Detection queries Not classified

testmetest worm hijacks 42 GitHub repos with Claude/Gemini startup hooks

42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md) and 12.9-13.7 MB…

What happened

42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners contain execution hooks for AI coding assistants (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md) and 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers decoding to same CI-publisher payload. Campaign uses compiled native addon (addon.node) that XORs .napi_cache with 0x96 to decrypt JavaScript payload. Addon checks for CI/container/sandbox environment and CPU/RAM limits, skipping execution in automated scanners. Payload collects credentials, poisons repos and CI, propagates via npm. GitHub account CementBeetleSteeple hosts repositories; SafeDep identifies as Shai-Hulud-descendant Miasma-family. Shellpanel artifacts in hijacked owner cluster link to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation. Socket (Kush Pandya, Nov 6, 2026) reports RubyGems strutil-core 1.0.1 (account jamnajiea); extconf.rb downloads Bun, runs worm at install; steals .claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json, cloud/CI credentials to paleasbest[.]top; plants workspace-tools MCP server, SessionStart hooks, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .vscode/tasks.json; signed-commit-message backdoor (marker msync-3f7a); wiper if stolen GitHub token revoked. SHA-256 3b3f6e1bde0b28b015030a81a6d805b5b5306dc3f021e1102123971cfd83acc0; related PyPI pystr-codec. Thomas Roccia (Nov 9, 2026) documents hijacked repos with forged backdated commits: toray/XiamiSDK-lib, widget-lib, Rainbow-lib, QiniuSDK-lib, torayUtils-lib; ejaaduipitara/djp-devops, whatsapp-bot, content-service; ConcordiaDev/theme_saimaniq; madolee/da; Imanilom/baraja-coffe; claudiohernanbesada/xenios.api. CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED block instructs agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start.

Worm plants execution hooks for AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini, Copilot, Aider, etc.) in hijacked repositories; steals credentials and propagates through package registries

Read the original sourceAdditional source: Socket: Shai-Hulud Descendant - Malicious Ruby GemAdditional source: Thomas Roccia: Hijacked repos with backdated commits and CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · Account/repository hijacking

    Hijacked 11 legitimate GitHub owners and 42 repositories via credential theft from earlier infections; exposed npm credentials; linked to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 Shellpanel exploitation

    Hunt: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

    Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · AI assistant execution hooks

    Armed repositories with .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md files; added 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; all decode to same CI-publisher payload

    Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

    Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · Malicious npm packages

    Published event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest; binding.gyp command expansion executes index.js during install; later versions use compiled native addon

    Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

    Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Scanner evasion via native addon

    Compiled addon.node checks CI/container/sandbox env vars (GITHUB_ACTIONS, CI, VERCEL, etc.), /proc/1/cgroup for docker/kubepod, RAM <1.5GB, CPU=1, TracerPid; returns without running if detected; skips automated scanners

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · Runtime decryption

    Addon reads /proc/self/maps for own folder, opens .napi_cache, XORs every byte with 0x96; drops result in /tmp, chmod 0600, forks detached process with node; decrypts Bun bootstrap and credential stealer

    Hunt: A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

    Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Credential collection and propagation

    Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 6
  7. 07 · Encrypted data exfiltration

    Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes

    Hunt: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

    An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

    Source for step 7

Dashed edges show a repeated decision loop.

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Account hijacks via GitHub/npm credential theft from earlier worm infections; exposed npm credentials; forged commit timelines and short-lived publishing branches; cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation (Shellpanel workflows in same hijacked cluster). Reported impact: Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing; Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes; reported targets include 42 GitHub repositories from 11 legitimate owners; AI development, npm package consumers; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Monitor GitHub repositories for unexpected .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md/instructions.md files; native addon scrutiny; large dotfiles in packages; npm install hook abuse; GitHub Actions secret access; CI environment variable monitoring

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance Additional source 2 Additional source 3
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01Account/repository hijackingCredential / session use outside baselineCustom schema · Draft

Hijacked 11 legitimate GitHub owners and 42 repositories via credential theft from earlier infections; exposed npm credentials; linked to cPanel CVE-2026-41940 Shellpanel exploitation

What to look for

Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Identity / service authentication logs
  • Device, source-IP and session context
  • Resource access and token issuance audit

Coverage limit. Shared infrastructure and legitimate travel create noise. IoT, SharePoint and cloud identity require their own collectors and field mappings.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Credential / session use outside baseline
id: 7d73d919-e785-4d40-ab0b-f12949adfaf5
status: experimental
description: Repeated credential attempts or a stolen session are followed by a
  successful login or resource access inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - identity.login
      - identity.token.use
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("identity.login", "identity.token.use")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare failures, successes and session reuse by account and source; inspect access to new resources.
  2. Check device registration, MFA and credential changes; do not equate travel anomalies with confirmed compromise.
02AI assistant execution hooksPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft

