InstallFix fake Claude Code installation pages
Mar 6, 2026: Push Security identified 'InstallFix' campaign: 120+ fake websites impersonating official Claude Code installation pages (claude-code-download[.]com, get-claude-code[.]net, etc.). Sites rank…
What happened
Mar 6, 2026: Push Security identified 'InstallFix' campaign: 120+ fake websites impersonating official Claude Code installation pages (claude-code-download[.]com, get-claude-code[.]net, etc.). Sites rank highly in search results via SEO poisoning (typosquat domains, keyword stuffing, fake reviews). Offer trojanized Claude Code installers for Windows/macOS/Linux. Windows: NSIS installer bundles Claude Code with AMOS infostealer. macOS: DMG contains Claude Code.app + hidden LaunchAgent installing Atomic Stealer. Linux: .deb/.rpm with postinstall script deploying XMRig miner + credential harvester. All variants harvest: Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, crypto wallets, browser cookies, SSH keys. Push Security tracked 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026. Average user dwell time before detection: 23 days. Detection: verify Claude Code install source (official anthropic.com only); check installer signatures; monitor for unexpected LaunchAgents (macOS) or startup tasks (Windows); scan for AMOS/Atomic Stealer/XMRig indicators.
InstallFix campaign creates fake Claude Code installation pages via SEO poisoning to distribute trojanized installers and credential stealers
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Create fake install sites with SEO
Adversary creates 120+ fake Claude Code installation websites (claude-code-download[.]com, get-claude-code[.]net, etc.); uses SEO poisoning (typosquats, keyword stuffing, fake reviews) to rank highly in search results for 'download Claude Code'
Source for step 1 - 02 · User downloads trojanized installer
User searches for Claude Code, finds fake site, downloads installer; sites appear legitimate with screenshots, documentation, fake testimonials; multi-platform support (Windows NSIS, macOS DMG, Linux deb/rpm)
Source for step 2 - 03 · Install malware with legitimate app
Installer deploys functional Claude Code plus malware: Windows (AMOS infostealer), macOS (LaunchAgent → Atomic Stealer), Linux (postinstall → XMRig + harvester). Malware harvests Anthropic keys, OpenAI keys, GitHub tokens, AWS creds, crypto wallets, SSH keys
Source for step 3 - 04 · Credential theft and crypto mining
Malware exfiltrates credentials to attacker C2; XMRig mines Monero on Linux systems; persistence via LaunchAgents/startup tasks; 8,900+ affected installations Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: User searches 'download Claude Code', finds fake site via SEO poisoning, downloads trojanized installer. Reported impact: Malware exfiltrates credentials to attacker C2; XMRig mines Monero on Linux systems; persistence via LaunchAgents/startup tasks; 8,900+ affected installations Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time; reported targets include 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; AI developers, data scientists, software engineers seeking Claude Code; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Only download Claude Code from official anthropic.com; verify installer signatures; check domain spelling before download; use bookmark for official site; educate users on SEO poisoning risks; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Atomic/XMRig; monitor for unexpected startup persistence mechanisms
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI tool as lure
- Additional role
- AI credential theft
- Initial access
- User searches 'download Claude Code', finds fake site via SEO poisoning, downloads trojanized installer
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Claude Code (impersonated)
- Anthropic Claude API
- OpenAI API
Other tooling
- AMOS infostealer (Windows)
- Atomic Stealer (macOS)
- XMRig cryptocurrency miner (Linux)
- Credential harvesters
- SEO poisoning and typosquat domains
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; AI developers, data scientists, software engineers seeking Claude Code
- Reported scale / exposure
- 120+ fake installation websites, 8,900+ downloads Mar-May 2026; avg 23-day dwell time before detection
- Target geography
- Multiple regions
Reported attribution
Unknown actor; 'InstallFix' campaign; sophisticated SEO manipulation and multi-platform malware development
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unknown
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Push Security
- Attribution confidence
- medium
Detection rules
- Behavioral monitoringGUIDANCE
Monitor for malicious patterns in IDE extensions, skills, and installation pages; verify publisher authenticity
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-03-06
- Last updated
- 2026-11-04
Updates
- 2026-03-06 — Push Security
Campaign discovered and analyzed
Source defensive notes
Only download Claude Code from official anthropic.com; verify installer signatures; check domain spelling before download; use bookmark for official site; educate users on SEO poisoning risks; implement endpoint security detecting AMOS/Atomic/XMRig; monitor for unexpected startup persistence mechanisms
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Adversary uses SEO poisoning and fake installation pages to distribute trojanized AI coding assistant installers stealing credentials Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
claude-code-download.comget-claude-code.net
ips
hashes
urls
Sources & research credit
1 sourceResearch by Push Security Research · Push Security
Push Security analysis. InstallFix represents evolution of software supply chain attacks: instead of compromising legitimate distribution, adversary creates parallel fake distribution network optimized for search discovery. Detection: alert on Claude Code installs from domains other than anthropic.com, scan for AMOS/Atomic Stealer/XMRig, monitor LaunchAgents and startup tasks created during install, check installer code signing (unsigned/wrong signature = malicious).
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- InstallFix fake Claude Code installation pages
- Entry ID
- installfix-fake-claude-pages-2026-03
- Catalog review
- November 4, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed