Symantec - AI-assisted commands revived a stalled intrusion at a US retailer
Symantec Threat Hunter Team (Broadcom; SECURITY.COM article created Nov 16, 2026) describes a September 2026 intrusion at a U.S. retailer. The initial access vector is unknown. The earliest activity, Sep…
What happened
Symantec Threat Hunter Team (Broadcom; SECURITY.COM article created Nov 16, 2026) describes a September 2026 intrusion at a U.S. retailer. The initial access vector is unknown. The earliest activity, Sep 18, was on three Microsoft SQL Server hosts, with cmd.exe running under sqlservr.exe, which Symantec treats as likely xp_cmdshell. Some of those commands were already long PowerShell scripts with quoted section labels. The scripts searched point-of-sale synchronization directories for stored passwords and connection strings, tested egress to 155.254.22[.]215:9458, and on one host appended base64 text under ProgramData, decoded it with Certutil, and compiled it with csc.exe. The source was EfsPotato (https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato). The payload saved the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives. On Sep 21 an internet-facing IIS server appeared, with commands under w3wp.exe. On Sep 22 the commands looked hand-typed: 110 actions, three typos including systemifo and pwoershell, average length about 45 characters. Loaders were killed by security software, including a Bitdefender bdreinit.exe sideload of log.dll and log.txt from 204.194.49[.]129:8080, a pairing also seen with ShadowPad loaders and not unique to one actor. The operators reran that loader about five times in 20 minutes. They also staged an AES PowerShell reverse shell, server.ps1, toward 166.0.25[.]106:443 with a fallback host at 154.81.37[.]136, and wrote ASP webshells filemanager.asp and qwdajhsd.asp. On Sep 23 they staged a G DATA ask.exe/ask.dll sideload and BreakChainC.exe, then switched to about 50 long, error-free PowerShell scripts over about two hours. Banners included ===FILES MENTIONING CONN STRINGS===. Comments stated a hypothesis, cited earlier results, and revised a conclusion, which Symantec reads as model reasoning pasted into a webshell. The scripts collected connection strings, the FileZilla Server user database, WinSCP, PuTTY, and RDP settings, IIS configuration, and Windows logon registry values. They found SolarWinds Orion, read its bundled RabbitMQ .erlang.cookie, and ran Orion's erl.exe so rpc:call reached os:cmd on a second server. The command was passed as decimal character codes. That was about 10 minutes after the first Orion query. Later the same day BreakChainCs.exe relaunched the sideloaded binaries through WMI and shell modes so they were no longer children of w3wp.exe. From Sep 24 to Sep 29 the activity reached more SQL servers, a host that looks like a domain controller, Chisel, a password sprayer, and searches for NTDS.dit, Group Policy Preferences passwords, and LAPS. No data theft or encryption was observed. Symantec's financial-motive reading rests on the point-of-sale password search, contact with 155.254.22[.]215 (named in a separate Sep 22 Gambit Security report as an AI console tied to card-skimming activity), and later domain-credential theft that could be ransomware preparation. Loader files and the staging server overlap an August intrusion elsewhere and a July intrusion at a securities firm; neither of those showed AI assistance. Yuze (https://github.com/P001water/yuze) was used in the August case back to 204.194.49[.]129. Trend Micro has documented Yuze use by Warlock operators (Symantec Longlegs, also known as Storm-2603). Symantec does not attribute this intrusion to them. ATT&CK techniques in the report include T1574.002, T1505.003, T1552.001, T1021, and T1003.002.
Symantec rates AI assistance high confidence and an operator-in-the-loop, rather than an autonomous agent, at moderate confidence. The model was not identified. Gaps between scripts never fell below seven seconds.
How it happened
Read the flow as text & sources
A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.
- 01 · SQL Server and IIS command shells
From Sep 18, cmd.exe runs under sqlservr.exe. From Sep 21, commands run under w3wp.exe. Symantec does not identify the initial entry vector.
Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Source for step 1 - 02 · Hand-typed commands stall
Sep 22 commands include typos such as systemifo and pwoershell. Security software kills staged loaders, including the bdreinit.exe and log.dll pair, and the operators retry without changing approach.
Hunt: A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.
Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.
Source for step 2 - 03 · Long labelled scripts
On Sep 23 about 50 error-free PowerShell scripts run in about two hours, with section banners and comments Symantec reads as model reasoning. Pauses fit an operator pasting the next script.
Hunt: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Source for step 3 - 04 · Orion cookie reaches a second server
About 10 minutes after the first Orion query, the operators read the RabbitMQ cookie and use the bundled erl.exe rpc:call path to run a command on a second server. Later activity dumps credential hives. No encryption was observed.
Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Source for step 4
Why it matters
Reported entry point: Unknown. The first observed commands were cmd.exe under sqlservr.exe on SQL Server, consistent with xp_cmdshell, and later cmd.exe under w3wp.exe on IIS. Reported impact: About 10 minutes after the first Orion query, the operators read the RabbitMQ cookie and use the bundled erl.exe rpc:call path to run a command on a second server. Later activity dumps credential hives. No encryption was observed; reported targets include A U.S. retail organization. Internet-facing IIS and at least six further servers, most of them Microsoft SQL Server. Point-of-sale synchronization scripts were searched for passwords; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.
What you can do
Protection & prevention
Alert when w3wp.exe or sqlservr.exe spawns cmd.exe or PowerShell, and when xp_cmdshell is used. Treat a same-directory unsigned DLL next to bdreinit.exe or ask.exe as sideloading. Alert on csc.exe compiling from ProgramData or a user-writable path, on Chisel client arguments, and on reg save of SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY. Hunt Orion's bundled erl.exe making rpc:call with a cookie, and ASP files dropped in the web application's image directory. A sudden change from short mistyped commands to long labelled scripts is an investigation lead, not a benign automation signature. Restrict xp_cmdshell, the Erlang distribution port, and the RabbitMQ cookie file.
Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.
Detection queries
Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.
Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.
01SQL Server and IIS command shellsSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft
From Sep 18, cmd.exe runs under sqlservr.exe. From Sep 21, commands run under w3wp.exe. Symantec does not identify the initial entry vector.
What to look for
A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
cmd.exe under sqlservr.exe and commands under w3wp.exe. The initial entry vector is unknown.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
- PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
- Download / network and installer events
Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \wscript.exe
- \cscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- -enc
- http
- FromBase64String
- "javascript:"
- "vbscript:"
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
02Hand-typed commands stallDLL loaded from a user-writable locationNative logs · Draft
Sep 22 commands include typos such as systemifo and pwoershell. Security software kills staged loaders, including the bdreinit.exe and log.dll pair, and the operators retry without changing approach.
What to look for
A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.
bdreinit.exe with log.dll and ask.exe with ask.dll loaded from the same directory. Hand-typed typos are not a detection.
Visibility: Windows image-load telemetry where collected
Required logs
- Windows image-load events such as Sysmon Event 7 or EDR equivalents
- File provenance, signature, and process ancestry
- Subsequent network and payload activity
Coverage limit. Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.
DLL image loads from common user-writable paths. Confirm the initiating executable is trusted and the loaded module is unexpected before treating the event as sideloading.
MCP reference matches: Microsoft Defender Blocked from Loading Unsigned DLL (SigmaHQ). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.
Sigma
title: Hunt - DLL Load From User-Writable Location
id: a5e6a4a2-be30-4a0a-8559-5f9a2623403e
status: experimental
description: Detects DLL image loads from common user-writable Windows paths.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
falsepositives:
- Portable, development, and self-updating applications
level: medium
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_path:
ImageLoaded|contains:
- \Downloads\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \Windows\Temp\
- \Users\Public\
selection_dll:
ImageLoaded|endswith: .dll
condition: all of selection_*
KQL
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName endswith ".dll"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\", "\\Windows\\Temp\\", "\\Users\\Public\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7
ImageLoaded="*.dll"
(ImageLoaded="*\\Downloads\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*"
OR ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\Users\\Public\\*")
| table _time host User Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus Hashes ProcessGuid
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Verify the executable and DLL signatures, original archive or installer, hashes, and load path.