Armed repositories with .cursorrules, CLAUDE.md, claude_code_config.json, instructions.md files; added 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; all decode to same CI-publisher payload

What to look for

A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
  • Repository and token permission inventory
  • Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records

Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
  repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - repository.public.write
      - repository.visibility.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
  2. Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
03Malicious npm packagesDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft

Published event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest; binding.gyp command expansion executes index.js during install; later versions use compiled native addon

What to look for

A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Package-manager and CI job logs
  • Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
  • Runner process trees, secret access and egress

Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
  dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - package.install
      - ci.workflow.change
      - package.lifecycle.exec
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
  2. Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
05Runtime decryptionLinux fileless or anonymous-file executionNative logs · Draft

Addon reads /proc/self/maps for own folder, opens .napi_cache, XORs every byte with 0x96; drops result in /tmp, chmod 0600, forks detached process with node; decrypts Bun bootstrap and credential stealer

What to look for

A Linux process executes from a memfd or /proc file-descriptor path, or stages an executable in a transient directory, consistent with fileless payload or miner execution.

Visibility: Linux process and audit telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Linux process creation with executable paths and command lines
  • Audit or EDR telemetry for memfd_create and execve where available
  • Network and persistence activity from the resulting process

Coverage limit. Updaters, runtimes, and security tools can legitimately execute anonymous files. Process collectors differ in how they represent memfd paths, so absence of a match is not proof of absence.

Linux process candidates whose image or command line exposes a memfd or procfs descriptor. Tune known runtimes and require supporting behavior before alerting.

MCP reference matches: Potential Fileless Execution via Unusual memfd Create Call (Elastic detection-rules). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Linux Anonymous File Execution
id: afc1e20b-3eae-46fd-b736-e14b639f3a66
status: experimental
description: Detects process paths or command lines associated with memfd and procfs file-descriptor execution.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
references:
  - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/linux/defense_evasion_fileless_execution_via_unusual_memfd_create.toml
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate runtimes, updaters, and security software using anonymous files
level: medium
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_image:
    Image|contains:
      - /memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  selection_command:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - memfd:
      - /proc/self/fd/
      - /proc/thread-self/fd/
  condition: 1 of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "Linux"
| where FolderPath has_any ("/memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd:", "/proc/self/fd/", "/proc/thread-self/fd/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where Processes.process IN ("*memfd:*", "*/proc/self/fd/*", "*/proc/thread-self/fd/*")
  by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process
     Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| sort - lastTime
Investigation steps
  1. Capture the process memory or recovered executable, parent tree, user, container, and destination.
  2. Correlate the execution with downloads, persistence changes, mining traffic, or reverse shells.
06Credential collection and propagationSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

Collects GitHub/npm/cloud credentials; poisons repositories and CI configuration; propagates through package registries; CI-publisher payload designed to run in GitHub Actions with npm tokens/trusted publishing

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
07Encrypted data exfiltrationSensitive data → unusual destinationCustom schema · Draft

Attacker-owned CementBeetleSteeple repository operates as active encrypted data sink receiving snapshot envelopes

What to look for

Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Sensitive resource access / DLP records
  • Proxy, egress and cloud upload events
  • Agent / SaaS audit with correlation IDs

Coverage limit. An outbound connection or high byte count alone is not exfiltration. Encrypted traffic may hide content, and bulk legitimate exports are common.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive data → unusual destination
id: 04b60968-3179-4b1f-ae13-6f57c2446077
status: experimental
description: Sensitive reads are followed by outbound transfer, a public
  artifact, or a tool call to a destination outside the approved workflow.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - data.export
      - agent.external.send
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("data.export", "agent.external.send")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join the resource read and outbound action by session, identity or process, preserving a bounded time window.
  2. Inspect destination ownership, payload classification and the user's intended action; baseline sanctioned sharing.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
Agent / MCP as target
Additional role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Account hijacks via GitHub/npm credential theft from earlier worm infections; exposed npm credentials; forged commit timelines and short-lived publishing branches; cPanel CVE-2026-41940 exploitation (Shellpanel workflows in same hijacked cluster)

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • npm binding.gyp command expansion
  • Bun 1.2.18 runtime
  • Native Node addon with XOR 0x96 encryption
  • Caesar transformation and AES-128-GCM
  • GitHub Actions for CI publishing
  • npm trusted publishing
  • RubyGems strutil-core 1.0.1 (account jamnajiea)
  • PyPI pystr-codec
  • workspace-tools MCP server
  • SessionStart hooks
  • Signed-commit-message backdoor (msync-3f7a marker)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
42 GitHub repositories from 11 legitimate owners; AI development, npm package consumers
Reported scale / exposure
42 armed repositories; 11 hijacked legitimate owners; multiple malicious npm packages (event-bus-lite-testmetest, @iobandamwer/cache-helper, @iobandamwer/native-helper, path-stream-utils-testmetest); polymorphic wrappers 12.9-13.7 MB; discovered Oct 21-26, 2026

