Detection queries Not classified

SOCRadar XaocMail ClickFix delivers Phantom53 and HavoX, built with Claude Code

SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (published Nov 13, 2026) describes a Russian-speaking operator chaining XaocMail, Phantom53, and HavoX (Havoc Demon). Preparation began in October 2025. Phishing tests and…

What happened

SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (published Nov 13, 2026) describes a Russian-speaking operator chaining XaocMail, Phantom53, and HavoX (Havoc Demon). Preparation began in October 2025. Phishing tests and framework development continued in early 2026. The operation launched in August 2026 and was still active at publication. XaocMail, on 185.224.132.148:8585, builds per-victim document-sharing lures (Google Docs, Adobe Acrobat, Office365, SecuredDocs) and stores landing JSON in Cloudflare KV. Emails point at hxxps://securedoc.[subdomain].workers.dev/?id={linkId}. The ClickFix page offers three Win+R paths: a PowerShell DownloadString cradle, mshta against /h?id=X (an earlier ZIP of GUP.exe sideloading libcurl.dll), and msiexec /i .../m?id=X /qn, which SOCRadar calls the active path. The MSI impersonates names such as Visual Studio Tools, Python, or Node.js and drops Python 3.11 under a random directory in AppData or LocalAppData. A pythonw scheduled task runs the beacon every 12 minutes. A second task runs the watcher every 3 minutes. The beacon is a .pyd named like a real package (cv2.pyd, with PyInit_cv2, and the same pattern for numpy, PIL, and lxml). It beacons over DNS-over-HTTPS to Cloudflare, Google, and ControlD, encoding commands in AAAA records, with UDP/53 as a fallback, and a week-keyed SHA256 DGA on .xyz. CMD_WAKE writes an IPC file so the watcher reflectively loads an AES-GCM HavoX blob in memory. If the MSI is not elevated it can show a UAC prompt for a product-named task, and a separate payload uses fodhelper.exe registry hijacking. Payload aliases include a Level RMM drop from downloads.level.io and an AI-secret stealer covering Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Windsurf, and other AI tools, plus password-manager, browser, SSH, git, wallet, and messaging collection. SOCRadar's AI evidence is on the operator side: .claude/settings.json, 143 numbered NNN-task-name.md files across adminka (25), implant_v3 (31), and implant_v4 (87), a 117 KB implant_v4/arch.md, and implant_v4/.tasks/prompts/noav-beacon-test.md, a Russian prompt for a claudeg5f-tmux Claude wrapper that tells the agent to install a test MSI on a VM named NoAV under an authorized red-team framing. HavoX's login panel and an exfiltration path are on 145.63.138.67. Almost a thousand personalized pages were identified. Named target countries are Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia, and Spain, across technology, finance, education, government, logistics, and manufacturing. SOCRadar did not confirm attacker intent beyond the footholds.

SOCRadar found Claude Code project files, 143 numbered task markdown files, a 117 KB architecture note, and a Russian prompt that frames implant testing as an authorized red-team job.

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · XaocMail sends the lure

    A self-hosted panel writes a per-victim landing page to Cloudflare KV and emails a workers.dev link.

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · ClickFix runs the MSI

    The page asks the user to run msiexec /i against /m?id=, or an older mshta or PowerShell path.

    Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

    Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · pythonw beacon over DoH

    Python 3.11 in AppData runs cv2.pyd every 12 minutes and a watcher every 3 minutes. Commands return inside DNS AAAA answers.

    Hunt: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.

    Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · Claude Code built the implant

    The operator tree has .claude/settings.json, 143 numbered task files, a 117 KB arch.md, and a Russian authorized-red-team test prompt.

    Hunt: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

    Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · HavoX in memory and AI-secret theft

    CMD_WAKE loads the Havoc Demon reflectively. Aliases include Level RMM and a stealer for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, and Windsurf.

    Hunt: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

    Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

    Source for step 5

Why it matters

Reported entry point: Spearphishing links from XaocMail to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages that ask the user to run msiexec, mshta, or a PowerShell cradle. Reported impact: CMD_WAKE loads the Havoc Demon reflectively. Aliases include Level RMM and a stealer for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, and Windsurf; reported targets include Technology, finance, education, government, logistics, and manufacturing. Almost a thousand personalized lure pages. No organization names are listed here; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Block ClickFix paste-and-run. Alert when explorer.exe starts msiexec.exe with a workers.dev URL, when mshta.exe fetches an HTTP URL, and when pythonw.exe runs a .pyw from AppData and loads a .pyd outside a normal Python install. Hunt scheduled tasks named like MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler, or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask with a short random suffix. Treat DoH from pythonw.exe to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, or 76.76.2.11 as suspicious when paired with those tasks.

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01XaocMail sends the lureLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

A self-hosted panel writes a per-victim landing page to Cloudflare KV and emails a workers.dev link.

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02ClickFix runs the MSISuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft

The page asks the user to run msiexec /i against /m?id=, or an older mshta or PowerShell path.

