Detection queries Not classified

Yoba campaign - fake GPT-6/Claude desktop apps via DLL sideloading

Campaign creates fake GitHub projects (gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop, gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io, opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io) with GitHub.io pages impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, and Claude Opus…

What happened

Campaign creates fake GitHub projects (gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop, gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io, opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io) with GitHub.io pages impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, and Claude Opus desktop apps. ZIP installers contain legitimate signed OpenAI and Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper/YobaLoader DLLs. Uses DLL sideloading (T1574.002) to load malware indirectly from signed binaries. No fake engagement (stars/forks) but ranks highly via SEO poisoning on Google. Malware avoids dedicated C2 infrastructure, uses Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS. Russian-origin indicators; operates UTC-4 time zone. Releases Aug-Sep 2026, low detection rate, no password protection on ZIPs.

Fake GitHub projects impersonate GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus desktop applications to distribute malware via DLL sideloading

Read the original source

How it happened

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Select a stage · Drag to explore · + / − to zoom · Dashed edges are loopsSelect a stage · Arrows show reported connectionsReported sequence
Read the flow as text & sources

A catalog reconstruction of the supplied source account. Unknown steps remain explicit; an edge describes the reported relationship between steps.

  1. 01 · SEO poisoning and fake repositories

    Created fake GitHub repositories impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus; GitHub.io pages with download links; no fake engagement but ranks highly on Google via SEO poisoning

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 1
  2. 02 · User downloads fake installer

    Victim searches for AI desktop apps, finds malicious GitHub repositories via Google; downloads ZIP from GitHub releases (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip)

    Hunt: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

    Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

    Source for step 2
  3. 03 · DLL sideloading from signed binaries

    ZIP contains legitimate signed OpenAI/Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper DLL; when legitimate signed binary runs, it loads malicious DLL via DLL search order hijacking

    Hunt: A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.

    Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.

    Source for step 3
  4. 04 · YobaDropper deploys YobaLoader

    YobaDropper executes, deploys YobaLoader component; anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques; no password protection needed due to low detection

    Hunt: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

    Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

    Source for step 4
  5. 05 · C2 via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DoH

    YobaLoader contacts attacker infrastructure via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS; no dedicated C2 infrastructure for strong OPSEC; fetches final payload

    Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

    A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

    Source for step 5
  6. 06 · Final payload execution

    YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source

    Hunt: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

    A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

    Source for step 6

Why it matters

Reported entry point: SEO-poisoned search results leading to malicious GitHub repositories and GitHub.io pages; users download fake installer ZIPs from GitHub releases. Reported impact: YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source; reported targets include AI tool users searching for ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications; applicability to your setup has not been assessed, so verify affected versions, permissions, and configuration in the original report.

Read the original report

What you can do

Protection & prevention

Verify official AI tool sources; DLL sideloading detection; monitor GitHub releases for fake AI projects; SEO poisoning awareness; C2 infrastructure monitoring (Telegram, Tor, DNS over HTTPS)

Catalog defensive guidance based on the reported behavior. Confirm scope and current mitigations in the original source.

Review the original guidance
Investigate each phase

Detection queries

Draft query starters grouped by the attack stages where they apply.

Download stage pack

Start with the logs you collect. Each hunt identifies its required visibility, field mapping and limits. Queries are catalog-authored drafts using reusable behavior profiles; test with known activity and your normal baseline before alerting.

01SEO poisoning and fake repositoriesLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Created fake GitHub repositories impersonating GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-6 Astra, Claude Opus; GitHub.io pages with download links; no fake engagement but ranks highly on Google via SEO poisoning

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
02User downloads fake installerLure → user action / deliveryCustom schema · Draft

Victim searches for AI desktop apps, finds malicious GitHub repositories via Google; downloads ZIP from GitHub releases (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip)

What to look for

An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Email / secure-web-gateway records
  • Browser redirects, downloads and URL reputation
  • User reports and downstream execution / identity events

Coverage limit. Polished text, AI branding and a novel domain do not prove maliciousness or AI generation. Follow-on evidence matters.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Lure → user action / delivery
id: e0056b49-9905-485b-ac12-2aa076a7bc82
status: experimental
description: An impersonating message, ad or website leads to a suspicious
  download, consent request, pasted command or payment instruction.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - message.link.click
      - web.download
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("message.link.click", "web.download")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Reconstruct redirect and delivery provenance using original report indicators, without visiting payload URLs.
  2. Correlate the click with the actual download, consent or execution; verify the sender through an independent channel.
03DLL sideloading from signed binariesDLL loaded from a user-writable locationNative logs · Draft

ZIP contains legitimate signed OpenAI/Anthropic executables alongside malicious YobaDropper DLL; when legitimate signed binary runs, it loads malicious DLL via DLL search order hijacking

What to look for

A signed or trusted Windows executable loads an unexpected DLL from an archive, download, temp, or other user-writable directory, consistent with DLL search-order hijacking.