- Compare the DLL name/location with the vendor's expected installation and correlate child activity.
03Long labelled scriptsSuspicious Windows script executionNative logs · Draft
On Sep 23 about 50 error-free PowerShell scripts run in about two hours, with section banners and comments Symantec reads as model reasoning. Pauses fit an operator pasting the next script.
What to look for
A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
Long PowerShell submitted through the existing shell. Section banners are content, not a process-name signal.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Windows process creation: Sysmon Event 1 or Defender DeviceProcessEvents
- PowerShell script-block logging when enabled
- Download / network and installer events
Coverage limit. Encoded commands and remote administration can be legitimate. This does not cover every script host, in-process execution, or non-Windows branch.
Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Suspicious Windows script execution
id: 2bb88802-9f03-4d99-a192-fe44c9484e8b
status: experimental
description: A script host or shell runs encoded content, a remote URL, or
inline script syntax, then downloads or launches a payload.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \wscript.exe
- \cscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- -enc
- http
- FromBase64String
- "javascript:"
- "vbscript:"
condition: selection
KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-enc" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http" or ProcessCommandLine contains "FromBase64String" or ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "vbscript:"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp descSPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe")
CommandLine IN ("*-enc*", "*http*", "*FromBase64String*", "*javascript:*", "*vbscript:*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Follow the parent and child process tree and recover the script or URL from logs without executing it.
- Correlate the payload's signer/hash, persistence, and network activity; baseline approved automation.
04Orion cookie reaches a second serverUnexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft
About 10 minutes after the first Orion query, the operators read the RabbitMQ cookie and use the bundled erl.exe rpc:call path to run a command on a second server. Later activity dumps credential hives. No encryption was observed.
What to look for
A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
The second-server command used Orion's bundled erl.exe. Later hive saves came from an EfsPotato payload. The generic payload query does not name either.
Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected
Required logs
- Platform-specific process and file provenance
- Signer / hash and software inventory
- Per-process network and remote-session records
Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.
Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.
Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
- Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
category: application
product: openattacks_audit
definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
selection:
EventType:
- process.unapproved.exec
- remote.session.start
condition: selection
KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated descSPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _timeInvestigation steps
- Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
- Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
Technical detailsTooling, impact & MITRE ATLAS
Attack context
- AI's role
- AI as operator
- Initial access
- Unknown. The first observed commands were cmd.exe under sqlservr.exe on SQL Server, consistent with xp_cmdshell, and later cmd.exe under w3wp.exe on IIS.
Tooling as reported
AI products, models and artifacts
- Unidentified model. Symantec assesses AI-written PowerShell with an operator relaying output, not an autonomous agent.
Other tooling
- EfsPotato (https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato), compiled on the server with csc.exe
- Chisel (https://github.com/jpillora/chisel)
- Yuze (https://github.com/P001water/yuze), seen in the overlapping August intrusion
- Bitdefender bdreinit.exe sideloading log.dll
- G DATA ask.exe sideloading ask.dll
- BreakChainC.exe and BreakChainCs.exe
- ASP webshells filemanager.asp and qwdajhsd.asp
- PowerShell
Targets and reported impact
- Targets / sectors
- A U.S. retail organization. Internet-facing IIS and at least six further servers, most of them Microsoft SQL Server. Point-of-sale synchronization scripts were searched for passwords.
- Reported scale / exposure
- Sep 18 through at least Sep 29, 2026. On Sep 23, about 50 scripts in about two hours, median length over 500 characters, against about 45 characters for the earlier hand-typed commands. About 10 minutes from the first Orion query to command execution on a second server. No theft or encryption observed in this intrusion.
- Target geography
- United States
The primary victim is a U.S. retailer. The August and July overlaps are different organizations and are not given countries in the retailer write-up.