What to look for

A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
  • PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
  • Download / network and installer events

Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
  inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \powershell.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \wscript.exe
      - \cscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -enc
      - http
      - FromBase64String
      - "javascript:"
      - "vbscript:"
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
  2. Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
03pythonw beacon over DoHNew persistence → recurring executionCustom schema · Draft

Python 3.11 in AppData runs cv2.pyd every 12 minutes and a watcher every 3 minutes. Commands return inside DNS AAAA answers.

What to look for

A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is changed and later launches the same unexpected program.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific registry, scheduled-task, cron and startup-file changes
  • Process creation and file provenance
  • User / administrative change records

Coverage limit. Windows and Unix persistence require different collectors. A configuration change without a subsequent launch is not proof that persistence ran.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - New persistence → recurring execution
id: 6154ff56-2978-45fa-aecd-86d91557f32e
status: experimental
description: A task, Run key, cron entry, shell profile, or startup file is
  changed and later launches the same unexpected program.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - persistence.create
      - persistence.modify
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("persistence.create", "persistence.modify")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Diff the persistence artifact and identify the creating process / principal.
  2. Correlate the subsequent launch and network behavior; baseline deployment and management agents.
04Claude Code built the implantUnexpected agent tool useCustom schema · Draft

The operator tree has .claude/settings.json, 143 numbered task files, a 117 KB arch.md, and a Russian authorized-red-team test prompt.

What to look for

Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Agent tool-call audit records with session / tool / destination
  • Tool-definition and approval changes
  • Endpoint process, file-access and network evidence where available

Coverage limit. Process logs cannot recover model intent. Remote connectors and in-process interpreters may produce no local child process. Prompt content alone is not a reliable signature.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected agent tool use
id: c709e384-0e11-479e-ab4d-3a06e2431e4b
status: experimental
description: Untrusted content or a changed tool definition precedes a file
  read, command, or remote call outside the user's intended task.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - agent.tool.call
      - agent.tool.definition.change
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("agent.tool.call", "agent.tool.definition.change")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Join input provenance, tool descriptions and calls by session ID and compare the action to the approved task.
  2. Inspect child processes and destinations; record whether execution was in-process, local, or through a remote SaaS connector.
05HavoX in memory and AI-secret theftSensitive store access → credential useCustom schema · Draft

CMD_WAKE loads the Havoc Demon reflectively. Aliases include Level RMM and a stealer for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, and Windsurf.

What to look for

An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • File-read / API access telemetry for relevant secret stores
  • Process identity and command lines
  • Identity, token and outbound-network audit logs

Coverage limit. Defender DeviceFileEvents is not a general file-read audit trail. Collect suitable object-access, EDR or application logs; legitimate developer tools also read secrets.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Sensitive store access → credential use
id: 46c46c62-2d83-4198-a8bf-d6637094527b
status: experimental
description: An unexpected process or tool accesses credential stores and is
  followed by token use or outbound transfer inconsistent with the owner.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - secret.read
      - credential.store.read
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("secret.read", "credential.store.read")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Identify the actor, process and exact store touched, then pivot to token use from new devices or infrastructure.
  2. Correlate reads with egress and rotate affected credentials after confirming exposure.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS

Attack context

AI's role
AI as operator
Additional role
AI credential theft
Initial access
Spearphishing links from XaocMail to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages that ask the user to run msiexec, mshta, or a PowerShell cradle

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

Other tooling

  • XaocMail phishing panel
  • Phantom53 DoH beacon and watcher (.pyd under pythonw.exe)
  • HavoX / Havoc Demon, reflective load
  • Cloudflare Workers and KV
  • msiexec, mshta, PowerShell (LOLBAS)
  • GUP.exe sideloading libcurl.dll (HijackLibs), earlier path
  • fodhelper.exe UAC bypass (LOLBAS)
  • Level RMM (LOLRMM)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
Technology, finance, education, government, logistics, and manufacturing. Almost a thousand personalized lure pages. No organization names are listed here.
Reported scale / exposure
Almost a thousand personalized XaocMail pages. 143 Claude Code task files. implant_v4/arch.md is 117 KB. No victim-host count was published.
Target geography
Brazil · Peru · India · Indonesia · Spain

Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia, and Spain are the countries SOCRadar names. The article also describes the set as Latin America, Asia, and Europe. Operator language is not a victim region.

Reported attribution

Unnamed Russian-speaking operator. SOCRadar does not name a country or a tracked cluster.

Structured attribution

Actor
Unnamed Russian-speaking operator
Motivation
cybercrime
Attributed by
SOCRadar Threat Research Unit
Attribution confidence
low

Detection rules

  • Suspicious Msiexec Quiet Install From Remote LocationSIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. msiexec /i against a remote URL with a quiet flag. Matches the active ClickFix path msiexec /i .../m?id= /qn.

  • Windows MSIExec Remote DownloadSPLUNKView rule

    Windows endpoint. msiexec retrieving a remote package. Same active delivery path.

  • Remotely Hosted HTA File Executed Via Mshta.EXESIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. mshta.exe with an http URL. Matches the earlier /h?id= path that fetched GUP.exe and libcurl.dll.

  • Potential DLL Sideloading Of Libcurl.DLL Via GUP.EXESIGMAView rule

    Windows image load. GUP.exe loading libcurl.dll. SOCRadar assigns this to the previous HTA ZIP, not the current MSI.

  • Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64SIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. Encoded PowerShell. Phantom53 CMD_EXEC runs powershell -EncodedCommand.

  • Bypass UAC via Fodhelper.exeSIGMAView rule

    Windows process creation. fodhelper.exe UAC bypass, which SOCRadar lists as a payload alias.

  • Local Scheduled Task CreationELASTICView rule

    Windows. New scheduled task. The MSI registers beacon and watcher tasks. Elevated installs use COM ITaskFolder::RegisterTask and do not spawn schtasks.exe.

  • Windows Scheduled Task Created Via XMLSPLUNKView rule

    Windows. Task registration from XML. SOCRadar says the non-elevated path writes p53_task_a.xml and p53_task_b.xml.

  • pythonw, DoH, and Level RMMGUIDANCE

    No cited rule names pythonw.exe loading cv2.pyd from AppData, DoH POST to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, or 76.76.2.11, or the Level RMM MSI. The schtasks.exe creation rule is not cited because the elevated path does not spawn schtasks.exe. Also hunt 145.63.138.67 and 185.224.132.148.

Activity timeline

First seen
2025-10
Last updated
2026-11-13

Updates

  • 2025-10 — SOCRadar

    Operators test malware and Cloudflare infrastructure. Development continues through early 2026.

  • 2026-08 — SOCRadar

    XaocMail phishing launches. The operation is still active at publication.

  • 2026-11-13 — SOCRadar

    STRU publishes the XaocMail, Phantom53, and HavoX chain, including the Claude Code task files and 145.63.138.67

Source defensive notes

Block ClickFix paste-and-run. Alert when explorer.exe starts msiexec.exe with a workers.dev URL, when mshta.exe fetches an HTTP URL, and when pythonw.exe runs a .pyw from AppData and loads a .pyd outside a normal Python install. Hunt scheduled tasks named like MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler, or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask with a short random suffix. Treat DoH from pythonw.exe to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, or 76.76.2.11 as suspicious when paired with those tasks.

MITRE ATLAS

AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.

AML.T0016.002Generative AI

Claude Code task files, settings, and a Russian test prompt show the operator used a Claude agent to build and test the implant Source

AML.T0054LLM Jailbreak

The NoAV prompt frames the job as authorized red-team work so the agent stays on task Source

AML.T0055Unsecured Credentials

A payload alias steals secrets from Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Windsurf, and other AI tools Source

AML.T0052Phishing

XaocMail sends document-sharing phishing links to Cloudflare Worker ClickFix pages Source

Indicators of compromise

domains

  • dns.timesyncserver-312453.com
  • securedoc.makeneg458.workers.dev
  • securedoc.mesuttgulerr573.workers.dev
  • linkrot.fypahedupal2-0maz.workers.dev
  • sync-node-serv.com
  • dns.cdn-syncnode-server.com
  • a8f2aac37385.xyz
  • kfkwrfdd.xyz
  • 544504d7fe1e.xyz
  • bestutyresdomaonupder.com

ips

  • 185.224.132.148
  • 145.63.138.67
  • 162.252.198.204
  • 162.252.199.92
  • 94.156.152.7
  • 91.132.93.251
  • 176.9.154.69

hashes

  • bceeb2d54b6a756c73a3e06617e9e95ad4d8e53da47639bcd6ef3cae98c6da6d
  • 7055483a77f679ad569c3a9bfe76cdb8e5b96efc44d2bf2a6f08e930add598b0
  • 4f656834e545c0b44922ce6d8952989c8c0859d8ae8b1f117c06ab07b047e2b4
  • 8ebb2bf61b48ae7abdcd674413bebd79b30ddd945854e175ba60d56c0a3adf54
  • a4ad001c6900176eba43a747ae5d212db6fc78f7ef4e777f276cbbdf8099dbe8
  • 0aff424f9a02eb9f429119c4caa05e85fc952603549d69849e745293d20235d6

urls

    Sources & research credit

    1 source

    Research by SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) · SOCRadar

    1. XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe socradar.io

    Chain, timings, Claude Code artifacts, and IOCs are from the SOCRadar article. Operator mailbox addresses in that IOC table are omitted. Victim names and stolen-file contents are not included. The article lists additional MSI and payload hashes beyond the set below. Havoc is the public framework; HavoX is SOCRadar's name for this operator's Demon build.

    Record & downloads
    Source record name
    SOCRadar XaocMail ClickFix delivers Phantom53 and HavoX, built with Claude Code
    Entry ID
    socradar-xaocmail-phantom53-claude-code-2026-11
    Catalog review
    November 15, 2026
    Category
    adversary-use-of-ai
    AI involvement confidence
    confirmed