Visibility: Windows image-load telemetry where collected

Required logs

  • Windows image-load events such as Sysmon Event 7 or EDR equivalents
  • File provenance, signature, and process ancestry
  • Subsequent network and payload activity

Coverage limit. Portable and self-updating applications legitimately load DLLs from user paths. This broad hunt requires signer, prevalence, and application-specific tuning and will not cover in-memory modules.

DLL image loads from common user-writable paths. Confirm the initiating executable is trusted and the loaded module is unexpected before treating the event as sideloading.

MCP reference matches: Microsoft Defender Blocked from Loading Unsigned DLL (SigmaHQ). The query below is a catalog adaptation, not a verbatim upstream rule.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - DLL Load From User-Writable Location
id: a5e6a4a2-be30-4a0a-8559-5f9a2623403e
status: experimental
description: Detects DLL image loads from common user-writable Windows paths.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-11-06
falsepositives:
  - Portable, development, and self-updating applications
level: medium
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_path:
    ImageLoaded|contains:
      - \Downloads\
      - \AppData\Local\Temp\
      - \Windows\Temp\
      - \Users\Public\
  selection_dll:
    ImageLoaded|endswith: .dll
  condition: all of selection_*
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName endswith ".dll"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\", "\\Windows\\Temp\\", "\\Users\\Public\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7
ImageLoaded="*.dll"
(ImageLoaded="*\\Downloads\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*"
  OR ImageLoaded="*\\Windows\\Temp\\*" OR ImageLoaded="*\\Users\\Public\\*")
| table _time host User Image ImageLoaded Signed SignatureStatus Hashes ProcessGuid
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Verify the executable and DLL signatures, original archive or installer, hashes, and load path.
  2. Compare the DLL name/location with the vendor's expected installation and correlate child activity.
04YobaDropper deploys YobaLoaderUnapproved Windows program executionNative logs · Draft

YobaDropper executes, deploys YobaLoader component; anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques; no password protection needed due to low detection

What to look for

A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Windows process creation
  • Download provenance and file hashes
  • File certificate information and application-control audit / block events

Coverage limit. Many approved installers run from user-writable folders. These events are hunt candidates, not proof of malware or an enforced block.

Windows process candidates. Sigma uses normalized process_creation fields; KQL requires Defender for Endpoint; SPL requires the Sysmon XML sourcetype. Tune collectors, fields and baselines before use.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unapproved Windows program execution
id: e217e948-e57c-48b8-a331-66006de42ae1
status: experimental
description: A newly downloaded or staged executable runs from a user-writable
  location and exhibits the reported follow-on behavior.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|contains:
      - \Downloads\
      - \AppData\Local\Temp\
      - \AppData\Roaming\
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// Draft hunt; requires Defender for Endpoint process telemetry for this OS.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FolderPath contains "\\Downloads\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA1
| order by Timestamp desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image IN ("*\\Downloads\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Verify publisher, hash, origin, prevalence and local approval rather than trusting a product name or signature.
  2. Trace child processes and related credential, network or persistence events.
05C2 via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DoHUnexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft

YobaLoader contacts attacker infrastructure via Telegram, Tor, Catbox, DNS over HTTPS; no dedicated C2 infrastructure for strong OPSEC; fetches final payload

What to look for

A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

Correlate the loader process with Telegram, Tor, Catbox, or DoH activity; those services are not malicious by themselves.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific process and file provenance
  • Signer / hash and software inventory
  • Per-process network and remote-session records

Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - process.unapproved.exec
      - remote.session.start
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
  2. Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
06Final payload executionUnexpected payload / remote-access behaviorCustom schema · Draft

YobaLoader executes final payload on infected system; details of final payload capabilities not disclosed in source

What to look for

A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.