Reported attribution
Unnamed. Symantec does not tie the activity to Warlock, Longlegs, or Storm-2603. ShadowPad-associated sideloading and Yuze are shared with other actors and are not treated as an attribution.
Structured attribution
- Actor
- Unnamed
- Country
- Unknown
- Motivation
- financially-motivated
- Attributed by
- Symantec Threat Hunter Team (Broadcom)
- Attribution confidence
- low
Detection rules
- Suspicious Process By Web Server ProcessSIGMAView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for w3wp. Windows process creation. A web-server parent, including w3wp.exe, spawning a suspicious child. Matches commands Symantec saw under the IIS worker. It does not match sqlservr.exe as the parent.
- Suspicious Child Process Of SQL ServerSIGMAView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for sqlservr. Windows process creation. sqlservr.exe spawning cmd.exe, PowerShell, or another listed child. Matches the Sep 18 pattern Symantec reads as xp_cmdshell.
- MSSQL XPCmdshell Suspicious ExecutionSIGMAView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for xp_cmdshell. Windows application log. MSSQL audit event 33205 whose data contains object_name:xp_cmdshell and statement:EXEC. Requires the xp_cmdshell audit policy. The process-creation rule above still applies when that audit policy is off.
- Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading In Same Process PathSPLUNKView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for DLL side-loading. Sysmon image load. An unsigned DLL loaded from the same directory as the process, outside Windows and Program Files. Fits bdreinit.exe with log.dll and ask.exe with ask.dll staged in the same folder. A signed decoy executable does not have to be on a named-binary list.
- Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe ImpersonationELASTICView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for Potato. The rule cites https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato and alerts on Sysmon pipe-creation event 17 when the pipe path contains a nested Pipe segment. It does not match the string EfsPotato. The Splunk Potato-family rule's file-name list does not include EfsPotato, so that rule is not cited. A renamed compile can still miss a name-based hunt.
- Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXESIGMAView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for csc.exe. Windows process creation. csc.exe whose command line points at ProgramData, Temp, or another listed user-writable location. Symantec compiled under ProgramData. The rule filters a w3wp.exe parent, so a compile whose parent is only the IIS worker does not match.
- PUA - Chisel Tunneling Tool ExecutionSIGMAView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search for chisel. Windows process creation. Image ending in chisel.exe, or command lines with client/server and reverse, socks, or r: arguments. Symantec's Chisel detection on Sep 25 was on a Windows host. The Linux Chisel rule is not cited.
- Windows Registry Entries Exported Via RegSPLUNKView rule
Selected from a security-detections-mcp search under T1003.002. Endpoint process data. reg.exe with save or export. Symantec says the EfsPotato payload saved the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives. This matches that copy when it is reg.exe. A custom writer that does not call reg.exe will not match.
- Erlang rpc:call and the Orion cookieGUIDANCE
security-detections-mcp search for erl.exe returned no rule. Nothing in the index alerts on Orion's bundled erl.exe, rpc:call, or a read of .erlang.cookie. Hunt process creation for erl.exe under the Orion Erlang path with -setcookie and rpc:call. ASP names filemanager.asp and qwdajhsd.asp, and BreakChainC.exe, are also absent from the index; the w3wp child-process rule covers shells spawned from the web worker, not the ASP file drop by itself.
Activity timeline
- First seen
- 2026-09-18
- Last updated
- 2026-11-16
Updates
- 2026-09-18 — Symantec Threat Hunter Team
First activity on three SQL Server hosts. Labelled PowerShell searches point-of-sale sync folders, tests egress to 155.254.22[.]215:9458, and compiles EfsPotato on one host.
- 2026-09-21 — Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Commands start under w3wp.exe on the internet-facing web server, then pause for about 12 hours.
- 2026-09-22 — Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Hand-typed commands with typos. bdreinit.exe/log.dll from 204.194.49[.]129:8080 is killed on each retry. server.ps1 and two ASP webshells are staged.
- 2026-09-23 — Symantec Threat Hunter Team
About 50 long scripts in about two hours. Orion's Erlang cookie is used to run a command on a second server roughly 10 minutes after the first Orion query. BreakChainCs.exe follows.
