QUIETVAULT AI-assisted credential stealer
A JavaScript stealer takes GitHub and npm tokens and uses AI CLIs installed on the host to hunt for more secrets. Industry reports link it to s1ngularity-style npm attacks.
What happened
JavaScript stealer targeting GitHub and npm tokens; exfils via creating public GitHub repos. Also leverages AI prompts and installed AI CLI tools to search for other secrets on the host. Observed in operations; linked in industry reporting to Nx/s1ngularity-style supply-chain delivery.
Credential stealer that also abuses on-host AI CLIs with prompts to find more secrets
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · Trojanized npm package is installed
Industry reporting links the delivery to supply-chain campaigns.
Hunt: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Source for step 1 - 02 · JavaScript stealer searches for tokens
GitHub and npm credentials are primary targets.
Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Installed AI CLIs help find more secrets
Prompts and local model tools extend host-side secret discovery.
Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Secrets are posted to public repositories
The malware creates public GitHub repositories to exfiltrate collected data.
Hunt: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Trojanized npm packages (industry linkage to UNC6426 / s1ngularity-style campaigns). Reported impact: The malware creates public GitHub repositories to exfiltrate collected data.
Check these source-linked conditions against your setup.
The stealer reaches developer hosts through trojanized npm packages and can abuse installed AI CLIs.
Conditions to check- Confirm a trojanized package ran; the catalog does not identify a specific affected AI CLI product.
Source-linked applicability guidance. Confirm current scope in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Review suspicious npm installs, token use and AI CLI process trees; rotate confirmed exposed secrets.
Disable or gate AI CLIs in CI; rotate GitHub/npm tokens; hunt public s1ngularity-style repos
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01Trojanized npm package is installedDependency / CI trust boundaryCustom schema · Draft
Industry reporting links the delivery to supply-chain campaigns.
What to look for
A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Package-manager and CI job logs
- Lockfile / manifest / workflow diffs
- Runner process trees, secret access and egress
Coverage limit. Package installation and unfamiliar names are not malicious by themselves. Dependency resolution and CI audit records are required.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Dependency / CI trust boundary
id: 5fa9c45a-ac1c-4666-a598-e80626320997
status: experimental
description: A package or workflow change introduces a lifecycle hook, remote
dependency or new command that accesses secrets or external services.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- package.install
- ci.workflow.change
- package.lifecycle.exec
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("package.install", "ci.workflow.change", "package.lifecycle.exec")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Compare package provenance, publish identity, lifecycle scripts and resolved dependency URLs with the approved version.
- Correlate the install or workflow to secret reads and subsequent token use; distinguish exposure from confirmed compromise.
02JavaScript stealer searches for tokensSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft
GitHub and npm credentials are primary targets.
What to look for
An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
- Process identity and command lines
- Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs
Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- secret.read
- credential.store.read
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
- Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
03Installed AI CLIs help find more secretsUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft
Prompts and local model tools extend host-side secret discovery.
What to look for
Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
- Tool-definition and approval changes
- Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available
Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- agent.tool.call
- agent.tool.definition.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
- Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
04Secrets are posted to public repositoriesPrivate access → public repository artifactCustom schema · Draft
The malware creates public GitHub repositories to exfiltrate collected data.
What to look for
A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue, repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Git-provider organization / enterprise audit
- Repository and token permission inventory
- Agent tool and secret-scanning / DLP records
Coverage limit. Git-provider audit completeness depends on product and plan. Not every file read or issue body is present in organization audit logs.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Private access → public repository artifact
id: b7b2d3f0-8170-4225-accb-c20633364ef4
status: experimental
description: A token or agent reads private material and creates a public issue,
repository, commit or visibility change inconsistent with the approved task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- repository.public.write
- repository.visibility.change
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("repository.public.write", "repository.visibility.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Join access and public-write actions by actor / token and time; inspect visibility changes and newly created repositories.
- Verify whether the artifact contains sensitive data using approved scanning, retaining original source qualifications.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI credential theft
- Initial access
- Trojanized npm packages (industry linkage to UNC6426 / s1ngularity-style campaigns)
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- On-host AI CLI tools
- crafted AI prompts for secret discovery
Other tooling
- GitHub API for exfil repos
- npm token theft
Targets and reported impact
- Reported scale / exposure
- Observed in operations 2025
Reported attribution
GTIG QUIETVAULT; industry links to UNC6426 / s1ngularity cluster
Structured attribution
- Actor
- GTIG QUIETVAULT
Detection rules
- Review attack-specific indicatorsGUIDANCE
Monitor for the techniques described in QUIETVAULT AI-assisted credential stealer. Refer to sources for specific IOCs and TTPs.
Source defensive notes
Disable or gate AI CLIs in CI; rotate GitHub/npm tokens; hunt public s1ngularity-style repos
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
The stealer uses local AI tools to search for additional secrets. Source
Sources & research credit
2 sourcesResearch by Google Threat Intelligence Group · Google GTIG
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- QUIETVAULT AI-assisted credential stealer
- Entry ID
- quietvault-gtig-2025
- Catalog review
- October 20, 2026
- Category
- attacks-on-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- confirmed