Visibility: Defender-side logs where collected

Required logs

  • Platform-specific process and file provenance
  • Signer / hash and software inventory
  • Per-process network and remote-session records

Coverage limit. A program name alone is not a signature. This normalized template requires the relevant platform collector and does not assert Windows-only policy coverage.

Custom-schema candidates, not out-of-box detectors. Map your application / cloud / platform logs to EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target and CorrelationId. KQL uses a custom OpenAttacksAudit_CL table; SPL uses openattacks:audit. EventType values are proposed normalization names, not native vendor event names. Correlation and environment-specific alert logic remain to be built.

Sigma
Draft SigmaDownload Sigma
title: Hunt - Unexpected payload / remote-access behavior
id: 998d4263-6e73-4472-a74d-cb4d61c28544
status: experimental
description: A program delivered by the reported lure executes, establishes
  access or contacts infrastructure outside the approved software baseline.
author: MagicSword OpenAttacks catalog
date: 2026-10-23
falsepositives:
  - Authorized activity matching this broad hunt; baseline and investigate
    before alerting.
level: low
logsource:
  category: application
  product: openattacks_audit
  definition: Custom normalized audit schema; map EventType, Actor, Asset, Action,
    Target and CorrelationId from the required source logs first.
detection:
  selection:
    EventType:
      - process.unapproved.exec
      - remote.session.start
  condition: selection
KQL
Draft KQLDownload KQL
// SCHEMA TEMPLATE: create/map this custom table before use; not a built-in Sentinel table.
// OpenAttacksAudit_CL: TimeGenerated(datetime), EventType/Actor/Asset/Action/Target/CorrelationId(string).
// Selects candidates only. Apply the stage hypothesis and correlation steps before alerting.
OpenAttacksAudit_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where EventType in ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Actor, Asset, Action, Target, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc
SPL
Draft SPLDownload SPL
sourcetype="openattacks:audit"
EventType IN ("process.unapproved.exec", "remote.session.start")
| table _time EventType Actor Asset Action Target CorrelationId
| sort - _time
Investigation steps
  1. Confirm the payload's operating system, origin and execution context before choosing a platform-specific rule.
  2. Correlate the launched program with child processes, persistence and network activity; verify authorization.
Technical detailsTooling, impact

Attack context

AI's role
AI tool as lure
Initial access
SEO-poisoned search results leading to malicious GitHub repositories and GitHub.io pages; users download fake installer ZIPs from GitHub releases

Tooling as reported

AI products, models and artifacts

  • GPT-5.6 Sol (fake)
  • GPT-6 Astra (fake)
  • Claude Opus (fake)

Other tooling

  • YobaDropper
  • YobaLoader
  • Legitimate signed OpenAI executables
  • Legitimate signed Anthropic executables
  • DLL sideloading
  • Telegram for C2
  • Tor
  • Catbox
  • DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

Targets and reported impact

Targets / sectors
AI tool users searching for ChatGPT and Claude desktop applications
Reported scale / exposure
3 fake GitHub repositories created Jul-Sep 2026; first malicious releases uploaded Aug 30, 2026; 3 ZIP installers (sol-setup.zip, GPT-6-Astra-Setup.zip, Setup-Claude.zip); low VirusTotal detection rates

Reported attribution

Yoba campaign; Russian-origin indicators (language, time zone); operates primarily UTC-4 time zone; different email addresses per repository suggest OPSEC to obscure true operational timezone

Source defensive notes

Verify official AI tool sources; DLL sideloading detection; monitor GitHub releases for fake AI projects; SEO poisoning awareness; C2 infrastructure monitoring (Telegram, Tor, DNS over HTTPS)

Indicators of compromise

domains

    ips

      hashes

        urls

        • https://github.com/gpt-5-6/sol-free-desktop
        • https://github.com/gpt-5-6/gpt-5-6.github.io
        • https://github.com/opus-5-0/opus-5-0.github.io
        • https://github.com/gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.github.io

        Sources & research credit

        1 source

        Research by Check Point Research · Check Point

        1. Tricks from the Past deployed via signed ChatGPT and Claude binaries research.checkpoint.com

        Check Point Research tracked campaign over two months; no password protection on ZIPs unlike typical malicious archives; low detection due to anti-sandbox and anti-analysis techniques

        Record & downloads
        Source record name
        Yoba campaign - fake GPT-6/Claude desktop apps via DLL sideloading
        Entry ID
        checkpoint-yoba-fake-ai-2026-10
        Catalog review
        November 4, 2026