- 2026-09-24 — Symantec Threat Hunter Team
Further SQL hosts save registry hives. Activity continues through at least Sep 29, including Chisel, NTDS.dit searches, and a password sprayer.
- 2026-11-16 — Symantec Threat Hunter Team
SECURITY.COM publishes the retailer write-up. AI assistance is high confidence; the operator-in-the-loop reading is moderate; the model is unidentified.
Source defensive notes
Alert when w3wp.exe or sqlservr.exe spawns cmd.exe or PowerShell, and when xp_cmdshell is used. Treat a same-directory unsigned DLL next to bdreinit.exe or ask.exe as sideloading. Alert on csc.exe compiling from ProgramData or a user-writable path, on Chisel client arguments, and on reg save of SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY. Hunt Orion's bundled erl.exe making rpc:call with a cookie, and ASP files dropped in the web application's image directory. A sudden change from short mistyped commands to long labelled scripts is an investigation lead, not a benign automation signature. Restrict xp_cmdshell, the Erlang distribution port, and the RabbitMQ cookie file.
MITRE ATLAS
AI-specific catalog annotations based on the reported behavior; these are not MITRE case-study assignments.
Symantec says the operators obtained working PowerShell, including the Orion cookie handoff, from an AI tool after hand-typed commands failed. Source
The AI-assisted phase was long PowerShell submitted through the webshell and through SQL Server command execution. Source
The scripts collected connection strings, client settings, the Erlang cookie, and registry hives that hold credential material. Source
Indicators of compromise
domains
ips
204.194.49[.]129166.0.25[.]106154.81.37[.]136155.254.22[.]215108.165.20[.]205
hashes
54fb493822bcd832f7b2256015f13e3dfde815e1931e7fd39a90ea8ad3fdbd0a9c866c403e6bd5778fa3788cac9aac39aab1bf2d18a22c9999a4c27e30c0abf3e95a265bf220a4330f77f842b3eeed8b1ed8c61f51d7e3f2fd33bac14b6b26af7265d69dd8d8939dc888ce5f05190ce200ee2660f928f3b84f60e6a7b33832053d79628bf7804dbf17e7b396ecd62ebf5d66518940c6d23daccf59a20953438af8b67854d119da08c704b78f7c9fae0501417f5e63ffece86d2e811f1c7dea685db5e7f655c4ee94411df8110d1b6d02bb15574ac199fa7a553ce6c3cb25bf03
urls
hxxp://166[.]0[.]25[.]106/server.ps1hxxp://154[.]81[.]37[.]136/server.ps1hxxp://204[.]194[.]49[.]129:8080/log.dllhxxp://204[.]194[.]49[.]129:8080/bdreinit.exehxxp://108[.]165[.]20[.]205:8080/sqlrun2.ps1
Sources & research credit
6 sourcesResearch by Symantec Threat Hunter Team · Broadcom
- How AI revived a stalled attack on a U.S. retailer www.security.com
- How AI revived a stalled attack on a U.S. retailer www.security.com
- How AI revived a stalled attack on a U.S. retailer www.broadcom.com
- EfsPotato github.com
- Chisel github.com
- Yuze github.com
Dates, typos, script counts, the Orion cookie path, the decimal-encoded rpc:call, and the published hashes are from the Symantec article at https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/ai-assisted-attack-us-retailer (canonical; the blog-post URL serves the same title). The article's createdDate is 2026-11-16. Symantec lists many additional file hashes; the set below is the named tooling from that table, not every unnamed suspicious file. Yuze's Warlock reporting is Symantec's summary of Trend Micro, and Symantec says it is not an attribution. Link the August staging overlap only as Symantec describes it.
Record & downloads
- Source record name
- Symantec - AI-assisted commands revived a stalled intrusion at a US retailer
- Entry ID
- symantec-ai-revived-retailer-intrusion-2026-11
- Catalog review
- November 17, 2026
- Category
- adversary-use-of-ai
- AI involvement confidence
- vendor-asserted