft

RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accept an empty access key when none was configured, so Run Command arrives without a ScreenConnect login.

What to look for

Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Identity / service authentication logs
  • Device, source-IP and session context
  • Resource access and token issuance audit

Coverage limit. Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline
id: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5
status: experimental
description: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a
  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - identity.login
      - identity.token.use
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
  2. Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
02SYSTEM installs sc.msi and SCKitUnapproved Windows program executionNative logs · Draft

The command writes C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi and sckit-run.bat, then downloads a UUID-keyed kit into C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap.

What to look for

A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation
  • Download provenance and file hashes
  • File certificate information and application-control audit / block events

Coverage limit. Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution
id: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1
status: experimental
description: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable
  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|contains:
      - \Downloads\
      - \AppData\Local\Temp\
      - \AppData\Roaming\
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "\\Downloads\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
  2. Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
03LLM-commented RelayTrapSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft

TrapWatch.ps1 compiles RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says looks LLM-written, and schedules TrapWatch every 10 seconds.

What to look for

A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
  • PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
  • Download / network and installer events

Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \wscript.exe
      - \cscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -enc
      - http
      - FromBase64String
      - "javascript:"
      - "vbscript:"
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
  2. Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
LLM-generated malware
Initial access
Blank access key on RMM+ 1.0.31 or 1.0.32, then ScreenConnect Run Command as SYSTEM. ConnectWise had not identified a single initial-access vector in the Nov 11 advisory.

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • RelayTrap.cs, which Huntress says appears LLM-generated from its explanatory comments

Other tooling

  • ScreenConnect (LOLRMM), including rogue clients
  • RMM+ extension 1.0.31 and 1.0.32
  • sqlite3.exe for .aspxauth cookie theft
  • msiexec

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Organizations using Huntress and ScreenConnect. 48 organizations on Nov 11 and 41 on Nov 13. Sectors were not named.
Reported scale / exposure
Nov 11: at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations in about 90 minutes. Nov 13: 205 hosts across 41 organizations. ConnectWise disabled the listed extensions across more than 400 partner environments. One panel parameter reached Exploited809 (190 downstream clients on one panel).

Huntress did not name the countries of the affected organizations.

Reported attribution

Unnamed. Huntress and ConnectWise describe the activity. No country is stated. Participant name Addmin and client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091 were published.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed SCKit operator
Motivation
cybercrime
Attributed by
Huntress
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Installation ExecutionSIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. ScreenConnect client install command line. Matches msiexec of sc.msi and the Nov 13 UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi.

  • Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Remote Command ExecutionSIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. Commands launched from a ScreenConnect session. Matches the Run Command that deployed SCKit as SYSTEM.

  • Suspicious ScreenConnect Client Child ProcessELASTICView rule

    Windows endpoint. A ScreenConnect client spawning a suspicious child, including the installer and script chain.

  • Newly Observed ScreenConnect Host ServerELASTICView rule

    Windows endpoint. A ScreenConnect client calling a host not seen before. Useful for 185.99.255.28 and 185.241.211.197.

  • Local Scheduled Task CreationELASTICView rule

    Windows. New scheduled task. The kit creates TrapWatch, which runs every 10 seconds as SYSTEM.

  • SCKit paths and the blank RMM+ keyGUIDANCE

    No cited rule names RMM+ 1.0.31, TrapWatch, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, or sckit-run.bat. Sigma csc.exe rules key on Temp, Public, or PerfLogs paths, or on an encoded PowerShell parent, so they miss TrapWatch.ps1 compiling under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. The Splunk on-the-fly csc rule also requires /noconfig, /fullpaths, and a response file, which the write-up does not show. ScreenConnect path-traversal rules describe CVE-class bugs, not the blank access key, so they are not cited. Also hunt sqlite3.exe reading ScreenConnect cookies and c=Exploited in the installer URL.

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-11-11
Last updated
2026-11-13

Updates

  • 2026-11-11 — Huntress

    From 17:47 UTC, Run Command installs SCKit on at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations. ConnectWise disables five extensions, including RMM+.

  • 2026-11-13 — Huntress

    A second wave at 16:12 UTC hits 205 hosts across 41 organizations from 185.241.211.197, including c=ExploitedNOTUSA. Blackpoint reports that a patched ScreenConnect Host did not fetch the file RelayTrap tried to send back with CVE-2026-84869.

Source defensive notes

Disable RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 where the access key was left blank, including on-premises ScreenConnect. Do not triage a suspect host over ScreenConnect. Remove the rogue client service, the TrapWatch task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, and sckit files under %TEMP%. Hunt msiexec installs of ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi or UpdateConnect.ClientSetup.msi with c=Exploited. Block 185.99.255.28 and 185.241.211.197.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

Huntress says the RelayTrap C# source appears LLM-generated from comments that explain the intended behavior Source

AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing Application

RMM+ 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key and exposed Run Command as SYSTEM Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • sc.payproofkit.com
  • newnewnew.gotdns.org
  • soxnewwork.homedns.org
  • cdn007-digitaldownloads.com
  • ns.mo7sen.dev
  • 007.from-ak.com

ips

  • 185.99.255.28
  • 155.94.150.39
  • 185.241.211.197

hashes

  • 94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11
  • 7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec
  • 3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4
  • d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a
  • 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af

urls

    Sources & research credit

    3 sources

    Research by Ben Nahorney, Susannah Matt, Lindsey O'Donnell-Welch · Huntress

    1. SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints www.huntress.com
    2. New worm-like SCKit malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks www.bleepingcomputer.com
    3. ScreenConnect attack: SCKit blackpointcyber.com

    Counts, the blank-key behavior, Figure 6's LLM comment, paths, and IOCs are from the Huntress article, including the Nov 13 update. BleepingComputer reports the same LLM-looking comments. The console-takeover and Shared Toolbox spread were recovered from the kit and were not seen succeeding. Blackpoint's patched-host test is the source for the 2.5 second TransferFilesMessage and the result that a current Host did not fetch the payload. Additional acknowledged contributors include John Hammond, Tanner Filip, Tyler Marzen, Austin Worline, Ethan Williams, Sharon Martin, Ben Bernstein, Andrew Brandt, Jamie Levy, Max Rogers, Aaron Deal, and Mendy Green. File hashes are weak because scripts are rebuilt per host. ScreenConnect is tracked by LOLRMM at https://lolrmm.io/tools/screenconnect.

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    Huntress SCKit installs rogue ScreenConnect clients; RelayTrap source looks LLM-written
    Entry ID
    huntress-sckit-screenconnect-llm-2026-11
    Catalog review
    November 15, 2026
    Category
    adversary-use-of-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    vendor-asserted