Reported attribution

GitHub account CementBeetleSteeple; SafeDep identifies as Miasma-family, Shai-Hulud-descendant payload; not established that original Miasma operators responsible; linked to Shellpanel cPanel exploitation (CVE-2026-41940)

Structured attribution

Actor
CementBeetleSteeple (GitHub account); Miasma-family, Shai-Hulud-descendant
Country
Unknown
Motivation
cybercrime
Attributed by
JFrog Security Research, SafeDep, Socket
Attribution confidence
medium

Detection rules

  • Curl or Wget Spawned via Node.jsELASTICView rule

    Detects Bun download during npm install (Node.js spawning curl/wget)

  • Package Runtime Secret File Access Followed by IMDS RequestELASTICView rule

    Detects credential file access (.claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json) during package installation

  • Shai-Hulud Workflow File Creation or ModificationSPLUNKView rule

    Detects Shai-Hulud family GitHub workflow modifications and git hook persistence

  • Worm artifact detectionGUIDANCE

    Monitor strutil-core RubyGem (account jamnajiea), pystr-codec PyPI; alert on paleasbest[.]top exfiltration; detect workspace-tools MCP server installation; monitor CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks; flag msync-3f7a signed-commit markers

Activity timeline

First seen
2026-10-21
Last updated
2026-11-09

Updates

  • 2026-10-26 — JFrog Security Research

    JFrog documents 42 hijacked GitHub repositories with testmetest worm; native addon camouflage; 12.9-13.7 MB polymorphic wrappers; CLAUDE.md/.cursorrules execution hooks

  • 2026-11-06 — Socket

    Socket reports strutil-core 1.0.1 RubyGem (account jamnajiea); extconf.rb downloads Bun, runs worm at install; steals .claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json; plants workspace-tools MCP server; msync-3f7a signed-commit backdoor; related PyPI pystr-codec

  • 2026-11-09 — Thomas Roccia

    Roccia documents hijacked repos with forged backdated commits (toray, ejaaduipitara, ConcordiaDev, madolee, Imanilom, claudiohernanbesada); CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks instruct agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start

Source defensive notes

Monitor GitHub repositories for unexpected .cursorrules/CLAUDE.md/instructions.md files; native addon scrutiny; large dotfiles in packages; npm install hook abuse; GitHub Actions secret access; CI environment variable monitoring

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0010AI Supply Chain Compromise

Supply chain attack targeting AI coding assistant users via hijacked GitHub repositories and malicious npm packages Source

AML.T0011User Execution

Worm propagates through package registries (npm, RubyGems, PyPI) and version control (GitHub), specifically targeting AI development environments Source

AML.T0051LLM Prompt Injection

CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks inject hidden instructions telling agents to silently run node scripts/setup.js at session start Source

AML.T0083Credentials from AI Agent Configuration

Worm steals AI coding assistant credentials (.claude/.credentials.json, .codex/auth.json) and cloud/CI credentials Source

AML.T0081Modify AI Agent Configuration

Plants workspace-tools MCP server and SessionStart hooks for persistent AI agent manipulation Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • paleasbest.top

ips

    hashes

    • 3b3f6e1bde0b28b015030a81a6d805b5b5306dc3f021e1102123971cfd83acc0

    urls

    • https://github.com/CementBeetleSteeple
    • https://github.com/toray/XiamiSDK-lib
    • https://github.com/toray/widget-lib
    • https://github.com/toray/Rainbow-lib
    • https://github.com/toray/QiniuSDK-lib
    • https://github.com/toray/torayUtils-lib
    • https://github.com/ejaaduipitara/djp-devops
    • https://github.com/ejaaduipitara/whatsapp-bot
    • https://github.com/ejaaduipitara/content-service
    • https://github.com/ConcordiaDev/theme_saimaniq
    • https://github.com/madolee/da
    • https://github.com/Imanilom/baraja-coffe
    • https://github.com/claudiohernanbesada/xenios.api

    Sources & research credit

    3 sources

    Research by Guy Korolevski, Yair Benamou · JFrog Security Research

    1. Beyond testmetest: Native Addon Camouflage and 42 Armed GitHub Repositories research.jfrog.com
    2. Socket: Shai-Hulud Descendant - Malicious Ruby Gem socket.dev
    3. Thomas Roccia: Hijacked repos with backdated commits and CLAUDE.md DEVOPS-SEALED blocks x.com

    SafeDep first documented npm package side Oct 22; JFrog complementary GitHub infrastructure investigation; campaign shifted to native addon camouflage to evade scanners; addon environment checks skip CI/containers/sandboxes with <1.5GB RAM or 1 CPU

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    testmetest worm hijacks 42 GitHub repos with Claude/Gemini startup hooks
    Entry ID
    jfrog-testmetest-worm-2026-10
    Catalog review
    November 4, 2026
    Category
    attacks-on-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    confirmed